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Abstract 
This study will explore the legal regulation and character of administrative contracts in 
Saudi Arabia, in order to prepare the ground for a critical investigation into arbitration 
agreements and clauses in administrative contracts. The site of scholarly focus will be 
directed to the legal characteristics of contracts caught by Saudi‟s public and 
administrative laws, with a special emphasis on the highly regulated and politically 
sensitive area of public procurement contract regulation. 
Set against this background, this thesis aims to provide a critical appraisal of the 
validity and enforcement of arbitration agreements and clauses in the context of 
administrative contracts. The proposed thesis will consider the potential impacts of 
Shariah on arbitration proceedings initiated in Saudi Arabia, with particular attention 
focused on the requirements of the applicable procedural and substantive laws.
1
  
Drawing on the administrative systems of France and Egypt, this thesis will consider 
how other civil law systems have balanced the rights of private parties with the 
unilateral authority of public administration, and the extent to which these systems 
have recognised the rights of private parties to resolve disputes through the 
mechanisms of arbitration. It will conclude that Saudi Arabia has unduly restricted the 
right to arbitrate disputes involving administrative contract, often times through 
arbitrary exercise of the sovereign power, and through the unjustified of public policy 
and other arbitrability defences. The limitations of the current legal framework 
governing the treatment and dispute resolution of administrative contracts is made 
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more challenging because public authorities can unilaterally amend or limit the rights 
of private parties, including by denying parties a general right to bring their disputes 
before a neutral arbitrator. This unilateral power is, however, not adequately 
constrained through statutory or judicial control. By exploring how public interest is 
balanced against private rights in Egypt and France, and by considering the 
“internationalised” elements of contracts which are nonetheless regulated by ad hoc 
the public law rules of Saudi municipal law, the thesis seeks to shed light on the legal 
effects and regulatory complexities of the modern administrative contract in the 
globalised economy.   
At the level of normative analysis, this thesis seeks to reconcile two ideals: the 
legitimate diversity of sovereign states to decide the laws that will apply to their 
contractual agreements in pursuit of the public interest, and the moral need to protect 
longstanding principles of contract law. The latter of these ideal is intimately related to 
concept of the sanctity of contract (or pacta sunt servanda), the legal protection of the 
substantive legitimate expectations of parties impacted by the decisions of the state 
and finally, the freedom of parties to choose the laws and means by which they can 
settle their dispute, as embodied by the principle of party autonomy. As this thesis will 
aim to show, the Islamic foundation of the Saudi legal system provides the necessary 
impetus for reform: a commitment to, both administrative justice and equity under 
contract law is entirely consistent with Islamic Shariah.  From these premises, the 
proposed thesis will proceed to assess and critically evaluate the extent to which Saudi 
law has reconciled it modernising ambitions of a modernised arbitration regime with 
the enduring forces of (religious) tradition.
2
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Chapter 1 
Background and Introduction 
1.1. Background  
1.1.1 The Arbitration Framework in Saudi Arabia 
In harmonising its national laws and procedures with leading international arbitration 
institutions and jurisdictions, the new Saudi Arbitration Act 2012 (“SAL 2012”) 
represents a significant step towards the reform and modernisation of the Kingdom‟s 
arbitration framework. It is widely recognised to have established a more commercially 
attractive and stable arbitration environment, strengthening legal certainty around 
decisional outcomes, while providing litigants with a viable “choice” of law and 
jurisdiction for settling disputes.
3
 
The new arbitration law, and the national regulatory framework which structures it, 
suffers from a number of “gaps” or challenges, both theoretical and practical.4 While 
many of the reforms instituted under the SAL 2012 can been seen to be representative of 
the „normative pull‟ towards the procedural harmonisation of international rules and 
principles on arbitration, the Saudi legal system remains deeply anchored in the Shariah 
(Hanbali) arbitral tradition.
5
 And in formal deference to the Islamic basis of Saudi 
Arabia‟s legal system, the Saudi Arbitration Law 2012 contains a number of provisions 
                                                     
3
 Raza Mithani, „Saudi Arabia, The Emerging Arbitration Landscape‟ (2014) 1 Corporate Disputes 
Magazine  
<http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/kspublic/library/publication/2014articles/1-14_corpdisputes.pdf> 
accessed 23 March 2017 
4
 Jeanne-Pierre Harb and Alexander Leventhal, „The New Saudi Arbitration Law: Modernization to the 
Tune of Shari‟a‟(2013) 20(2) Journal of International Arbitration, 113-135 
5
 Saud Al Ammari and A. Timothy Martin, „Arbitration in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia‟ (2014) 30(2) 
Arbitration International 387  
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which explicitly mandates that arbitration proceedings shall be in compliance with 
Shariah.
6
 Correspondingly, while the new law significantly curtails the review power of 
local courts, judicial authorities in Saudi Arabia continue to enjoy broad discretion to 
determine whether an arbitration agreement is invalid, or to set a final award aside. The 
grounds for annulment, revision or refusal to enforce during arbitration include any 
agreement deemed to contravene Shariah law, Saudi public policy and prior Saudi court 
decrees
7
 – in addition to more familiar public policy and arbitrability defences. The more 
important issue however is whether administrative contracts are arbitrable under the 
current framework governing arbitration in KSA. The answer to this question would 
appear to be answered in the negative, as discussed below.  The negative answer can be 
observed in the perspectives of contextual examination of historical judicial decisions 
within KSA, by international arbitration panels exercising jurisdiction over administrative 
contracts, and through systematic comparisons with other civil law states such as France 
and Egypt.  
1.1.2 Administrative Contract in Context 
1.1.2.1 Highlights of Administrative Law Theories and Conflict 
The theory of administrative contracts relates to the municipal practice of states who 
enter into contracts with private individuals or entities. As these are treated as a special or 
                                                     
6
 For an overview of all salient aspects of the New Arbitration Law, see Mohammed Al-Hosban, „The New 
Saudi Arbitration Law on Arbitration: Presentation and Commentary‟ (2012) 4(3) Int‟l. J. Arab Arb. 3, 5; 
see also Jeanne-Pierre Harb et al (n 9); Khalid Alnowaiser, „The New Arbitration Law and its impact on 
investment in Saudi Arabia‟ (2012) 29(6) J. Int‟l. Arb. 723 
7
  SAL 2012, (n 1) Article 14 
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sui generis class of contract that escape the ordinary rules of contract, they are limited 
and conditioned upon, the supervening authority of the state.  
Administrative law is fundamentally concerned with the exercise, and limits of public 
power. By extension, administrative law is deeply rooted in constitutional and public law 
theories and the principle of sovereignty. Embodied by the principle are the rights and 
duties of the state, and its representatives to act on behalf of the public from which it 
draws legitimacy and authority.
8
 Public law itself is founded on the notion of 
differentiated rights and responsibilities between the sovereign state and private person.
9
 
Indeed, in continental and common law theory this inequity between the state and 
individual is a defining feature of public power.
10
 Public law on the other hand, 
presupposes that the state exercises its power in service to the needs and interests of the 
public.
11
 
The evolution and experience administrative law and administrative justice in late 
modernity is eclectically diverse. For instance, contemporary comparisons can be drawn 
from the American experience (e.g. the tests of participation, reason giving and public 
functions that are employed in the State action doctrine), and from principles long 
established in common law systems (legality, judicial review, rationality, fairness and 
good faith) as well as other such general principles blended from a comparative or 
common denominator reading of various domestic legal systems e.g. non arbitrariness, 
                                                     
8
 Jerry L Mashaw, „The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law‟ (1989) 65 Chicago-
Kent Law Review 123, 132; Richard B. Stewart, „The Reformation of American Administrative Law‟ 
(1975) 88(8) Harvard Law Review 1667 
9
 Giorgio Pino, „The Place of Legal Positivism in Contemporary Constitutional States‟(1999) 18 Law and 
Philosophy 513 
10
 S. Badaui, General Theory of Administrative Contracts (2
nd
 ed., AI-Nahdah Publication 1976) 103 
11
 Alec Stone Sweet, „Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism and International Regimes‟ (2009) 16(2) Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 621 
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proportionality, reasonableness etc.
12 
However, such a special or sui generis class of 
contract does not seem to work well with private contracts which is a very different 
animal, in Western legal systems at least. And it is here that we find another source of 
conflict. Not all contracts are treated equally from one legal system, and culture to 
another. Islamic countries have made strong use of administrative law theory in their 
treatment of contracts of public interest or benefit, and have done so precisely to defend 
their sovereign authority, immunity and autonomy as will be discussed in the context of a 
discussion of the ARAMCO arbitration.  
1.1.2.2 The Legal Character of an Administrative Contract 
In classic conceptions, an administrative contract is typically concluded with a 
governmental authority or public administrator and will typically include provisions and 
other regularities which are not typically present in private contracts. 
Three legal tests are applied to determine the public nature of a contract: 
i. One of the parties to the contract is a public authority. 
ii. The contract contains provisions which are not typically found in private 
contracts. 
iii. The objective of the contract is the achievement of a public good or benefit. 
Administrative contracts have been defined elsewhere as: 
                                                     
12
 For a sample of the relevant literature see Richard B. Stewart, „The Reformation of American 
Administrative Law‟ (1975) 88(8) Harvard Law Review 1667.Daphne Barak-Erez, „A State Action 
Doctrine for an Age of Privatization‟ (1995) 45 Syracuse Law Review 1169,1171; Sheila S. Kennedy, 
„When is Private Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships‟ (2003) 11 
George Mason University Civil Rights Law Journal 203 
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[C]ontracts which the administration [has] concluded with private persons, 
corporations, or other departments to aim to regulate and facilitate public 
utility, provided that these contracts include provisions unparalleled in private 
law contracts. For these contracts administration would have exclusive 
powers, and provided restriction cannot be afforded between private law 
persons in their relation with each other, and subject to the administration and 
contractor being together with regard to the special legal system which is the 
administrative law.
13
 
In the main, a contract concluded between a state authority and a private firm can be 
classified as either an ordinary civil law contract or as a public contract. The legal 
implications of this classification are significant, since each contract is governed under 
the (presumptively) distinct and mutually exclusive domains of private or public law, 
respectively. That is to say, the laws governing administrative contracts are legally 
distinguishable from the rules governing the treatment and dispute resolution of a 
commercial or civil contract. 
A public contract shares certain commonalities with its civil cousin. As with an ordinary 
contract, a public contract will include terms relating to its formation, expiry and material 
effects on the involved parties. On the other hand, the terms and stipulations of an 
administrative contract are of a substantially different nature and character from those 
                                                     
13
  Mansour Al-Saeed, „Legal Protection of Economic Development Agreements‟ (2002) 17(2) Arab Law 
Quarterly 150, 156. See more generally, Anne C. L. Davies The public law of government contracts, 
(2008 Oxford University Press, New York) 200-220 and. Săraru, Silviu Catalin, Administrative 
Contracts. Regulators. Doctrine. Law, (2009 C.H. Beck Publishing) 245-250 
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found in a private contract. In short, administrative contracts are subject to the rules and 
regularities of public law.
14
 
In classic conceptions, an ordinary civil contract is based on the private law principle of 
mutual consent of the parties. By extension, neither party to a contract has the right to 
unilaterally amend, penalise or terminate the contract, absent the consent of the other 
party, or through the normal operation and execution of rights provided for under the 
express or implied terms of contract. In capsule, the contracting State party enjoys equal 
footing with the other party in the content of an ordinary commercial agreement, an 
arrangement that embodies the foundational precepts of private law – equity and formal 
equality. Subject to the condition of mutual consent, both parties of the contract are to 
amend or modify the terms of the contract as required. Above all, the state party does not 
enjoy special privileges in the contractual relationship, and cannot unilaterally amend or 
terminate the contract, regardless of whether it is in its interest to do so.
15
 
Furthermore, subject to the conventional rules of contract law an ordinary court has 
jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate any disputes relating to the terms and operation of the 
contract. Moreover, consistent with the principle of party autonomy, the parties are free to 
negotiate the terms of contract which bind them, including methods of dispute settlement. 
Parties are free to pursue less cumbersome and costly alternatives to litigation and will in 
this regard, frequently refer their disputes for arbitration.  
                                                     
14
 Soliman Al-Tammawi, General Basis of the Administrative Contracts: A Comparative Study, (5th edition 
Dar Al-Fiker Al-Arabi, 1991) 52-54 
15
 Khaled Mohammed Al-Jumah, „Arab State Contract Disputes: Lessons from the Past‟ (2002) 17(3) Arab 
Law Quarterly 280-284 
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The laws which are applicable to an administrative or governmental contract depart from 
ordinary contractual rules and procedures in several significant ways.
16
 As an illustration 
of this point, the state party to an administrative contract can exercises its sovereign 
authority to impose penalties on the other party for breach of contract, even if this right is 
not expressly provided for in the terms and conditions of the original contract.
17
 A public 
entity may also elect to terminate the contract before the contract has been executed if 
such an action is deemed necessary to protect the public interest.  
The administrative law of a state may include specific rules governing the personality or 
capacity of entities with authority to enter into administrative contracts, or otherwise 
exclude the application of certain rights or conditions in the formation and execution of 
the contract. As will be discussed in the context of our comparative study of civil law 
systems, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and France, the treatment and regulation of administrative 
contracts are sensitive to questions of sovereignty, the exclusivity of state law, and state 
immunity in connection with public contract pursued in the public interest or public 
policy.
18
 One of the most pivotal ways in which the doctrine of sovereignty comes to bear 
on the rules applied to administrative contracts is the limited recourse to arbitration as a 
method of dispute resolution. As the next chapters will detail and explore, an agreement 
to arbitrate a dispute is deemed valid and enforceable only with the express authorisation 
of competent state authorities, usually in the form of the consent of the executive 
branches of government. Saudi Arabia is no exception in the above regard, and 
                                                     
16
 Neville Brown and John Bell, French Administrative Law (5
th
 ed., Oxford University Press 1998) 202. 
17
 Al-Wehaiby, The Organising Principles for Administrative Contracts and their Applications in Saudi 
Arabia (1
st
 ed., Riyadh, 2002) 215-218 
 
18
 Brown N and Bell J, French Administrative Law (5th ed., Oxford University Press 1998)  
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administrative contracts have till very recently been considered non-arbitrable on public 
policy and sovereignty grounds under the applicable statutory frameworks and codified 
laws of the KSA legal order. 
It is precisely this feature of administrative contracts – the lack of parity between parties 
– which distinguishes it from contracts governed by private law. That is to say, in an 
administrative contract it is assumed that private contractors have expressed an intent and 
willingness to enter into a public contract, even with the knowledge that they are denied 
safeguards under private and public law (e.g. equal treatment, in the former, and 
transparency and non-retroactivity in rule and decision-making, in the latter). 
Furthermore, the mere fact that private contractors acquiesce to these terms is itself 
evidence of the sui generis character of the contract, since provisions of this type are not 
usually present in an ordinary civil contract. The question posed by this thesis in the 
above regard can be articulated as follows: to what extent can a contract be determined to 
have a public character, where the intent of one or both parties is itself unclear, or 
whether the contract is not expressly identified as either public or private? 
1.1.2.3 The Treatment and Dispute Resolution of Administrative Contracts in Saudi 
Arabia 
Saudi Arabia‟s model of administrative law is loosely based on the French concept of the 
droit administrative. This model has been adopted by a number of Islamic legal systems, 
such as Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and Algeria, and French administrative law has 
- 9 - 
remained a guiding principle in all these legal systems.
19
 Apart from contracts subject to 
civil and commercial codes, Arab nations who have implemented the French model 
acknowledge public or administrative contracts governed by administrative law.  
Under Saudi municipal law, any contract involving a public service concession, or to 
which the state or its representatives is a party, is subject to its legislative or judicial 
(re)classification as an “administrative contract”.20 Public contracts will typically include 
regulatory features or provisions that are not analogous to those contained with private 
contracts, including for instance clauses related to penalties, inspection and supervision, 
the formulation of detailed governmental plans, and so on.
21
 Public authorities, as 
stressed above, may also unilaterally modify
22
 or rescind
23
 the contract.  
Saudi Arabia‟s Consultant Department has said on this question:  
A public contract differs in nature from a private contract. It is entered into between 
a public legal person, and a private contractor……The legal rights of both 
contractors are not equal because the public benefit causes the public party to have 
precedence. The private contractor must know and accept these privileges before 
signing the contract.
24
 
                                                     
19
 Al-Fayad Abraham, Administrative Contract: The Public Theory and its Application in the Kuwaiti and 
Comparative Law (Al-Fallah Press 1981) 9-10 and Mansour Al-Saeed, „Legal Protection of Economic 
Development Agreements‟ (2002) 17(2) Arab Law Quarterly 157 
20
 See for example See Henry Cattan, The Law of Oil Concessions in The Middle East and North Africa 
(1967,New York: Oceana Publications Inc) 75  
21
 Saudi Chambers of Commerce, The Finance Difficulties which Face Saudi Contractors. Working paper 
produced at the Saudi Contractors‟ Annual Meeting, Saudi Chambers of Commerce, Riyadh, 10/2/2001.  
22
 Implementation of Purchasing Regulations (Implementing Regulations), Ministerial Decision no. 
17/2131 dated 5/5/1397 AH (1979), Art. 25 
23
 Ibid, Art. 29 
24
 Consultation no. 637, dated 23/10/1956 
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On this view, the government has the sovereign right to control, regulate or modify the 
contract‟s execution, irrespective of the other party‟s consent. By virtue of its sovereign 
status, moreover, the state has the exclusive power to grant or deny a private entity the 
right to perform public services on its behalf.
25
 
The administrative law of KSA, encompassing uncodified provision of Shariah law,
26
 
also regulates the personality or capacity of entities with authority to enter into 
administrative contracts. For instance, state immunity defences may apply, the effect of 
which is to prevent private parties from pursuing legal claims against the state for breach 
or non-satisfaction of contractual conditions. The state may also impose penalties on the 
contractor for actions (or inaction) not covered in the terms of contract.
27
 Notably, 
however, Islamic Shariah does provide relief and grounds for compensation for parties 
who have suffered losses suffered due to the unilateral exercise of authority which result 
in the adaption, renegotiation or termination of a contract. These provisions extend, 
equally, the adaptation of contracts which have been rendered impossible due to 
unforeseen circumstances.
28
 Furthermore, Islamic principles of contract allow for the 
flexible construction and adaption of a contract when, for instance, a private party suffers 
                                                     
25
 See Saudi Chambers of Commerce paper (n 26) and on issues of dispute resolution Karl-Heinz 
Böckstiegel, Arbitration and State Enterprises: A Survey on the National and International State of Law 
and Practice (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers 1984) 44–45 
26
 Basic Law of the Government (Basic Law), Royal Decree no: A/90 March I, 1992, Arts. 44, 46, 55 and 
67 
27
 Implementation of Purchasing Regulations (Implementing Regulations), Ministerial Decision no. 
17/2131 dated 5/5/1397 AH (1979), Art. 29 
28
 Samir Amin, „The Theory of Changed Circumstances in International Trade‟ (1984) 4 Int‟l & Comp L. 
Qtr‟ly 577, 582–83 
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economic or physical hardship occurring from a change or modification of the terms and 
performance of the contract, as discussed in chapter 3.
29
   
Above all, any administrative contract concluded with a governmental authority may be 
treated as non-arbitrable under the relevant national law, except with the explicit consent 
of a competent authority, and only when the agreement to arbitrate has been formed by 
parties with consent to conclude arbitration agreements or enforce arbitration clauses. 
This is the prevailing approach of all legal systems who apply the model of droit 
administratif, including France, Egypt and, most crucially, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
The non-arbitrability rule, however, is subject to criticism on the grounds it deprives 
private contracting parties with an effective means of resolving their disputes, or in some 
instances, with an effective remedy with which to recover losses stemming from a 
governmental authority or agency‟s modification or termination of contract.30  
Over the past decades, the Saudi government expanded its reach into all areas of society 
and with it, the demands placed on state resources and expertise grew exponentially. The 
Kingdom‟s infrastructure commitments witnessed the rise in public works, procurement 
and the supply of public utilities. In the late eighties, the myriad laws applicable to 
concession of public service were finally consolidated in a single document through an 
act of the Council of Saudi ministers.
31
 Yet, with the exception of enacted legislation in 
the area of public procurement (chapter 3), rules governing the supply of public services 
and utilities are largely uncodified and have evolved largely through discretionary 
                                                     
29
 Alwasit Alsanhouri, Nazareiat Al-Eltezam (The Theory of Obligations) (Dar Alnahda Alarabia 1964) 
717–24. 
30
 Hassan Mahassni and Neal Grenely, „Public Sector Dispute Resolution in Saudi Arabia: Procedures and 
Practices of Saudi Arabia‟s Administrative Court‟ (1987) 21(3) The International Lawyer 836. 838; Royal 
Decree No. 17 dated December 26, 1344 (17 June 1926) 
31
 Council of Ministers‟ Act, Royal Decree no. A/13 dated 3/3/1414 (1993), Art. 31. 
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exercises of royal power and the decisions of Saudi Arabia‟s principal administrative 
court, the Board of Grievances (chapter 2). 
In 1955, the Saudi Arabian government established an administrative tribunal known as 
the Board of Grievances. As the principal administrative court, all disputes between 
government agencies and private individuals are subject to the jurisdiction of the Board 
of Grievances.
32
  The Board is empowered to hear cases involving abuse of powers and 
other acts of illegality committed by government officials, including complaints 
concerning the denial of justice in the Shariah courts,
33
 the ultra vivre acts of 
administrative officials and similar claims involving the government.
34
 This tribunal, the 
Grievance Board, has power to hear any complaints filed with its chairman.
35
 The 
limitation of the Board, as with other Saudi administrative tribunals and Shariah courts, 
stems from the informality of its procedures, which are not regularly published or bound 
by judicial precedent or other formal administrative law-like guarantees and related rule-
of-law principles e.g. legal rationality, generality, non-retroactive application of rules or 
decisions and publicity.
36
 The parties are required to offer evidence to an independent 
administrative judicial board that has broad discretionary power to decide the case based 
on non-standardised interpretations of the relevant rules and principles of Shariah.
37
 The 
                                                     
32
 The Board Act Royal Decree No. (M/51) dated July 17, 1402 (21 May 1982) 
33
 Royal Decree No. (M/21) 20 Jumada I, 1421 [19/8/2000] regarding procedure before Shariah Courts 
Article 1 
34
 Royal Decree No. (M/51) of 17-7-1402 Hegira; See also Article 29-32, The Law of Judiciary, Royal 
Decree No. (M/64) (1975) 73 
35
 Jeanne Asherman, „Doing Business in Saudi Arabia: The Contemporary Application of Islamic Law‟ 
(1982)16 Intl LJ. 325 
36
 See the Board Act Royal Decree No. (M/51) dated July 17, 1402 (21 May 1982). For a related 
discussion, see Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (1969) 39 
37
 For instance, the full list of “rule of law” criteria identified by the legal scholar Lon Fuller :  rules must be 
general so as not to privilege or discriminate against particular interests; they must be publicly 
promulgated; prospective in effect; expressed in clear and intelligible terms; consistent with one another; 
must be predictable in that they must not require conduct beyond the powers of the affected parties; or be 
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board‟s decision is appealable directly to the Council of Ministers.38 Despite exercising 
judicial functions, neither the Board nor the Council has provided a comprehensive 
definition of administrative contracts or their constitutive features, as discussed in chapter 
3. As will be discussed throughout the thesis, the following issues are central to our 
understanding of the constraints placed on exercises of sovereign authority assessed 
against the standards, doctrines and concepts of classic administrative law. Thus will be 
outlined in the sections below. 
1.1.2.4 Jurisdiction over Administrative Disputes 
All administrative judicial systems have jurisdiction over disputes involving the decisions 
of a public entity at the level of municipal law, or so called “state acts” of a sovereign 
authority in respect of international trade or investment agreements. As affirmed by the 
judicial decisions of the French Conseil d‟Etat law, there are three main types of 
governmental contract or “contract administrative”: contracts relating to the concessions 
of public utilities, public procurements, and public works. 
 However, the categories of contract enumerated under French case law are not 
exhaustive per se. In the era of rapid and rapacious globalisation, the traditional contract 
takes on ever more sophisticated and complex forms. Administrative contracts will often 
have regulatory and commercial features. Moreover, there has also been a rise in 
“internationalised” administrative contracts, usually in the form of international public-
                                                                                                                                                              
changed so frequently that the subject cannot rely on them. Finally, they must be administered in a manner 
consistent with their wording; See also Fuller (n 36) 39-42 
38
 A new Board of Grievances Law, promulgated on May 10, 1982 by Royal Decree No. M/51 reforms 
Saudi Arabian judicial practice. 
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private partnerships, international procurement agreements and concession agreements.
39
 
These contracts take on an international character principally because such agreements 
are concluded with a foreign party,
40
 and, in some instances, as a party of an “umbrella” 
trade or investment agreement.
41
  
The most common kinds of administrative cases include, in France for example, those 
related to the application of economic or social regulations, taxation, town-planning, 
building permits, public works, public service procurement, environmental projects, 
hospital liability, immigration permits, civil servants‟ career and pensions, European and 
local government elections.
42
 These are similar to the types of administrative contracts 
and the nature of such contracts that are discussed throughout this study. The difference 
between KSA and other jurisdictions, however, is that KSA has less consistency, 
predictability, and transparency in how it may rule in cases or which ones it chooses to 
adjudicate than the other states.  In addition, it appears to more often than not exercise an 
administrative authority or power of review as often as possible regardless of unpublished 
results or statistics for such matters. The comparison in transparency and predictability 
comes with examining which States have codified laws, judicial precedent, and record-
keeping practices, and what each of those entails in the particular jurisdictions. 
                                                     
39
 See Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, „State Contracts in Contemporary International Law: Monist Versus 
Dualist Controversies‟ (2001) 12(2) Eur. J. Int‟l L. 309, 311; Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, „The Legal Rules 
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1984) 117 
40
 A. H. Hermann, „Disputes Between States and Foreign Companies‟ in Julian D. M. Lew (ed.), 
Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration (Springer Netherlands 1987) 250; B. Poznanski, „The 
Nature and Extent of an Arbitrator‟s Powers in International Commercial Arbitration‟(1987) 4(3) J. Int‟l 
Arb. 71, 86 
41
 Ibid; On the issue of umbrella clauses, see Christoph Schreuer, „Travelling the BIT Route of Waiting 
Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road‟ (2004) 5 J. World Inv. & Trade 231, 251–55. 
42
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Road‟ (2004) 5 J. World Inv. & Trade 231, 251–55 
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1.1.2.4.1  Administrative Justice 
The basic definition of administrative justice is a legal guarantee to citizens that they 
have the right to be heard when they have a grievance against the State. It is also the 
process by which a legal system of a government is executed. At its core are the 
administrative decisions by public authorities that affect individual citizens and the 
mechanisms available for the provision of redress for those citizens. Specifically, it 
includes substantive evaluation and procedural dues process through adjudication in 
administrative tribunals.  
The mechanisms of French administrative justice work to permanently balance two 
fundamental priorities: “a balance between the respect for the specific requirements of 
administrative action and the protection of citizens‟ rights; and, secondly, a balance 
between the concern to ensure the efficiency of the administrative judge and the respect 
for procedural guarantees of the parties.”43  
The administrative body has a responsibility to act in a manner congruent to the interests 
of the public, but the public has a right to call into question any administrative act that 
goes beyond the scope of that authority to personal benefit of the administrative entity. 
This accords with the very core principle of constitutional law and theory, in which 
political power (and royal power in the case of KSA) is made subject to legal constraints 
or “checks and balances” to ensure that public authorities act within the bounds of 
legality, and that they do not abuse the rights of individuals impacted by their decisions, 
                                                     
43
 M. Patrick Frydman, „Administrative Justice in France‟ (11th Annual AIJA Tribunals Conference, 
Queensland, Australia, 5 June 2008) < http://www.aija.org.au/Tribs08/Frydman.pdf> accessed on 12 March 
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on the pretext of public policy or public order.
44
 Under classical administrative law, 
accordingly, a citizen or party to a dispute has a right to notice and to be heard, not 
dissimilar to the common law concepts of procedural due process. This right is 
recognized and incorporated into all administrative law systems.   
The methodology for procedures and finding of substance, is not universal, however 
because each State prioritizes different understandings of administrative duties; has 
different court procedures and structures; and has different administrative laws that are 
applied to each adjudicatory proceeding. Thus, the inevitable debate about the level of 
administrative justice achieved within each State‟s administrative system. In common law 
systems, it is usually a process of appeal through the judicial system. In general, 
administrative justice is measured by its ability to be challenged judicially if a party 
believes it was applied incorrectly. Ideally, it is a system of accountability, access, and 
transparency. 
1.1.2.4.2 Due Process: Substance of the Matter and Procedural Concerns  
In administrative systems, the administrative court looks to the grounds of public policy 
(moyen d‟ordre public), the potential lack of legal authority “incompetence” and the 
scope of pertinent legislation to determine the substance of the matter.
45
 Procedurally 
speaking, a citizen has a right to notice, a right to be heard, a right to a decision by the 
adjudicating body in a reasonable time under the particular circumstances of the case, and 
                                                     
44
 Jean-Marie Auby, „The Abuse of Power in French Administrative Law‟ (1970) 18 The American Journal 
of Comparative Law 148 
45
 Jean Massot, „The Powers and Duties of the French Administrative Judge‟ (adapted from “Les pouvoirs 
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a right to enforcement of that decision. Administrative Judges are granted specific 
procedural powers to this effect. For example, in France, a jurist may “now accompany 
his decisions with measures to ensure that they will be properly enforced, and may give 
emergency rulings within the framework of interim injunction proceedings (with the 
possibility of giving a ruling within 48 hours).”46 
Egypt has comparable priorities, in promoting access to justice with low administration 
fees, a system of court appointed lawyers for citizens who cannot afford them, and 
timelines for appeal.
47
 Enforcement of judicial decisions seem to be effectuated on a 
regular basis. 
As will be explored in the following chapters, the administrative law of Saudi Arabia 
only grants a citizen the right to notice and to be heard. There are some procedural 
guarantees for timelines of appeal, but there are no regulations pertaining to the 
timeliness or enforcement of matters.
48
 The absence of legal certainty, specifically 
certainty over judicial or arbitral outcomes, is not helped by the fact the Saudi courts do 
not follow a system of judicial precedent or stare decisis. Accordingly, private parties 
who seek to resolve their dispute in Saudi Arabia will struggle to predict the legal 
outcome of a dispute with state authorities. Such a legal situation makes it impossible for 
a private party to rely on any kind of legitimate contractual expectation, much less its 
substantive protection, since the construction of the contract is entirely dependent on the 
                                                     
46
 France Council D‟Etat, „The Administration Justice System: An Overview‟ (Le Conseil d'État, July 
2013) 
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interpretation of the competent local court, or on the decision of state authorities not to 
regulate to the contrary.  
1.1.2.4.3 Capacity and Consent  
While the above sections have dealt with “substantive” considerations of the contract, the 
issue of capacity or consent of a party is a matter of authority in formation and mutuality 
in understanding between the parties, as well as procedure.  Any administrative contract 
must be considered under its procedural merits as well as what the French call 
“incompetence” or “want of authority”.  
Whether a party has capacity or authority to enter into a contract is an acrimonious and 
crucial topic in administrative contracts practice in Saudi Arabia. This is not a question of 
traditional capacity, but is that the ability to retroactively-determine (or reclassify) 
whether a party is an administrative authority, with unilateral authority to alter the terms 
of a contract. It invokes consideration of whether that practice leads to the formation of 
contracts lacking in material disclosure and mutual understanding, or as legally classified: 
illusory, null and void. The legal quandaries generated by issues of capacity include 
retroactive authority to unilaterally change terms and condition; invalidation based on 
lack of original authority to enter into contract; questions of authority to modify before 
classification; loss of mutuality and understanding in formation issues; undermining of 
materiality within a contract; and application of regulations restricting arbitrability. 
In several administrative law systems, it is possible to find several examples of 
“incompetence”, for instance when an administrative contract is formed without the 
consent or permission of the applicable governmental authority before engaging in the 
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contract itself, or as what will be of importance to this study, consent to agree to an 
arbitration clause or to arbitrate an administrative contract. 
1.1.2.5 The Non-Arbitrability of Public Contracts Under Saudi Law 
Pursuant to the arbitration law of KSA, administrative contracts, or any contract to which 
a Saudi governmental authority is a party, cannot be arbitrated without the consent of the 
Prime Minister (chapter 3).
49
 This rule, which has survived the reforms made to Saudi 
Arbitration Law under the newly modernised SAL 2012,
50
 is broadly justified on public 
policy grounds. As will be discussed in later chapters in the context of the ARAMCO 
dispute and the updated SAL 2012, the absence of a clear definition of “public policy” 
has significant bearing on the class of disputes which the Saudi government has 
designated - through a prospective law or regulation, or retrospective exercise of royal 
power - to be non-arbitrable on procedural or substantive grounds (chapter 4). This leaves 
open the question of the circumstances under which an administrative contract is 
arbitrable, including instances in which the consent of prime minister has not been 
obtained in advance. Other relevant considerations are the formality and choice of law 
requirements of arbitration agreements contained in administrative contracts, and the 
jurisdiction of international tribunals to determine whether an administrative contract is 
arbitrable, even without governmental consent, for instance when the “public” or 
domestic character of that contract is subject to challenge on the merits (chapter 4).  
As will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6, a number of tribunals have considered questions 
around the “commercial” character of a contract which is otherwise regulated as public 
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 SAL 2012, (n 1) Article 10(2) 
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contract under the governing laws of the state, of state officials with whom the contract 
has been concluded.
51
 This may lead tribunals to assert competence to hear disputes with 
the Saudi government has deemed inarbitrable. Other tribunals have sought to review the 
legality of state actions on public law type grounds, for instance retrospectivity law-
making affecting the rights of private parties in the context of administrative contracts.
52
 
Similar questions have been raised over the extent to which international law and rules 
can be applied to control and constrain the actions of States, at odds with classic doctrines 
such as sovereign immunity (or, at the level of national law the unfettered discretion of 
public officials and restrictions on administrative liability) (discussed in chapter 5 and 6). 
1.1.2.6 The Relationship between Constitutional Norms of Shariah and the Regulatory 
Power of Saudi Authorities 
The above discussed issues reflected on some of the main problems or doctrinal issues 
associated with the treatment and dispute resolution of administrative contracts – the 
features of administrative contracts, governing regime i.e. public or private law, judicial 
review versus judicial law making and so on – as governed under the laws and legal 
system of Saudi Arabia. In a variety of ways, it has raised issues around administrative 
legality and legitimate contractual expectations, and correspondingly between the rules of 
public and private law, which each overlap and conflict in various ways in the Saudi 
context. The comparative analysis that will be developed in the main chapters of the 
thesis (chapter  5 and 6) is that the structure and powers of the Saudi government seems 
to tilt heavily in favour of an absolute conception of sovereign authority (i.e. unilateral 
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authority to restrict or regulate the rights of private individuals, in both the public and 
contractual sphere) and sovereign immunity (actions carried by public authorities acting 
in the capacity of state actors in the interest of the state and public interest attract no 
liability). The Basic Law mentions three governing authorities applicable to 
administrative law; Judicial, Executive and Regulatory.
53
 Nonetheless, as will be 
discussed in chapter 2, the system of government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is not 
clearly based on the principle of separation of powers.
54
 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia does 
not have a formal constitution per se, in the guise of a comprehensive constitutional 
document that defines, distributes, and subjects to legal limits the powers and 
responsibilities of distinct organs of the state.
55
 
On the other hand, the Saudi Arabia is an avowedly Islamic state. The Basic Law which 
was adopted in 1992 stipulates that the Holy Quran and Sunnah is the constitution of the 
country, which is governed on the basis of Islamic law (Shariah).
56
 Substantively, 
however, the powers of the Saudi sovereign, the King, cannot be absolute, if only because 
all statutory law, and all expressions of legal authority, are subject to the supreme law of 
the law: the law of the Islamic Shariah.
57
 
By extension, the political authority vested in the King, and the Council of Ministers, or 
the discretionary judicial powers vested in the Board of Grievance, are subject to 
constitutional-like restraints: all laws, decisions or rulings may be consistent with the 
spirit and text of the primary sources of Islam. And yet, Shariah imposes a duty on all 
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followers of the faith – in their private or public life- to honour their contractual 
obligations in good faith, a principle that is similarly honoured in most Western civil and 
common law traditions.
58
 There is no doctrinal difficulty or conflict between Islamic and 
“Western” models of contract law, public law, or arbitration. Public authorities must 
conduct themselves with regard for the public interest and the good faith principle of 
Islamic law. Indeed, Islamic principles are in many respects fundamentally reconcilable 
with similar concepts developed over centuries in common law systems, including the 
principle of sanctity or contract, promissory estoppel or pacta sunt servanda.  
1.1.2.7 The Nexus between the Administrative Contract and Extra-National Laws 
As the discussion on Saudi law on administrative contracts will show, the legal value and 
binding effect of a contract is shaped to a large extent by the law applied to the contract, 
specifically in relation to how the nature of the contract is determined, and the character 
of rights that flow from it.  
It is perhaps the category of internationalised administrative contracts, more commonly 
known as the internationalised state contract which presents the most challenging 
questions around the treatment, determination and dispute resolution of administrative 
contracts. Indeed, what is called an administrative contract at the level of national law is 
often regarded as something quite different from an international perspective. From 
within the national legal system, an administrative contract is essentially bound by, and 
subject to, the rules and decisions of actors with public legal capacity to act on behalf of 
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the public interest or in accordance with national policy. From outside the national legal 
system, an international contract involving a state (public or corporate) entity and a 
foreign party is not necessarily viewed in the same terms. The regulatory or public 
dimension of the agreements may recede into the background, and the state authority may 
be seen to act in the character of a commercial partner. 
Viewed in the above light, a whole series of related legal issues or challenges come into 
contact and conflict as soon as we consider arbitration of administrative contracts 
(chapter 4), and especially the arbitration of administrative contracts involving a foreign 
party or choice of law elements. Such issues, include: 
i. the arbitrability of administrative contracts ab initio; 
ii.  the validity of the arbitration agreement that has been entered into and those 
with legal capacity to conclude such agreement 
iii. the applicable law of the contract and disputes over choice of law,  
iv. and the forum with jurisdiction and competence to decide these procedural 
issues (is the dispute arbitrable, and the agreement valid), or substantive 
questions (what laws regulate or govern the contract). 
1.1.2.8 The Relationship Between Contract Law and Public Law 
One reason why internationalised state or administrative contract raises significant 
challenge concerns the nature of the agreement itself, and more specifically the risks 
involved (chapter 5). Given their duration, these projects are exposed to several risks, 
risks which may be commercial as well as legal or political, or environmental (i.e. acts of 
God, or force majeure). As a result, foreign contractors may only enter such agreements if 
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they can be assured that the financial payoff will exceed the possible risks of the project‟s 
fiscal and regulatory regime. This is not mere trifling point but impacts directly on the 
future economic prospects of a country such as Saudi Arabia. If the fiscal and regulatory 
conditions in a state are seen to be overly burdensome or inequitable, then there are few 
incentives for foreign firms or entities to do business with Saudi Arabia. While this may 
be justifiable from the perspective of the classic theories of sovereignty and the sovereign 
powers of the State (the sovereign is not and should not be bound by the same law as its 
subjects) or in view of the normative assumptions underlying public law (an 
administrative body should be free to take any necessary action to protect the public 
interest, within the bounds of its lawful power), such a policy is hardly likely to advance 
the regulatory or financial objectives of the state on the international stage. A 
retrospective amendment to the existing statutory law, or ad hoc modification to a 
contract based on the unilateral decisions of an administrative agency or Board decision, 
is likely to upset the financial bargain struck under the contract, placing the private party 
at a significant disadvantage, while holding that party hostage to the unpredictable or 
discretionary decisions of public officials. This clearly constitutes an affront to the 
legitimate expectations of the private contractor, and is precisely the kind of scenario in 
which public and private law ought to overlap. A public official who fails to fulfil a 
promise on which the private actor relies both infringe the principle of trust or legal 
certainty, a public law concept, and the principle of legitimate expectations, a principle 
commonly associated with private law. 
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1.1.2.9 Summary 
Bearing such complexities in mind, the researcher intends, in chapter 6, to highlight the 
distinctive nature of administrative contracts in so far as they are subject to the 
discretionary justice of administrative authorities, and their unilateral modification by 
state authorities on the grounds of public interest within both statutory and Shariah 
frameworks. Taking all of the above as its starting point, this thesis will critically appraise 
the Saudi legal systems to assess its adherence to principles of natural justice and 
administrative legality. The treatment and dispute resolution of administrative contracts in 
Saudi Arabia will be also be assessed against emerging international law standards and 
principles, focusing on contemporary concepts such as the denial or access to justice, 
discrimination and minimal standards of fair treatment of foreign nationals.  
1.2 Introduction 
Due to their distinctive nature, administrative contracts involving the Saudi government 
sit uncomfortably within the Saudi statutory and Shariah frameworks. On the one hand, 
administrative contracts straddle between public and private law which attracts different 
interpretations and dispute resolution mechanisms. On the other hand, administrative 
contracts can be regulated and, more importantly, unilaterally amended by King‟s orders, 
statutes, and perhaps more fundamentally the Shariah law.  Consequently, the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia (referred to as „KSA‟) has long been recognised as a difficult jurisdiction 
in which to bring disputes or enforce foreign awards and judgments involving 
administrative contracts or, indeed, all contracts. Such complexities is further 
compounded by an undefined role of execution judge, replacing the functions of Board of 
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Grievances, under the recently introduced New Enforcement laws which came into effect 
on March 2013 by issue of Royal Decree No. M/53 (the „Enforcement law 2013‟ 
hereinafter) and the move taken in the Saudi Arbitration Law 2012 (the „SAL 2012‟ 
hereinafter) to exclude ab initio the arbitration of any disputes involving members of the 
government, and by extension contracts entered into by public authorities, except with 
explicit permission of the Council of Ministers.
59
  
Under the existing laws of Saudi Arabia – a complex blend of the ad hoc rulings of 
commercial and administrative courts, enacted legislation and customary principles of 
Islamic law – an administrative contract, by definition, is a contract formed on request of 
a public authority.
60
 In this regard, the Saudi legal system blends principles derived from 
the French system of administrative law, or droit administratif with an Islamic system of 
arbitration, as governed by norms of Shariah.
61
  
An uneasy relationship links these two distinct spheres of law and governance: the 
administrative domain of law-making and the Islamic foundation of Saudi Arabia‟s 
(unwritten) constitution.
62
 As conventionally understood, classic theories of 
administrative law are deeply rooted in principles of natural justice and bounded power. 
For the outsider, the Saudi legal system may seem to legitimize the illegitimate: the 
unprincipled, arbitrary and unbounded exercise of sovereign power. Such challenges may 
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also be levelled at the treatment of administrative contracts, in so far as these have been 
construed in a manner which escape or evade their control by ordinary rules of contract 
law or to the jurisdictional claims of international arbitration tribunals. Taken together, 
the Saudi legal system may well encounter “external” challenges on grounds that it is 
system of administrative law is subversive to the rights of foreign (and national) private 
contractors and antithetical to the principle of administrative or natural justice.
63
 
This thesis however looks more particularly on the impact of administrative law on 
administrative contracts, and more particularly on rules governing arbitration of 
administrative contracts. In the Saudi context, this requires an examination of both the 
statutory and Shariah based framework governing arbitration in KSA, and in particular 
arbitration agreements and clauses in administrative contracts.  
1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Research  
Situated from within this wider context, the aim of the current research is to explore the 
possibility of a reform on the law governing administrative contracts under Saudi public 
law and the Kingdom‟s newly streamlined commercial arbitration laws, including the 
national implementation of international arbitration standards.
64
 Through comparative 
study, this thesis aims to assess and critically evaluate the legal treatment and 
construction of state contracts under the current legal system, focusing on the rights of 
private actors who have entered into transnational agreements with Saudi governmental 
authorities.  
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To achieve this aim, the researcher intends to use research data to provide answers to the 
following robust questions.  
1.3.1 Commercial Contracts in Disguise as Administrative Contracts 
The first question to resolve is: Are all contracts labelled “administrative” under Saudi 
Law properly understood as such, or does this designation disguise the “true” intentions 
and motives of the governmental authorities? If so, how can the law governing 
administrative contracts in Saudi Arabia be reformed to achieve a more just and effective 
balance between the sovereign authority of the state and the rights of the private 
contractor? 
In the above light the thesis will reflect on the use of contractual clauses that are designed 
to exclude or limit the scope and applicability of mandatory national laws, including 
choice of law rules, stabilisation clauses, and mandatory arbitration clauses.
65
 The above 
points to tension that is well known to international legal scholars and contract theorists 
alike. In the first sense, there is a “normative pull” towards the harmonisation of 
international private law standards, grounded in Western principles of sanctity of contract 
and to a lesser extent, the good faith customary law principle known as pacta sunt 
servanda.
66
 On the other hand, there is the principle of sovereignty which requires that 
states are accorded some autonomy and flexibility to determine the laws, procedural and 
substantive, which apply to them. 
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1.3.2 International Law and Saudi Administrative Contracts 
The examination will be followed by the second question to the role then, if any, 
international law should play in administrative contracts in which municipal law is the 
exclusive choice of law: the law, more often than not, of the host state and its law alone. 
Can international law intervene in the performance of state contracts?
67
 And what of the 
reverse scenario where application of international law or third country municipal law 
leads to a “breach” or violation of Shariah law? What reconciliation may occur, if any? 
Furthermore, can a nexus between a state contract and international law be established 
under existing private international law rules?
68
 Otherwise put, can the parties‟ intention 
to internationalise the contract be soundly presumed from the inclusion of foreign „choice 
of law‟ stabilisation clauses, through reference to mandatory provisions for international 
arbitration or internationalised “conflict rules”, for example with procedurally 
harmonised arbitration rules and codes (ICC, UNICTRAL etc), or does an 
internationalized contract with a party whose domestic law is Shariah law require an 
alternative “choice of law” or expression of intent?69 
1.3.3 Arbitration of Administrative Contracts: Scope for Reform? 
From the above premises, the next question highlighted in this thesis – are state or 
“public” contracts arbitrable under the applicable law of Saudi Arabia – is, by definition, 
“dualist” in orientation. It offers a critical appraisal of the national treatment of 
administrative contracts as though it was a closed or autonomous legal system.  
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Currently, the Saudi legal system forbids governmental authorities from entering into any 
agreement with mandatory arbitration provisions, nor are governmental authorities 
permitted to enter into arbitration agreements or initiate arbitral proceedings without the 
consent of the Council of Ministries. Yet, is such an arrangement equitable from the 
perspective of private law theory, international law or, crucially, the constitutional norms 
of the Shariah governed Saudi legal system? More importantly, under what 
circumstances could an arbitration agreement or clause be deemed valid and, thereafter, 
an arbitral award made enforceable under the existing statutory and Shariah frameworks. 
1.3.4 Shariah Law, Saudi Administrative Contract and Arbitrability 
This takes us to the central question posed by this thesis: are administrative contracts, as 
governed under Saudi municipal law, arbitrable? And if so, who has the final authority 
and competence to determine these issues? Saudi courts or international arbitration 
panels? Moreover, which actors have capacity to enter into arbitration agreements under 
the existing law? Is the arbitrability of a contract itself arbitrable? 
In the absence of codified rules on private or public law, or determinate guidelines on 
Shariah Saudi legislation suffers from its inconsistent and non-transparent interpretation 
and application.
70
 The institutional or “rule of law” challenges outlined in earlier sections 
are no means unique to the legal system of Saudi Arabia. However, the Islamic 
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foundation of its legal system does present thorny questions as to the legitimate role and 
function of public law and power in the regulation of internationalised state contracts.
71
  
Saudi laws compromise a mix of regulations and principles derived from the authoritative 
sources and texts of Islam, a body of public and private law principles known as 
Shariah.
72
 Strikingly, Saudi Arabia is equally unique in so far as it is the only the legal 
system to have adopted Shariah in an uncodified form.
73
 When a matter of public policy 
is raised in a dispute, Saudi authorities are obliged to consider requirements of Shariah 
law at first instance, which are to be balanced against the wider public interest (so called 
“public order” considerations). Yet it is by means clear what is included, or excluded, by 
public policy under existing Saudi legislation, specifically in respect of those contracts 
which are governed by the “special” rules of administrative law and in connection with 
agreements which are determined non-arbitrable. 
1.4 Methodology 
The research initially employs a textual analysis methodology, a data-gathering process 
whereby valid inferences can be made by interpreting and coding textual material. This 
represents an objective tool of analysing data as it provides evidence contained in texts. 
The subject matter required a simultaneous reading of texts used in international 
contractual or transnational instruments; comparative civil law administrative law 
systems; and jurisprudential texts extracted from the sources of Islamic law (Shariah). 
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These are represented by the primary sources of the Shariah: the Quran and the Sunnah 
(the sayings, actions and tacit approval of Prophet Muhammad) and its secondary 
sources, as represented by the unanimous agreement of Islamic scholars (ijma) and 
analogical reasoning (qiyas), as well as the Saudi laws which tackle the issues discussed 
in the thesis.   
This thesis adopts a mixed approach to its methodology. Where possible, this research 
has examined the jurisprudence of KSA with the aim of illustrating or contrasting how 
KSA courts have attempted to balance public policy issues with rights protection in the 
context of administrative contracts. The limitations of the current system of adjudicating 
the administrative contract adjudication, and obsctales to arbitration, are explored through 
use of the method of comparative jurisprudence, specifically by focusing on how other 
courts and tribunals in foreign legal systems, or through the framework of international 
arbitration, have approached the most contentious issues associated with the treatment 
and dispute resolution of administrative contracts.   
The study of the KSA legal system is critically appraised from the standpoint of 
constitutional law and public law theory, particularly in chapter 2. By examining further 
the relationship between public and private law, chapter 3 focuses on the differential 
treatment of administrative and commercial contracts under the relevant administrative, 
regulatory and contractual regimes, and does so by highlighting key points of comparison 
and contrast between civil law and Islamic concepts of contract law, which are then used 
to critically appraise the current practice of administrative (and private) contract 
regulation in KSA. While this research does not apply a comparative method in the 
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strictest sense, it does attempt to contrast many key aspects of the governance, contract 
law, adjudication and dispute resolution of administrative contracts in KSA with two key 
legal systems: France and Egypt. Chapters 2, 3 4 include sections which draw final 
comparisons with Saudi Shariah and domestic laws, which address the issues relevant to 
the subject of this study.  
Saudi Arabia has, in-part, adopted its administrative law and contracts practice from 
international law and Shariah based models. Given the strong influence of French models 
of administrative contract law on KSA, key insights are drawn from similarities and 
differences in structures, administrative law processes and dispute settlement practices in 
France, Similarly Egypt is selected because of its application of Islamic Shariah law 
which is also a defining feature of the KSA legal system.   
The primary difference between a common-law system and a civil law system is that a 
common law system is strict in its system of binding judicial review and administrative 
decisions, basing those powers in systems of checks and balances; legislation; and 
promulgated standards for proper rule-making. While there are similar practices of 
sovereignty of the state, indemnification, good faith and fairness in civil law systems, 
under Shariah law, and specifically in KSA rules and regulations; individual rights to 
contract are fiercely protected within the common-law systems, with no unilateral 
modifications or authority by one party over the other, it is a system of mutuality, 
exhaustive remedies, and notions of fairness.  
Egypt is considered closely related to Saudi Arabia in both civil and Islamic legal 
systems, similarly based in Shariah Law as well as civil law, but it operates under a more 
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comprehensive system of codified law, judicial and case law precedence, scholarly 
influence, and settled principles of contract law. Egypt promulgated its civil law into a 
Civil Code in 1948 and is considered to be the “code” which other Islamic states have 
modelled their existing codes after.
74
 France, also a civil law system, is considered to be 
the “father” of administrative law in a civil law, consultative system, the first to establish 
an administrative judicial review tribunal and system of legal regulation.  
The French system provides the distinction that an administrative contract could be 
defined as such by function of law, i.e. codified, regulated, original authorization, etc., or 
by function of a judicial interpretation which considers the content and satisfaction of 
certain criteria. However, French system does not default to a Shariah construct in its 
evaluation, but is characterized by recorded judicial precedent, sophisticated legal tests 
and principles, documented case law, fully developed dispute resolution techniques, and a 
restrictive handling of arbitration matters. Over the course of their history, France's 
administrative courts have developed an extensive and coherent case law (jurisprudence 
constante) and legal doctrine (principes généraux du droit and principes fondamentaux 
reconnus par les lois de la République), often before similar concepts were enshrined in 
constitutional and legal texts.
75
 Both France and Egypt have a Conseil d‟Etat, which is 
similar to the Council of Ministers and the Board of Grievances in Saudi Arabia. They 
also practice public interest notions of unilateral modification, unilateral cancelation, 
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financial equilibrium, and penalties. These comparisons will be dealt with in greater 
detail throughout the thesis. 
As will be discussed, the legal order of France and Egypt each impose restrictions on the 
arbitration of governmental disputes, extending to disputes arising from administrative 
contracts (chapters 5 and 6). This methodology is critical as France is considered to be 
the „patriarch‟ of administrative law whereas Egypt directly adopted and trained under 
French jurists and experts, while being the first Islamic state to codify and incorporate 
Shariah law into a civil administrative law system. The Saudi system has been adapted 
from these two legal systems, but customized to Saudi Arabia‟s terminology and 
ideology of Shariah law, as well as its autonomous domestic administrative law and 
jurisprudence. This method highlights the parallels and gaps between the systems. It 
further establishes customary standards and legal concepts for examination of arbitration 
in administrative law within civil law and Shariah law based systems, within the broader 
context of western based arbitration practices. This method is also objective as it makes 
the study more structured and conclusions derived more precise.   
One of the overarching objectives of this study is to distinguish between Islamic law, 
KSA domestic administrative law, international administrative law, and western based 
contractual practices. However, the inherent differences in the theoretical basis for each 
of these systems is the source of tension in practice as well as scholarly study. In 
considering these issue, chapter 5 broadens the focus away from its study of the law 
governing administrative contracts in the state setting to consider how international law 
and other relevant customary practices can be applied to the rise of international state 
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contracts. These comparative or international insights are then used to identify key areas 
of reform and progress in the context of KSA, particularly in respect of the future 
development of KSA‟ arbitration framework. 
One of the limits of the methodology applied to this research is that it is extremely 
difficult to find published decisions of Saudi courts, administrative or commercial, and 
case law covering the direct differences between Saudi Arabia‟s administrative law 
system and other legal systems. What case law or jurisprudence that is available is often 
only known about through verbal accounts from Saudi legal professionals or limited 
references in previous studies. So, the researcher was either limited in the information 
available on orally shared cases, or found it necessary to access Arabic and English 
translated sources with references to previous cases, again with limited documentation of 
case proceedings, judicial reasoning, and decision-making authorities, thereby limiting 
his ability to get a detailed understanding of the facts of a dispute or judicial reasoning. 
1.5 Research Rationale  
This thesis will focus primarily on administrative contracts and in particular those 
contracts which straddle the boundaries between public and private law, and which do not 
fit neatly within the categories of state-regulated public contracts and international 
commercial contracts governed by the rules of private law (and international law). These 
contracts are best described as transnational state contracts which is commonly 
interchanged with the term international administrative contracts in the literature.
76
 Saudi 
Arabia has experienced a period of tremendous growth over the last three decades. On the 
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surface, the Saudi government has introduced a number of reforms are designed to 
liberate Saudi‟s fledgling, and low-growth, private sector from excessive state control or 
monopolisation. This leads to the conclusion of international state contracts;
77
 including 
concession agreements, treaty based investment agreements, transnational state contracts 
and most importantly international administrative agreements concluded with the state 
such as international private partnership contracts or procurement agreements.
78
 Despite 
their similarities, these agreements may well be subject to rules of a different legal 
system. The legal effects of the agreement may depend, for instance, on relevant choice 
of law, or the nature and terms of the agreement itself. This thesis will focus on those 
agreements that establish a contractual relationship between a public authority and 
private foreign entity.
79
 
For instance, international public procurement or transnational agreements strike a fragile 
balance between the sovereign authority of the contracting state and the economic 
interests of the private contractor. The “legitimate expectations” of the private contracting 
party must be balanced against the “legitimate diversity” of state laws, including its 
exclusive authority to determine the legal character of the contract and the laws 
applicable to the contractual regime.
80
 As such, the effective conclusion and enforcement 
of an international administrative contract entered into between a state and private foreign 
parties will largely depend on the extent to which the balance of rights and 
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responsibilities of each party are justly weighed and balanced.
81
 Of course, this only begs 
but does not yet answer the question: how are these dual and seemingly conflicting 
imperatives to be brought into harmony, and which takes priority in the event of a 
dispute? The regulatory autonomy of the sovereign state or the private autonomy of 
parties to decide the rules (of contract and dispute resolution) that bind them?
82
 
The above issues have significant bearing on the treatment and dispute resolution of 
administrative contracts under the governing and applicable laws of the Saudi legal 
system. In the Saudi context, after the ARAMCO decision, the site of controversy centres 
on those contractual elements of an investment, procurement, or concession agreement 
that can be properly determined as “administrative” in nature.83  
As suggested above, one noteworthy characteristic of administrative contracts is the 
exclusive power reserved to the state, and its authorities, to unilaterally modify, suspend 
or terminate the execution of a contract without the express consent of the counterparty.
84
 
With this, effective protection of the private contractor‟s rights is subject to the 
discretionary justice of administrative courts and legislators who are endowed with wide 
powers to deny or abrogate the rights of the private party, or otherwise dissolve the 
contractual bond.
85
 More contentiously, private contractors may well find themselves 
deprived of effective remedies absent judicial or other “rule of law” guarantees, including 
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opportunities to challenge acts or decisions in an international or domestic forum.
86
 As 
such, the legal character of these contracts demands further scrutiny and delineation. 
As it stands, the existing laws of Saudi Arabia – Saudi legislation and the judicial 
decision of the Board of Grievances, the Saudi equivalent of the French Council D‟Etat – 
fail to provide clear and determinate legal criteria by which an “administrative contract” - 
their constitutive features and their legal effects – can be distinguished from a civil 
contract governed under the ordinary rules of private law.
87
 This creates a legal vacuum 
in which Saudi judicial authorities, chiefly the Board of Grievance, are offered broad 
latitude to decide how such terms are to be interpreted and applied to the facts of a 
particular dispute or legal controversy. The effect of this is to imbue judicial authorities 
with wide discretionary authority to determine the content of these principles, and to 
invalidate any laws or contracts which are held to contravene these.
88
 For instance, in 
Saudi Arabia as in other GCC countries there has been a tendency to reclassify energy 
sector disputes as matters of public policy, for reasons that have as much to do with the 
nation‟s economic sovereignty as they are an attempt by Saudi Arabia to assert the 
constitutional and jurisdictional priority of its national laws and courts.
89
 The upshot of 
this “public policy” designation is to render arbitral proceedings pursued outside of 
formal courts as null and void.
90
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The larger problem is that the Saudi legal system currently lacks a settled body of legal 
principles that can be effectively applied to the construction of modern commercial 
instruments.
91
 Judicial constructions of terms like “public authority” do not only have 
bearing on the legal tests used to distinguish a public contract from a private one, they 
also implicate wider questions around the capacity of certain institutions to enter into 
contracts on behalf of state authorities, and their relationship to the non-arbitrability of 
contractual disputes involving government entities under Saudi law. 
1.6 Originality in Contributing to the Knowledge  
There is very little literature on the treatment of administrative contracts in KSA, and 
even less on dispute resolution methods in the context of administrative contracts. This 
thesis therefore seeks to „fill‟ a gap in the literature, thereby providing practitioners with 
some understanding of the relevant features of the legal system in Saudi Arabia, and the 
regulatory frameworks governing administrative contracts and arbitral recourse.   At a 
more conceptual level, the thesis will argue in favour of a constructive “best light” 
interpretation of Shariah law in the context of KSA regulation and dispute settlement of 
contract. If the legal system of Saudi Arabia is to remain competitive in the face of the 
increasing complexities of modern commercial practice, it will need to developed a more 
consistent and coherent set of standards for governing administrative contracts, Shariah 
and administrative law.  
This thesis aspires to expose and critically assess, through comparative analysis, the 
principal limitations on Saudi statutory and Shariah frameworks, and seeks to propose a 
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set of reforms towards the advancement of a “gap-less” and coherent framework on the 
regulation and arbitration of public and private contracts, rooted in principles of justice 
and rule of law. By drawing on comparative jurisprudence, and reflecting on the 
relationship between Saudi Arabia‟s municipal law and the rules of international law, the 
thesis will conclude that conflicts between laws and legal system presents an exciting 
opportunity for mutual learning and accommodation between Islamic and non-Islamic 
legal systems. Such mutual learning will enable Saudi authorities to develop more 
effective models of contract construction and dispute resolution. The goal here is to 
propose a set of legal reforms which allow for an effective and equitable balancing of 
sovereignty related concepts (immunity, exclusivity of national law, administrative 
freedom and so on) with the commercial demand for regulations which respect long 
established contractual freedoms and rights, particularly in respect of foreign entities and 
individuals made subject to the laws and legal system of KSA.
92
 
 By extension, this thesis will contend that Shariah principles need not be seen as an 
impediment to doing business in Saudi Arabia, but, rather, the reverse. Saudi arbitration 
law is ripe for change and innovation. By looking, extrinsically, to other systems for 
comparative guidance, and to the Shariah traditions intrinsic to Saudi legal system, the 
thesis attempts to expose the limitations of the existing treatment of administrative 
contracts in Saudi Arabia and considers the impact this may have on its commercial 
development. If Saudi Arabia is to become an arbitration “hub” of the region, and attract 
future business and enterprise though international contracts and partnerships, it will need 
to prove that its laws, and its legal system, are predictable, fair, and effective.  This thesis 
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will examine the arbitration of administrative contracts in KSA as a paradigmatic 
example of the strengths and weaknesses of Saudi Arabia‟s system of governance and 
dispute resolution, in view of legal systems which share similar features, and in light of 
comparative assessments of the appropriate and legitimate regulation and dispute 
resolution of increasingly complex and internationalised state contracts.  
1.7 Thesis Outline 
The subsequent Chapters in this thesis will provide an introduction to the issues arising 
from administrative contracts and place them in the context of the current research. The 
second chapter will explore the structure of the historical context for the Saudi legal 
system, the governing bodies of administrative law, and Islamic foundation of its 
constitution, focusing on the sources of Islamic law as derived from the holy text of the 
Quran. This chapter also introduces concepts of separation of powers, judicial 
subjectivity, sovereignty and capacity of the parties. The third chapter introduces the 
Islamic based definitions of contracts; considers “private” v. “public” contractual rights 
of parties within Shariah Law; presents the framework for the legislative or judicial 
identification and classification of administrative contracts; delineates the rights of parties 
within an administrative contract, including the unilateral authorities of a public entity; 
and establishes the concept of due process and legitimate expectation guarantees. The 
fourth chapter delves into the historical and comparative reforms of Saudi Arbitration 
Law and the arbitrability of administrative contracts, while leveraging contemporary 
perspectives from France and Egypt. This chapter becomes a practical anchor to 
theoretical concepts, enabling a transition to the next chapters. The fifth chapter conducts 
extensive international case law comparisons to universal administrative law practices; 
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including hindrances to KSA‟s integration of international contractual tools such as 
stabilization clauses or force majeure concepts. The sixth chapter initiates the discussions 
of socio-economic and policy oriented impediments, economic imperatives, and proposed 
reforms to arbitration practices. This conclusion to the study offers a comprehensive and 
holistic approach to practical and realistic based solutions to expanding arbitrability of 
administrative contracts within KSA under the international construct of harmonization 
and cultural dualism; thereby producing improved economic realities for KSA.  
1.8 Conclusion  
In the next chapters, the thesis will consider the implications of above discussed shifts in 
constitutional theory, including administrative law theory, and emerging international 
legal arbitration practice, reflecting, along the way, on the tensions that exist between 
them. In the first sense, this entails a consideration of how domestic courts and 
international tribunals have differentiated contractual and public administrative law from 
contract law. The differentiation is shown to have important procedural “choice of law” 
consequences, as well as impacting the substantive outcomes of decisions in which the 
rights of states are balanced against the rights of domestic and foreign contractors before 
national courts. To the extent that international tribunals may reject the national 
characterisation of an internationalised state contract as an administrative contract, 
significant questions remain over the legal basis and character of a disputed agreement, 
and the choice of forum and law used to determine these issues.  
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Chapter 2 
The Legal Framework and State Institutions of Saudi Arabia 
This chapter considers the institutional framework and structure of the Saudi legal 
system, and key sources of statutory, codified and Shariah law. It will provide the reader 
with an understanding of the key institutions that perform administrative functions in 
Saudi Arabia and the relationship between the administrative bodies of Saudi Arabia and 
other organs of the state i.e. the legislative and judicial branches. The chapter then sets 
out the main rules and guidelines which govern administrative action, specifically which 
relate to and govern administrative contract-making. These issues entail a broader 
discussion of the relationship between administrative authority, administrative principles 
and constitutional rules.  
In recent decades, the general legal subjects of “administrative contracts” and 
“arbitration” have been deduced and contemplated ad naseum by scholars, the Islamic 
legal community, and the international law arena, and yet as presented in this thesis, this 
moment in history may provide a fresh perspective for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as 
impetus for reform. Falling oil prices is an undeniable and uncontrollable force on Saudi 
Arabia‟s economy, even attracting the attention of the most stalwart religious scholars 
within the Kingdom. Such strident developments have been centrifugal in Prince 
Muhamad‟s “Vision 2030” initiative, a trend of “Saudisation” in private firms or with 
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foreign contractors, and the progressive approach King Salman established pursuant to 
the forecasted economic challenges within the Kingdom.
93
   
The inevitability of these economic forecasts on the political economy and social fabric 
of the KSA are speculative in nature, but the potential consequences, especially in terms 
of the legal implications and interplay of foreign investors, are significant and should not 
be underestimated. A natural interface to these concerns is the functionality of 
Administrative Law in Saudi Arabia‟s metamorphosis from an oil-based economy to one 
based on diversification of industries.  
Aged statistics from the Chamber of Commerce in Jeddah suggested even in 2002, “more 
than 108,648 companies and establishments are working in the procurement sector with a 
combined capital investment of 70 billion Saudi Riyals, or 14.4 per cent of non-oil GDP.  
These activities account for more than one million jobs, employing 15 percent of the total 
labor force.”94 As evidenced by KSA‟s labour statistics and the rise of state initiatives to 
refocus vast resources internally, these numbers for government workers, contracts, and 
the procurement sector have exponentially grown in the past decade. 
This means any diversification in industry or economic growth depends on administrative 
contracts, governed under KSA‟s Administrative Law, having legal or judicial 
mechanisms in place to resolve these disputes. Administrative Law includes 
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considerations of international and foreign notions of standard contract practices, KSA‟s 
own administrative contract practice, the unique characteristics of an administrative law 
construct based in a civil law system, and the overarching adherence to Shariah law 
regardless of the character of a contract. Administrative Law, and in particular the system 
of arbitration in administrative contracts, are the cornerstones to KSA‟s governing choices 
and indicative of what its economic future will be.   
While this introduction has thus far described the economic and practical state of Saudi 
Arabia, the thesis seeks to achieve a broader understanding of how the Saudi legal 
framework and state institutions come together to create their version of administrative 
law. Viewed through this lens, this chapter contextualizes its study of administrative 
contracts, and arbitration agreements in administrative contracts, from within a wider 
examination of the structure and institutional features of the Saudi government and legal 
system. This progression invites broader enquiry into classic questions of public and 
constitutional law, including questions of functionality, separation of powers, 
constitutionality, duty and authority. 
This study also considers the alleged unilateral rights of administrative authorities under 
the constitutionality of Shariah law and its tension with the protection of rights of private 
parties or contractors. The ultimate question is what are the legitimate expectations of 
rights of parties, and how are such rights derived from within Saudi Arabia‟s 
administrative framework and arbitration proceedings. This question is answered 
independently within KSA‟s system as well as through comparative study of France, 
Egypt, and similarly related administrative systems. What can be assumed by this study is 
that all civil law systems that avail themselves of administrative contracts accept that 
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performance of the contract is subject to the paramount principle of protection of public 
welfare through the driving force of public law. There is traditionally an inherent 
balancing of rights of parties even within these systems biasedly designed to protect 
public interests. A public authority can only claim to act in the public interest if their 
authority is legitimate, within the bounds of law, and subject to requirements of fairness 
as determined by the control function of an independent court.  As can be shown through 
comparisons to France, for example, the balancing is effectuated through an advanced 
system of constitutionalized checks and balances, procedural “rule of law”, and legality.   
2.1   The Legal Structure and Basis of Administrative Laws    Regulating 
Administrative Contracts  
2.1.1 Saudi Arabian Administrative Law and Court Structure: Basic 
Definitions, Historical Formation, and Contemporary Mechanisms 
Administrative Law in KSA is a combination of influences from French civil and 
administrative laws as well as Egypt‟s Shariah-based, civil law and administrative law 
system; and its own interpretations of Shariah law into domestic KSA decrees, rules, and 
regulations
95
 Administrative law is typically identified as being derived from 
constitutional and public law theories and the principle of sovereignty.  
KSA‟s entire body of domestic law originates from Shariah law and is part of the 
characterized legal collective of Arab states, as administrative law is vested in the axiom 
that divine sovereignty, or the protection of Shariah law through the autonomous 
interests, actions and laws of the State, is supreme. It also utilizes what it perceives as 
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model components from other Islamic states, such as Kuwait or Egypt,
96
 who 
comparatively have a more structured and codified approach to oversight of 
administrative contracts than KSA. More generally as a guide, KSA uses the civil law 
based system of France‟s droit administrative,97 considered the birthplace of the 
administrative law model under a civil law system. Similar to these models, KSA utilizes 
the administrative contract as the primary tool for exercise of administrative law.  
The Kingdom‟s concept of administrative law began with the formation of Saudi Arabia 
itself. Dr. Abdullah Ansary, has succinctly articulated the vast and intricate history of the 
development of Islamic tenets and administrative authority in Saudi Arabia: 
In 1924, the first King of Saudi Arabia (1932-1953)-took control over the 
Western Province of Saudi Arabia and transformed the territory into a nation by 
uniting the people, their culture and heritage, under the doctrine of Islam, while 
simultaneously validating Islamic practices as an infinite alternative to imposed 
governmental, societal, and ruling methodologies or ideologies……toward the 
establishment of a system of governance based on the Islamic principle of 
consultation, as advocated by the Quran (Islam‟s Holy Book) and the authentic 
Sunnah (Traditions of the Prophet).”98 [Italics added] 
                                                     
96Abdullah F. Ansary, „A Brief Overview of the Saudi Arabian Legal System‟ (Hauser Global Law School 
Program, New York University School of Law, July 2008); See also, Roger Perrot, Institutions Judiciaries 
(1983). 223 - 234; Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle 
East (1997) 86; Maren Hanson, „The Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia‟, 
(1987) 2(3) Arab L. Q. 286-288; George N. Sfeir, „An Islamic Conseil d'État: Saudi Arabia's Board of 
Grievance‟ (1989) 4(2) Arab L.Q. 130 
97
 A Al-Wehaiby, The Organising Principles for Administrative Contracts and their Applications in Saudi 
Arabia (1st ed., Riyadh, 2002)    
98
 Ansary (n 96)  
- 49 - 
The creation of a “complaints box” by King Abdulaziz in 192799 is considered a seed of 
administrative law and the origin of administrative tribunals. Subsequent Kings preserved 
the spirit of this historical precedent by reforming the government structure into a version 
with more delineated functions and clear chains of authority. Arguably, the most 
important player to administrative law are the King, with executive, legislative, and 
ultimate authority; the Council of Ministers, with executive and legislative authority;
100
 
and the Board of Grievances (“the Board”), the independent administrative judicial 
system.
101
  
2.1.2 The King (Executive, Legislative, and Administrative Authority) 
The King in KSA serves as President, Prime Minister, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces and ultimate decision-maker.
102
 He can issue administrative, legislative, and 
executive Orders and Decrees, which take priority over all other governmental actions or 
entities.
103
 He crafts the public policy and the leading figures in each initiative, such as 
the National Transformation Plan, through these powers. His power, however, is only 
legitimate so long as he adheres to Shariah law,
104
 including honouring his commitments, 
being fair, and upholding moral and communal tenets.  He is also subject to controversial 
limitations or conflict that may arise with the ulema (religious elites) or the Hanbali 
religious school in their interpretations of Shariah law and their assessment of the King‟s 
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actions or authority under those interpretations. Regardless, it is through these multi-
faceted roles that the King participates in the oversight of administrative contracts, and 
has the corresponding ultimate discretion in accepting, rejecting, or creating any 
administrative action or decision. 
2.1.3 The Council of Ministers (Legislative Body and Executive Advisor) 
The Council of Ministers (“the Council”, also referred to as the Cabinet) serves as the 
legislative body, executive advisor, and regulatory arm of the King, and is comprised of 
the heads of 22 ministry departments. The council drafts resolutions, which are binding 
upon a majority vote of the members, but enactment of the resolution is dependent upon 
ratification by the King‟s decree. The Council both as a whole and each minister 
individually, is responsible for drafting regulations and implementing the policies of the 
Kingdom.
105
 As Article 18 of the Council Act 1958 encapsulates the all-encompassing 
essence of the Council‟s responsibilities: 
“The Council of Ministers shall lay out the matters of the country in relation 
to international and foreign matters, finance, education, the economy, 
defence, and all public affairs and will supervise the implementation thereof.  
It retains legislative power, executive authority and administrative power. It is 
the ultimate power for financial affairs and for the entire affairs connected 
with the different ministers of the state and other government offices, and will 
determine what measures are to be taken in these matters...”106 
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Despite the declaratory nature of Article 18, as previously mentioned, an important point 
in the flow of power and authority within the administrative bodies, is that the King is 
also the Prime Minister of the Council and the person whom all decisions have to be 
ratified by for acceptance and implementation, regardless of the authorities bestowed 
upon the entirety of the Council or its individual ministers. Aside from the supreme 
nature of Shariah law and religious interpretations, the KSA hierarchy begins and ends 
with the King. The Council is also subject to share some of its administrative powers with 
judicial bodies. 
While judicial autonomy and independence are landmark features in Shariah and KSA 
law,
107
 there is protruding authority between the Council of Ministers and the Board of 
Grievances when it comes to the oversight and accountability of administrative contracts. 
The Council has reserved certain types of administrative decisions or contracts, which 
would normally fall under the purview of the Board, for itself, e.g. concession contracts 
that deal with investors and public projects or contracts regarding public loans which 
prevents any government official from signing a loan document without the Council‟s 
permission.
108
 The Council also authorized its ministers, serving as heads of ministries, to 
enter into administrative contracts on behalf of their ministry. The Minister of Finance is 
one of the more influential ministry positions as that ministry has the authority to control 
the execution of government contracts under the Tenders and Procurement Laws,
109
 
which comprises the majority of disputes brought before the Board of Grievances and are 
the subject of efforts to delineate administrative law from matters between private parties.  
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Finally, the Council has authority to establish quasi-judicial committees to assist with its 
oversight of executive affairs.
110
 Often these quasi-judicial committees are commonly the 
first stop for resolving administrative disputes between contracting parties. 
Each type of contract is a potential grievance situation that could be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Board of Grievances based on each unique fact pattern.
111
 In many 
instances, the Board serves as an appeal tribunal based on the decision of a Council 
review committee of specific complaints or situations, such as labour issues in a 
procurement contract.
112
 Ironically, it was the Council which gave the Board its “essence” 
as an administrative court by issuing a Decision in 1976, which validated the Boards 
power of review and determination, as well as its binding nature.
113
 The Council is also 
the source of shifting some adjudication jurisdiction away from the Board, for example a 
new Enforcement judge tribunal, created in 2012 through Arbitration law reforms, erodes 
some of the Board‟s authority by vesting the power of enforcement and review of arbitral 
awards with this new tribunal.  As would be expected, there seems to exist a subtle 
struggle for control, and separation of powers, between the governing bodies as to 
directing administrative policy and establishing domestically and internationally 
established protocols for handling administrative matters. 
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2.1.4 Dual-Court System (Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies): Shariah 
Courts and the Board 
Established by the King‟s Announcement of 1926, inviting all people to bring their 
complaints or grievances against other persons to him, and the Council of Ministers‟ Act 
of 1958; the dual-court system is comprised of the Shariah Courts, which have 
jurisdiction over land, family, civil, and criminal matters; and the Board (or Diwan Al-
Madhalem), which is the primary adjudication authority for disputes in administrative 
matters, in particular public sector projects.
114
 The court systems have equal authority and 
the power to bind parties within their judicial decisions.  
Shariah courts appear to have overlapping jurisdiction with the Board of Grievances in 
some instances. Not every contract entered into by a government agency or entity is 
deemed to be an administrative contract, and therefore are subject to the civil and 
commercial authority of the Shariah courts.  An example would be when the government 
rents offices, or sells parts of its goods or property, they enter into a private contract, 
subject to the normal evaluation of Shariah contractual standards. As is evident in 
evaluation of the nature of administrative contracts, this difference in jurisdiction is not 
always a clear.   
The Shariah courts also include or stand alongside specialized committees who have 
specific jurisdiction over types of cases.
115
 These often overlap with the Board of 
Grievances and on a case-by-case basis it is determined which tribunal has authority of 
review and jurisdiction. Examples are the Committee for Banking Disputes, The 
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Commission for Settlement of Labour Disputes, and the Committee for Adjudication of 
Insurance Related Disputes and Violations of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency.
116
 As 
a result of legal reforms in KSA in 2007 and 2012, jurisdiction for commercial cases will 
be transferred from some of these tribunals, as well as the Board of Grievances, to the 
Shariah courts and a new commercial tribunal that is to be established.
117
 While the 
intent of this tribunal is to clarify adjudication jurisdiction and procedures, it may well 
magnify existing confusion amongst parties to contracts as to which judicial authority is 
the appropriate venue to file a claim. As is evident from this discussion, some hybrid 
contracts or matters with commercial, administrative, and topic-specific provisions may 
well fall into the simultaneous jurisdictions of the Shariah courts, the Board, the new 
Enforcement tribunal, and even quasi-judicial committees under the Council.
118
 
2.1.5 The Board of Grievances (Judicial – Administrative Body) 
The Board is the primary authority in administrative law and has terminal discretion in 
administration of matters or contracts involving a public entity. The Board went through a 
series of reforms in 2007, namely the Law of the Board of Grievances (promulgated by 
Royal Decree No. M/78 of 18 Ramadan 1428H (October 1st, 2007))
119
 which clarified 
the parameters of its adjudicative authority and established a hierarchy. The SAL 2012 
reforms by the Council and the Board, later revised the Arbitration Laws and established 
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Enforcement Laws; which amongst many articles, created an Enforcement Judge who 
presides over enforcement decisions related to commercial or administrative contracts, 
international alternative dispute resolution decisions (such as arbitration agreements), and 
arbitral awards.
120
  
The Board has the general jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputes in which the 
administration is one of its parties, whether raised by an award, a contract or an incident.  
While under the Act, the Board‟s actual decision-making authority and power applies to 
seven specific types of cases,
121
 for purposes of this thesis they can be categorized into 
1.) disputes relating to annulment, or assessing the validity, of administrative decisions 
2.) integrated judicial disputes (such as disputes of employment and retirement rights 
between a government employee and the ministry which employs them; or compensation 
disputes by public procurement private contractors), and 3.) the judiciary as a 
disciplinarian of administrative staff (within each ministry as brought by the aggrieved 
party or the ministry whose rules an employee has violated; or through external 
complaints by private parties against government officials).
 122
  It has also been accepted 
                                                     
120
 Saud Al-Ammari & A. Timothy Martin, „Arbitration in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia‟ (2014) 
Arbitration International 389; See also Royal Decree No. M/34 dated 24 Jumada 1433H, corresponding to 
16 April 2012G. On 8 June 2012, the law was published in the official gazette, Um Al-Qura. In accordance 
with Article 58 of the New Arbitration Law, the law came into force 30 days after the date of its 
publication, which was 19 Sha‟baan 1433H corresponding to 9 July 2012G. The Implementing Regulations 
of the New Arbitration Law were not published as of the date that this article was written. The English 
translation of the New Arbitration Law can be found on the website of the Saudi Bureau of Experts, which 
provides all official translations of Saudi laws and regulations: <http://www.boe.gov.sa> accessed 23  
February 2017; 
See also Royal Decree No. M/53 dated 13 Sha‟baan 1433H, corresponding to 3 July 2012G.  The 
Enforcement Law was published in the official gazette, Um Al-Qura in Issue No. 4425, Year 90, 13 Shawal 
1433H, corresponding to 31 April 2012G. In accordance with Article 98 of the Enforcement Law, the law 
came into force 180 days after the date of its publication, which was 16 Rabi II 1434H corresponding to 27 
February 2013G. The Implementing Regulations of the Enforcement Law were published on 17 Rabi II 
1434H corresponding to 28 February 2013G 
121
 Al-Jarbou (n119) 19-21; See also Board of Grievances 2007 Statute, Art. (1) enacted by Royal Decree 
No. M/78 dated 19/9/1428 
122
 Board of Grievances 2007 Statute, Art. 13(A-C), enacted by Royal Decree No. M/78 dated 19/9/1428 
- 56 - 
that the Board has general jurisdiction to hear any administrative party-related case, even 
if the party or case is normally adjudicated in other courts or if neither the party nor the 
case is clearly defined as administrative.  If a matter is found to fall outside of the Board‟s 
jurisdiction, it has the authority to transfer the case to the appropriate tribunal.
123
 This 
broad stroke rule has diminished jurisdictional lines and exaggerated the number of 
instances in which the Board has exercised its adjudicative authority, particularly when it 
comes to matters involving foreign parties. 
The 2007 reforms attempted to resolve conflicting jurisdiction between the Board and 
other court systems within the Kingdom, and set forth guidelines for the jurists in 
reaching decisions on matters under consideration such as administrative decisions, 
compensation, contracts and disciplinary measures.
124
 Some of these procedures were 
promulgated into rules in 2013, but reservations remained in place for any procedures 
that may conflict with Shariah law.
125
 In these reforms, the Board‟s authority was 
expanded to include wide powers of review, such as the general jurisdiction , and the task 
of expanding the list of administrative law contracts beyond those classed as such under 
existing legislation.
126
 As will be discussed later, the latter classification is considered to 
be “by function of law” and the former is by “judicial determination”. Within its 
adjudicative authority, as immunized by Shariah law, the Board shall classify (or re-
classify) contracts as administrative or non-administrative, determine lawfulness and 
validity, assess penalties against parties, and exercise independent discretion in 
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enforcement.
127
 This authority exists regardless of whether an opposing party to a 
government entity is public, private, or foreign. 
The Board is considered an ultimate guardian of Saudi Arabia‟s sovereignty. As such, the 
Board has final say on any administrative related grievance or complaints filed with its 
chairman,
128
 whether international or domestic. It should be noted that sovereign acts are 
generally understood, not justiciable in any court. Rather, sovereign acts are afforded safe 
harbour under international law doctrine of sovereign immunity (in classic administrative 
law this is known as administrative liability). Leaving aside the delicate matter of 
justiciability of sovereign acts in foreign courts, applying international or domestic law, it 
is fairly established that the administration of domestic affairs are generally considered 
distinct from sovereign acts. This is an important point If as it will be shown, a private 
party to an administrative contract is generally refused opportunities to bring disputes 
before a neutral and independent arbitrator or tribunal, it becomes vitally important that 
the discretionary power of public authorities are subject to independent review and 
control by the competent court: in this case the Board of Grievances. The public authority 
could still exercise its functions and powers appropriately in the administration of an 
administrative contract or public-private partnership whenever necessary, provided that 
the Board is sufficiently vigilant to any abuse of power or infringement of administrative 
(procedural fairness) rights, or substantive breach of the party‟s expectations under 
contract. It is not entirely obvious, however, that the Board does in fact bring into 
equitable reconciliation the rights of the individual and freedom of administrators to 
exercise their powers in the service of public needs and interests. 
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The independence, and supreme authority, of the Board is enshrined in Article 46 of the 
Kingdom‟s Basic Law of Governance which states “the judiciary shall be an independent 
authority and, in their administration of justice, judges shall be subject to no authority 
other than that of the Islamic Shariah.”129 This authority of independent review is 
unprecedented, figuratively and literally speaking. It means the Board is not bound by 
legal precedent, or in some cases codified or statutory laws, requiring individual jurists to 
delicately apply legal sources of law and logical reasoning to perceived “gaps” in Shariah 
law, based on their many years of service and experience within the KSA legal system. 
2.1.6 Enforcement Tribunal (Judicial – Administrative and Commercial 
Body) 
Growing international pressures and economic realities forced the Council to re-evaluate 
the possibility of using arbitration practices and international mechanisms for dealing 
with disputes, outside the construct of the Board system. The international reputation of 
the Board as being complicated in its procedures dampened executive efforts to grow 
industry, thus necessitated a fresh approach by KSA to an efficient process of 
enforcement. Established through the passage of the New Enforcement Law of 2012,
130
 
this new judicial body has adopted the Board‟s powers of review and enforcement of 
arbitral awards.  Similar to the Board, this tribunal sits separate and apart from the 
Shariah courts and is enshrined with authority through the executive and legislative 
interests of the Council and the King. Its purpose is to improve the transparency and 
consistency in enforcement of arbitral awards, and to make the process more accessible to 
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private parties and foreign entities who enter into arbitration proceedings with Saudi 
Arabian parties.
131
   
Under the 2007 Board of Grievances Law, parties who sought enforcement of arbitral 
awards before the Board were often exposed to entire retrials of an original dispute based 
on the merits of Shariah law.
132
 Article 2 of the new Enforcement Law, authorizes the 
Enforcement Tribunal to review and enforce such awards related to commercial, private, 
and international matters, but confusingly restricts review of administrative or criminal 
matters. Article 10 provides for Appeal of the Enforcement Judge‟s decision to the 
Supreme Administrative Body of the Board.  It is not clear how the enforcement judge 
bypasses full consideration of an arbitration proceeding in enforcing an award or any 
adherence to Shariah law, for as we have already established, Shariah law is the binding 
authority for all governmental entities within the KSA. This seems to be an inherent flaw 
in the new regulations. This then becomes a more complicated question of separation of 
powers, of which we will discuss further in this chapter. 
2.2  Sources of Law Created or Utilized by Administrative Decision-Makers 
Administrative bodies and jurists tasked with decision-making authority, or in 
consideration of contractual disputes between parties, functionally rely on a system of 
secondary sources of administrative law: Basic Law of Governance, Royal Decrees, 
Royal Orders, Council of Ministers‟ Orders, ministerial regulations and circulars, as well 
as promulgated regulations or limited codification, and case-by-case independent judicial 
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analysis. This system does not include record-keeping practices, case law precedent, or 
publication of rendered decisions. Further, all secondary sources, decisions made, and 
even contracts themselves are subject to reversal or dismantling in order to perpetuate the 
sanctity of Shariah Law. 
2.2.1 Statutory Mechanisms in Saudi Arabian Shariah Law: The Quran, 
the Sunnah, Fatwa, Royal Decrees, Royal Orders, Council of 
Ministers‟ Regulations, Circulars, Codes, and Independent 
Jurisprudence 
2.2.1.1 Supremacy of Shariah - Primary Sources of Law 
Shariah Law is the divine, unequivocal authority for all social, cultural, religious, public, 
private, and governmental affairs in the Kingdom. Any normative practice, cultural 
imperative, or legal perspective is ordained from within Shariah Law. Shariah Law is 
comprised first and foremost of the Quran (the written word of Allah) and the Sunnah 
(the teachings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad). Secondarily important are 
human interpretations (fiqh and fatwa) or consensus by the religious scholars (ijma)
133
, 
the religious elite (ulema) or specific religious schools of thought such as Wahhabism or 
Hanbali, which can range from traditional or contemporary
134
; literal or theoretical; and 
patriarchal or progressive readings. This religious establishment has an authority that 
supersedes that of any Royal family or governmental entity. As alluded to in the previous 
section on judicial structures in KSA, independent judgment and legal reasoning using 
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analogy by jurists (ijtihad) is also accepted as a secondary authority in Shariah law, 
particularly within the legislative or judicial constructs.  
2.2.1.2 Secondary Sources of Law 
Saudi Arabia does not have a formal constitution, traditional legislation or 
comprehensively codified laws, but instead operates under the Basic Law of Governance, 
Royal Decrees, Royal Orders, and Council of Ministers‟ Regulations, as well as other 
similarly functioning sources.
135
 The purpose of these sources is to “execute” Shariah 
law and principles into practical governmental and societal rules for the people of KSA to 
follow. The Basic Law outlines the responsibilities and processes of the governing 
institutions but is insufficiently specific to be followed as a conventional constitution 
would be.
 136
 The King has the discretionary authority, within the confines of Shariah 
Law and religious scholarly interpretation, to issue Royal Decrees or Orders of his own 
cognizance or upon ratification of resolutions, regulations, or implementation policies 
from the Council of Ministers.
137
 Royal Decrees, or Orders, are considered to be 
regulations, not laws, because the term “law” is considered to be Shariah law, namely the 
Quran or Sunnah.
138
  Noticeably missing as a traditional source for administrative law 
discussion, is a comprehensive, working body of developed laws or codes. Instead, KSA 
                                                     
135
 Brian (n 133) 
136
 Whiteley (n 104) “To the extent that the Basic Law can be considered an „informal‟ constitution, Article 
I establishes the Quran and the Sunnah as the „formal‟ constitution.” 
137
 Basic Law of Governance, Royal Order No. (A/91) dated 27 Sha‟ban 1412H – 1 March 1992. (See 
Article 70: Laws, international treaties and agreements, and concessions shall be issued and amended by 
Royal Decrees.  See also Articles 5, 8, 55 and 56 pertaining to the King‟s authority.) 
138
 Gayle E. Hanlon, „International Business Negotiations in Saudi Arabia‟, in James R Silkenat, Jeffrey M. 
Aresty & Jacqueline Klosek (eds), The ABA Guide to International Business Negotiations ( American Bar 
Association 2009) 918 
- 62 - 
operates on limited codified rules and regulations, with deference to religious or 
independent interpretations and applications of Shariah law. 
2.2.1.2.1 Royal Decrees 
Royal Decrees are issued in the name of the King, as the head of the Council.  He has 
ultimate discretion as to whether or not to issue a Royal Decree. General policy, treaties, 
charters, and public concessions are all issued and amended in accordance with Royal 
Decrees. The underlying laws or regulations to each Decree have been drafted, debated, 
and approved by a majority of the Council. Royal Decrees prevail over any other 
regulation except Shariah law, and are more consequential than other sources of law, as 
to their effect on the administrative system.
139
 
More recent examples of Decrees which have had significant effect on administrative law 
in KSA include, Royal Decree No. M/SI, art. 8, dated 17/07/1402 A.H. (1982), which 
established the Board of Grievances as an independent body and the subsequent Royal 
Decree No. M/78, dated 19/9/1428 AH. (2007), which established the 2007 statutory 
reforms of the Board of Grievances. These Decrees have already been introduced, but 
their importance lies in their creation of a powerful, independent administrative, judicial 
entity, which is at the centre of this study and the discourse surrounding administrative 
contracts and the rights of parties within those contracts.  
Other Decrees relevant to administrative law, and as impactful as the creation of the 
Board, include Royal Decree No. M/46, art. 3, 12/7/1403 AH. (1983), The Law of 
Arbitration, which established that approval of the Council of Ministers has to be 
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obtained before a government entity can submit to arbitration.  It also entrenched the 
authority of the King, the Council of Ministers, or the Board to alter the arbitrator‟s 
decision. This Decree created a significant threshold issue and deterrent to foreign 
elements in administrative contracts within KSA. 
Royal Decree No. M/34, dated 24/5/1433H (16 April 2012) solidifying the Arbitration 
and Enforcement Reforms
140
 and Royal Decree No. M/53 March 2013, promulgating 
rules for the creation of the Enforcement tribunal and laws, distinct from the Board of 
Grievances. As will be more appropriately discussed in later chapters, the Arbitration and 
Enforcement Laws similarly set new standards within KSA for how they intend to 
oversee administrative contracts and to engage in fresh dialogues concerning the practice 
of arbitration with foreign elements. 
Decrees also regulate industry and set standards for performance and accountability for 
execution, inferring specific obligations for both private and public parties engaged in 
contracts, subject to the Decrees. For example, Royal Decree No. M/58, dated 4/91427 
A.H. (2006), the Government Tender and Procurement Statute, Art. 54 require a public 
agency to execute an administrative contract in accordance with its terms. This Decree 
and associated “Code” is the most often leveraged Code in the body of KSA law because, 
as the statistics have illustrated, procurement and concession contracts in administrative 
law, are the most prolific contracts within KSA and therefore those most often subject to 
disputes and means of relief or resolution.  As will be analysed , there are rules within 
this code that apply to government entities during the bidding and award processes, but 
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the burden primarily rests on the private party who has the responsibility of execution of 
the contract.  
The oft-cited concern of Royal Decrees, and a grave weakness in administrative law, is 
the breadth of Royal Decrees not implemented, or done so in a fragmented fashion, such 
as in codified laws which only address certain provisions of the Royal Decree (or 
Regulation) and intentionally omit other equally important provisions whose 
implementation would enhance transparency, enforcement, and consistency within KSA‟s 
administrative law practice. This is evident in the fact that KSA does not have an actual 
Administrative Law Code, but instead relies on a conglomeration of Decrees, 
Regulations, and Circulars. Another example is Article 47 of the 1982 Board‟s Act which 
requires that the Board classify, print, and publish their decisions on an annual basis. 
However this has not been carried out since 1980 due to lack of consistency in the 
codification and enforcement process.
141
 Given that the Council of Ministers and the 
King assisted in the creation and authority of the Board, deliberate choices are being 
made by officials as to which laws, rules, and regulations to promulgate or enforce, the 
motivation behind which is not always evident.  
2.2.1.2.2 Royal Orders, Council of Ministers‟ Regulations, Ministerial 
Regulations and Circulars 
Adding to the complexity and highlighting the fragmentary nature of the Saudi legal 
system are Royal Orders, Council of Ministers‟ Regulations, Ministerial Regulations and 
Circulars. A Royal Order, akin to an executive order, has a variety of functions all 
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stemming from the King, as the head of state.  Likewise, the Council of Ministers issues 
regulations regarding the executive work of government agencies focused on internal 
policy and functionality of government entities, and are the “promulgation” and 
“implementation” mechanism for Royal Decrees.142 The Regulations often serve as the 
substance to the Royal Decrees, transforming into the “codified laws”, ministerial 
procedures or directives, and authority for quasi-judicial committees and are 
intermittently published in The Gazette. Each Minister and heads of government agencies 
may also issue circulars or regulations, known as Ministerial Regulations or Circulars and 
not to be confused with Council of Minister regulations. These ministerial regulations 
and/or circulars serve to instruct its public employees or private contractors regarding the 
function, operations, and procedures of that agency. They are not typically published, but 
may be posted on websites, physically posted in the individual ministries, or dispersed to 
employees via technological means and are insubordinate to Royal Decrees, Royal 
Orders, and Council Regulations.   
2.2.2 Consideration of Codified Laws Applicable to Administrative 
Contracts 
Codified law in Saudi Arabia is limited in scope and nature, based on intentional 
omissions or gaps in Shariah Law, or as another explanation the Kingdom has only 
codified areas of law in which there is clearly no conflict with the purpose and guidance 
of Shariah Law. As Dr. A. Alasry has observed, “modern statutory laws and regulations 
can be introduced and adopted only through the doctrine of public interest (a l-maslahah 
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al-mursalah) as a basis for rule making.”143 Neither “contracts”144 nor specifically 
classified “administrative contracts” have their „own‟ set of codified laws in Saudi 
Arabia, rather they are governed and classified by the Board‟s independent judicial 
reasoning and inter-related Codes.
145
 Current “codified” laws affecting administrative 
authority and contracts include but are not limited to areas of procurement, labour, real 
property, finance, bribery, insurance, utilities, enforcement, and arbitration.
146
 These 
codes are construed as administrative in nature because administrative contracts regularly 
involve projects of construction, public utility, and commercially regulated activities that 
have a fiduciary or economic interest for the state.
147
   
The Board applies these codes as part of their evaluation, reclassification, and 
enforcement considerations. The Board assimilates these regulations into its contractual 
assessment of valid conditions, public interest operations, and administrative authority. 
Many of the codes reflect the Board‟s punitive authority to issue financial sanctions or 
terminate contracts. The codes markedly utilized by the Board in their independent 
evaluations include the Government Tender and Procurement Law, the Labour and 
Workmen‟s Law, the Contract Law Licensing Requirements and Insurance Law, and 
codes pertaining to bribery of public officials as well as environmental and safety issues.  
Many of these codes apply to private or commercial contracts, but due to the pervasive 
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use of procurement contracts in administrative matters, there is significant interchange 
between these types of contracts and seemingly commercial codes. This is illustrated in 
the way the codes themselves are written and in the non-linear jurisdictional lines 
between the Council, the Board, and Shariah courts. 
Originally called the Bids and Tender Act, the Procurement Code was created by the 
Council of Ministers in 1968.
148
 In the wake of increased government spending and oil 
related profits, the Council recognized the need for a cohesive system in dealing with 
government-related purchases and projects.
149
 Throughout the following decades, the 
Tender Act grew exponentially in power, scope, and uniformity to become the 
Procurement Code, currently mandated by the KSA.
150
 The Government Tender and 
Procurement Law of 2006 is the ruling code, but is unabatedly subject to commentary, 
revision, and modification through the Council‟s actions or circulars. Created by Royal 
Decree in 2006, this Statute contains significant provisions for the expected roles of 
parties, their rights, obligations, and means of defining the intent of a contract.
151
 This 
statue is demonstrative of the issues related to the adjudicative and classification 
authority of the Board, and in specific instances the Council of Ministers, within 
administrative contracts. 
Article 77 of the Procurement Law mandates “contractors and government authorities 
shall execute their contracts in accordance with contract terms, in good faith and as the 
proper functioning and interest of the public utility.”152 This applies for any contract 
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under the purview of the procurement code. The procurement code also emphasizes the 
principles of equal treatment, or no discrimination, of potential contractors (including 
foreign entities) in either the bidding or awarding process; as well as transparency 
through publication requirements of the projects and awards.
153
 This sets a certain 
expectation that all private parties or foreign contractors will be fully engaged and un-
biasedly considered in the bidding process and in contract formation. The code stipulates 
that national products and contractors are to be favoured in order to protect Saudi 
industries. The bidding and award processes are divided into open, selective, or direct 
categories, depending on the type of contract, the nature of the project, and the timeline 
with which the project needs to be completed. Finally, the code distinguishes between 
public works, supply, concessions, and operations or maintenance contracts, providing 
different rules for each type of contract regarding the bidding, awarding, and performance 
stages of the project. 
The code‟s stated purpose is designed around economic efficiency, timely completion of 
government projects, and the protection of public funds expended in the course of 
performance of procurement contracts. Ideally, it sets the expectations, rights, and 
obligations of the parties involved in an administrative contract, but as is evident in 
practice, the role of the government authority and its weighted obligations towards the 
public distort the normal expectations of parties in a contract. For example, instead of 
parties being on “equal footing” of mutuality in actions or decisions, a contractor is 
subject to unilateral authorities of the government entity within a procurement contract 
that severely restricts the contractor‟s ability to seek relief from any decision made by the 
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government entity. Specifically, the government authority has the power to modify or 
terminate the contract as well as to penalize the contractor for delays, failures to perform, 
or certain criminal acts, such as bribery of a public official.
154
 Conversely, as Articles 54 
and 78 state, a contractor‟s rights are limited to compensation related matters and 
adjudication through the Board.
155
 Such articles within this Code illustrate the differences 
in the rights and obligations of the party, including limitations to the use of unilateral 
powers by a government entity, exorbitantly detailed requirements for foreign related 
contractors who are awarded an administrative procurement contract, high-risk 
performance expectations which are set for each contractor, and the consistency with 
which the Board rules in favour of the government authority in light of public interest. 
Recent governmental policies such as the Nitaqat programme (“Saudisation”) are directly 
affecting the nature and administration of procurement contracts, and being integrated 
into everything from the Laws themselves to Decrees, Regulations, and Circulars as well 
as into the government sponsored project of every ministry within KSA. Generally, KSA 
is taking initiative to promote the training and retention of a Saudi workforce, and 
reducing dependence on foreign labour, by promulgating specific rules and regulations.
156
  
Specifically, procurement contracts now include provisions obligating a contractor, in 
particular foreign contractors, to meet certain standards.  Examples include the Council of 
Ministers Resolution No. 124, which states “foreign entities engaged in public works 
contracts are required to give 30% of the work under the contract to Saudi Arabian 
nationals”, i.e. direct employees or subcontractors who are Saudi nationals; or 
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requirements that private firms must employ a certain percentage of Saudi nationals; and 
limit any foreign workers under its payroll for a particular project to those with 3 or more 
years of explicit experience.
157
 This means that a contractor is subject to sanctions or 
penalties by the government authority (in case of procurement contracts, the Minister of 
Finance or the Board) for any violations related to these new criteria, no matter how 
unduly burdensome they may be to a contractor to administrative contracts. 
As demonstrated by the foregoing discussion, the KSA codified law is complicated, yet 
reflective of the country‟s commitment to standardize certain processes for maximum 
efficiency and benefit to both the KSA and its partners.  The totality of secondary sources 
of administrative law in KSA are inherently concentric in their nature to protect the 
sovereignty of the state, while respecting the religious traditions of the past and 
commercial pressures of the future. The application of Shariah Law, however, can be 
confounding for foreign partners in administrative contracts, but provides consensual 
markings, which serve as the basic understanding for any contractual issue in KSA. 
2.3 Arbitration-Specific Mechanisms 
The above legal structures and mechanisms apply to all administrative contracts, but 
there are tools and issues specific to the management of arbitration agreements and 
clauses, which themselves are also administrative contracts or provisions within 
administrative contracts. The tools are the powers of review by the judicial or executive 
bodies and legislation or regulations that have been passed by the Council of Ministers to 
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control rights and expectations of parties; as well as to set procedures and substantive 
matters of arbitration. Explanation of these tools is important in framing the rest of this 
thesis.   
2.3.1 Legislative and Judicial Bodies 
2.3.1.1 Board of Grievances  
When issues arise as to jurisdiction, interpretation and enforcement of arbitration in the 
context of Administrative Contracts, such as application of Shariah to an arbitration 
clause within a contract or the scope of the Prime Minister approval requirement, i.e. 
what are and what are not “governmental bodies” under Article 10(2) of the New 
Arbitration Law, the Board of Grievances is typically the supervising and reviewing 
court. Their discretion is determinative of the rights of parties within arbitration, the 
threshold for proceeding with or enforcement of arbitration matters, and a purportedly 
biased weapon in upholding the constitutionality and convoluted sovereignty of Saudi 
Arabia. 
2.3.1.2 Council of Ministers  
As was discussed in Council of Ministers earlier, their ability to pass regulations and 
resolutions is the mechanical implementation of specific laws.  In terms of Arbitration, 
the Council has passed specific laws related to the Arbitration process, including the New 
Arbitration Law (“SAL 2012”) see below, and the controversial yet historically 
significant Resolution No. 58, but has poignantly failed to issue a resolution pertaining to 
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any Prime Minister approval of arbitration for Administrative Contracts, rendering such 
approval a subjectively volatile interpretive matter for all parties involved. 
2.3.1.3 Enforcement Judge 
As review, the Enforcement Judge overseas specific and limited matters of review and 
enforcement of arbitral awards.  Their authority overlaps with that of outside tribunals 
and the Board.  
2.3.1.4 Saudi Arabia Commercial Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Centre   
The new centre, opened in October 2016, is an example of a thriving, in-house arbitration 
system which provides parties access to Shariah and international law experts.
158
  It 
serves as a case study in how Muslim and non-Muslim based systems can cooperate to 
the mutual benefit of both parties within arbitration within Saudi Arabia. While, this 
centre is not currently used for arbitration of administrative contracts, it is a reference 
point for reform. 
2.3.2 Codified Laws or Regulations Pertaining to Arbitration Matters 
2.3.2.1 Resolution 58   
Resolution 58 was passed on June 25, 1963 in response to a notorious arbitration case 
involving the Saudi Government as a party. While the case shall be discussed at length 
throughout this study, what is pertinent to a framework discussion is that this Resolution 
forbid state agencies to resort to arbitration except in some cases where special 
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authorization is required. In practice, it confined arbitration to the private sector and 
severely restricted any administrative participation in resolving disputes through 
arbitration proceedings. This Resolution is an obstacle to the arbitration of administrative 
contracts and the subject of debates on reform, and example of what can happen when 
parties make certain choices related to venue, rule of law, and arbitrators within the 
confines of Saudi Arabia. 
2.3.2.2 The New Arbitration Law (“SAL 2012”)  
Touted as significant strides towards international standards and a statutory scheme more 
accepting of foreign participants, the SAL 2012 is modelled after the 1985 UNCITRAL 
standards on international commercial arbitration.  It sets up new systems, procedures, 
and requirements for arbitration in KSA. Primarily designed for commercial or 
international proceedings, it does contain reservations for administrative contracts and 
matters involving the Saudi Government. The reigns of sovereignty are still tightly 
gripped within this new law, but signs of a loosened hold still emerge.  For instance, it 
empowers the Council of Ministers to modify the provisions of SAL that prohibit State 
entities from resorting to arbitration. For such entities, an authorization to resort to 
arbitration no longer needs a legislative act issued by Royal Decree amending the Act, 
but a simple decree of the Council of Ministers is now sufficient. In any case, the Prime 
Minister (e.g. the King) is empowered to authorize state entities to resort to arbitration, 
for example, if he approves a procurement contract containing an arbitration clause. Thus, 
SAL confirmed the former prohibition, under Res. 58, but gave the Prime Minister, who 
is also the King of Saudi Arabia, the power to depart therefrom. 
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2.3.2.3 The Enforcement Law  
This law passed in July 2012 introduces the institution of quadi al tanfiz or the 
enforcement judge (similar to a “juge de l‟execution” in France).159  It establishes 
authority, procedures, and regulations pertaining to this new court and its interplay with 
the Board in effectuating the review and enforcement of arbitral awards. 
2.3.3 International Conventions and Agreements 
2.3.3.1 NYC Convention  
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 
(NYC) sets the international standards for awards in arbitration of administrative 
contracts in international spheres. Saudi Arabia ratified the convention and appointed the 
Board as the competent court for the enforcement of arbitral awards and awards rendered 
outside Saudi Arabia.
160
 KSA made no reservation concerning the nature of the dispute to 
be settled by the award, meaning whether they had to be commercial or administrative, 
but did make reservations concerning reciprocity and public policy. The reservation on 
public policy exception requires that any and all awards must be compliant with Shariah 
law. This same exception has been made by other Islamic states such as Egypt and 
Kuwait. This authority is also specifically provided for under Article V(2)(b) of the NYC 
granting signatories the discretion to decline enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
which would be “contrary to the public policy of the contracting state.” 
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2.3.3.2 1983 Riyadh Convention  
In April 1983, Saudi Arabia signed, but has yet to ratify, the convention on Judicial 
Cooperation between States of the Arab League. The Convention distinguishes between 
public order and morality versus Shariah law. Specifically, Articles 25 and 37 of the 
Convention provide that an arbitral award or enforcement may be rejected if it violates 
the public order, morality, or principles of Shariah law of the State in which enforcement 
is sought. It is a companion convention to the NYC for Saudi Arabia and the crux for its 
policies concerning arbitration within the State. 
2.4 Comparative International Civil Administrative Law Judicial Structures  
2.4.1 Dual Court Systems 
Most administrative law systems in civil law models, such as France and Egypt, have a 
dual court system similar to Saudi Arabia‟s. It consists of one tract of civil, domestic, or 
commercial matters, and another tract for purely administrative matters. Both France and 
Egypt have what is called a “Counseil d‟Etat” or a Council of State as their 
administrative body.  Another interesting aspect of these systems is that often, the 
administrative body serves as both legislator and adjudicator, meaning they not only 
decipher, but they advise, revise, and provide research on administrative laws and 
regulations.
161
 An important distinction can be made between these civil law examples 
and common law examples, in that common law models have a single court system with 
hierarchy and levels of appeal as well as a body of government codes and separate laws 
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for government contracts, instead of a specialized court system reserved for 
administrative matters and creation of laws. 
A few Arab nations provide alternative structures. For instance, Kuwait is different than 
its fellow Arabian or administrative states in that it has a full Parliament which dilutes the 
authority of the administrative tribunal. UAE, as another example, has a unified court 
system (more similar to common law systems) in which a special regulatory framework 
for administrative contracts has been established to resolve disputes relating to the mutual 
rights and obligations of the parties under an administrative contract.
162
  
Again, this is in contrast to the KSA, whose Board is considered to be a stand-alone 
entity, who answers only to the King, and not other judicial bodies, such as a Supreme 
Court or a Court of Appeals.  UAE‟s system would be more identified in the quasi-
judicial committees of KSA who answer to the Ministers, the judicial bodies in appeal, 
and the King. 
2.4.2 Legislative Bodies: Who Makes the Administrative Laws? 
In France and Egypt, the administrative laws are made by their respective Council 
D‟Etats or State Councils, which functions as legislative drafter and advisor; adjudicator; 
as well as executive arm in contracts. They can render legal opinions for proposed 
legislation, issue administrative regulations, and rule on disputes. The powers appear to 
be all encompassing, but they have intricate systems and hierarchies of administrative 
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and judicial bodies within the Council whom are assigned specific functions and 
authority, including specific Administrative courts and Courts of Appeal. 
Article 190 of Egypt‟s 2014 constitution states: “The State Council is an independent 
judicial body that is exclusively competent to adjudicate in administrative disputes, 
disciplinary cases and appeals, and disputes pertaining to its decisions.  It is also solely 
competent to issue opinions on the legal issues of bodies to be determined by law, review 
and draft bills and resolutions of a legislative character, and review draft contracts to 
which the state or any public entity is a party.  Other competencies are to be determined 
by law.”163   
Specifically, the Couseil has departments for opinions and legislation, which advise 
public entities on diverse aspects of public law such as administrative contracts, tenders, 
ministerial decrees, etc.”164 There are four “categories” of courts within Egypt‟s system, 
including the Administrative court as well as an Administrative Court of Appeal. It should 
also be noted that Egypt has an official Parliament “People‟s Council” with legislative 
authority as well as a Shura “Consultative Council”.  
Article 52 of France‟s original constitution of December 1799 reads: “A council of State 
shall be responsible for drafting the bills and regulations of public administration and for 
solving difficulties arising in administrative matters”.165 France has an unprecedented 42 
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administrative tribunals and 8 courts of appeal spread across its domestic and 
international jurisdictions.
166
 Combined, these tribunals adjudicate close to 200,000 cases 
a year. The jurists, clerks, and staff are trained through the highly acclaimed National 
School of Administration (ENA),
167
 thereby providing consistency in procedure and 
quality of adjudication opinions as well as legislative actions. France‟s system has 
interwoven accountability, transparency, and enforcement techniques to make sure they 
are taking administrative action that is not contrary to existing law, consistent with 
previous rulings, in the interest of the public, fair, reasonable, and having rulings which 
are duly executed by public authorities.
168
 
KSA‟s Council of Ministers and the Board fulfil the same legislative and judicial roles, 
but again, there is significant overlap and convolution in their roles as legislative 
advisors, drafters, “think tank” to the King, and judicial or semi-judicial binding 
authorities. Their responsibilities also go beyond mere administrative considerations, 
breeding potential conflicts-of-interest in handling certain matters. The Board, for 
instance, is not given legislative advisory authority, like the Conseils of Egypt or France; 
but has the same keystone of independence.  The Council, has a quasi-judicial role with 
special committees under each Ministry and a system of appeal to the Board.  The 
challenge with KSA‟s system is the constant concern of competition and lack of 
communication between the two bodies.  The Conseil designs of Egypt and France 
promote a more comprehensive and efficient means of administering law because, while 
their Conseils share legislative and judiciary duties; they access the same resources, have 
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clear means of cooperation between their administrative clerks, legislative clerks, and 
jurists, and an internal system of accountability if say the legislative advice is 
disconnected from the jurisprudence.  Whereas, KSA‟s system suffers from conflicts-of-
interest, lack of cooperation, and stymied accountability due to their weaknesses in rule 
of law, separation of powers, and record-keeping practices. 
2.4.3  Source of Administrative Laws: Code Comparisons and Judicial 
Precedent, Who Has Them and What do they Use to Make their 
Decisions? 
All administrative judicial systems have jurisdiction over disputes involving the decisions 
or actions of a public entity or authority. The most common kinds of administrative cases 
include, in France for example, those related to the application of economic or social 
regulations, taxation, town-planning, building permits, public works, public service 
procurement, environmental projects, hospital liability, immigration permits, civil 
servants‟ career and pensions, European and local government elections.  These are 
similar to the types of administrative contracts and the nature of such contracts that were 
previously discussed in this study. The difference between KSA and other jurisdictions, 
however, is that KSA has less consistency, predictability, and transparency in how it may 
rule in cases or which ones it chooses to adjudicate than the other states. In addition, it 
appears to more often than not exercise an administrative authority or power of review as 
often as possible regardless of unpublished results or statistics for such matters. The 
comparison in transparency and predictability with KSA comes with examining which 
States have codified laws, judicial precedent, and record-keeping practices, and what 
each of those entail in the particular jurisdictions. 
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2.4.3.1 Application of Laws: The Experience of Egypt  
The Egyptian legal system, being considered as a civil law system, is based upon a well-
established system of codified laws.  Egypt‟s supreme law is its written constitution. With 
respect to transactions between natural persons or legal entities, the most important 
legislation is the Egyptian Civil Code of 1948 (the “ECC”) which remains the main 
source of legal rules applicable to contracts.
169
 Much of the ECC is based upon the 
French Civil Code and, to a lesser extent, upon various other European codes and upon 
Islamic (Shariah) law (especially in the context of personal status). Other Arab states, 
including KSA, use Egypt‟s civil code system as a model for their own system of laws.   
Unlike France and more like KSA, Egypt‟s system is heavy on judicial discretion as it has 
not fully codified its administrative legal rules and similar gaps occur in judicial 
precedents: “Despite the non-existence of an established system of legally (de jure) 
binding precedents, previous judicial decisions do have persuasive authority. Courts are 
morally and practically bound (de facto binding effect) by the principles and precedents 
of the Court of Cassation (for civil, commercial, and criminal matters) and the Supreme 
Administrative Court (for administrative and other public law matters).”170 Some judicial 
decisions are published online or soft copies are made available to the public, but there 
are no regular periodicals or journals that publish full collections of cases or judicial 
decisions. Egypt does, however, have “crystallized rules and regulations for the 
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administrative courts.
171
   
KSA, in comparison, has even fewer published opinions and rules and regulations.  For 
example, “the Law of the Board of Grievances” and the Board‟s “Law of Pleadings”, give 
authorities and a hierarchy of judicial courts; but are scarce on clear and precise rules, 
definitions, or procedures for jurists or parties in actually accessing and using the 
system.
172
 Simply explaining that there is a hierarchy to the courts or that judges may be 
held accountable for certain violations of law, does not suffice in providing genuine 
access by parties to grievance proceedings. 
2.4.3.2 Application of Laws: The Experience of France 
France‟s “Napoleonic” codes have been crafted by the Conseil, including: the civil code, 
the penal code, the civil procedure code, the criminal instruction code and the 
commercial code; with policy and legislative advisory work being done by 
"administrative sections" within the Conseil.
173
 Each section includes approximately 
twenty members of the Conseil and a chairman.
174
 These codes set the precedent for 
administrative law, as adopted by other civil law systems; but what is fascinating is that 
while France is considered to have a sophisticated and highly functional system of 
administrative law, they have a limited administrative code, instead relying primarily on 
patterns of ruling and determination through case law.
175
 They do extensively publish 
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caselaw and provide access to codified laws as well as judicial opinions to interested 
parties. It is considered to be a transparent and successful system. Again, this is in start 
contrast to KSA‟s sparsely published opinion, accessibility to the public, and limited 
codified law. 
These structural and legislative comparisons will be reintroduced in the following 
chapters as a means of possible reforms and open-ended questions, which often seem 
insurmountable in international public debates. Such questions as whether a standardised 
international body of administrative law shall be established or whether a universally 
understood practice of international arbitration shall be accepted by Arab countries; can 
only be addressed through comparisons to best practices and failures from other 
jurisdictions. It is through cooperative learning and shared information that continuity 
and consistency in legal practices may be developed.     
2.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has begun the process of identifying reoccurring issues or themes manifest 
within Saudi Arabia‟s legal framework as well as in the promotion or restriction of 
arbitration of administrative contracts.  Substantively speaking, this thesis questions the 
constitutionality of Sharia law as automatic grounds for an inexhaustible public authority. 
Standards to assess what policy or Sharia norms have been contravened or a threshold for 
review have not been adequately tested through the independent judicial review. More 
generally, the Saudi legal system is subject to criticism on the grounds that it lacks a 
settled body of law, or developed theory of public law and (the limits of) public authority, 
or developed principles of private law which can be applied consistently towards the fair 
- 83 - 
and equitable settlement of contractual disputes. Rather, Saudi courts have tended to 
adopt a highly discretionary approach to matters of justice, while failing to subject to 
exercise of administrative power to the requirements of legality or constitutional 
constraints. In contrast, States like Egypt, have an Islamic system but a more apparent 
and determinate set of standards and grounds for judicial review.   
Ideas such as separation of powers and scope of review can only be comprehended if, as 
this chapter has done, an encyclopaedia-like explanation is given of the legislative bodies 
and functions of law within KSA. It leads the curious reader down a line of questioning 
into what helps or hinders the setting of legitimate expectations of parties‟ rights within 
administrative contracts?  A truncated answer is that all of these “issues” can be attributed 
to powers and behaviours of the Board, the Council, and the administrative authority 
participants to arbitration and individual contracts.   
The next chapter considers how these issues of fairness, authority, rule of law, and 
separation of powers between public and private parties permeates the actual contracts 
and arbitration proceedings. These themes represent the problematic approaches to 
arbitration and administrative law in Saudi Arabia, as well as the organic solution to 
altering international perceptions of a system uniquely shrouded in a technicolor coat of 
Shariah, domestic, administrative and international law. 
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Chapter 3  
The Theory, Determination and Treatment of Administrative Contracts under 
Saudi Law 
The last chapter discussed the legal structure and sources of administrative law in Saudi 
Arabia, focusing on the key statutes, regulations and codes, which govern, or are 
applicable to administrative contracts. This chapter offers a more detailed analysis of the 
doctrinal issues surrounding the classification, defining features and judicial treatment of 
administrative contracts. This will prepare the ground for a discussion of specific 
obstacles to the arbitration of administrative contracts in the next chapter. In this chapter 
we will discuss contract law in the context of Saudi Arabia, focusing on how established 
contractual doctrines such as “changed circumstances”, the juxtaposition of legitimate 
expectations of rights of parties to a contract, and the tensions between public and private 
parties.  We will also discuss the distinction between the Shariah perspectives of 
contractual obligations and KSA public law approaches.  
Under the KSA legal system there is no formal criterion to distinguish between 
administrative contracts and ordinary contracts governed under private law. However, in 
its most basic definition and function, an administrative contract is qualified as being 
“administrative” by either a function of law or through a process of judicial 
determination.
176
 The process to identify the nature and character of the contract is 
challenging regardless of how it is defined. Administrative contracts are often 
categorized, then labelled as different types under those categories. But the more critical 
distinction between contracts is not whether they are of one categorization or type, but in 
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whether they are of the private or administrative nomenclatures. Each nomenclature 
associates different rights and responsibilities to the parties involved. Specifically, there is 
a unilateral authority present in an administrative contract, which drastically impacts the 
nature of, dealings within, and administrative grievance procedures associated with these 
contracts. This raises significant questions about contracts which have a mixed public or 
private character, the judicial treatment of such contracts, and the extent to which contract 
law principles, and in particular contractual defences, do or should apply to 
administrative law contracts.   
By pursuit of these questions within this chapter, we also consider a comparative analysis 
of the defence of “changed circumstances” as a contractual concept, focussing on the 
applicability of this private law doctrine to (public law governed system of) 
administrative contracts and to the model of contract law prescribed under Shariah law.  
More specifically, normative tenets of Islamic Shariah law within private contracts 
establish principles of freedom to contract, consent, and right to choose. Contrarily, 
administrative contracts revolve around public law elements of unilateral authority, 
sovereignty, and systems of feigned separation of powers, thus creating an inherent 
tension with Shariah law.  Here, we will establish the nature, identifying features, and 
classification of administrative contracts, so that we can then expand upon the unilateral 
authorities of public entities within administrative contracts and the powers exercised by 
the Board of Grievances in defining or legitimizing rights of parties. Finally, this chapter 
touches on high level concerns in administrative law, which resonate in arbitration 
practice, and presents a basic comparative law structure with France and Egypt as 
bifurcated lenses for examination of these issues. 
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3.1 The Administrative Contract: Classification, Definitions and Judicial 
Determination  
This section identifies what an administrative contract is, and what it is not. What follows 
is a discussion of the identification and treatment of administrative contracts by the Saudi 
Board of Grievances. Finally, this section highlights some of the doctrinal and normative 
issues and challenges associated with the public law rules applied to administrative 
contracts in the context of a wider discussion of some the more unusual or problematic 
features of the Saudi legal system. This lays the groundwork for a discussion of the 
relationship between the public and private laws of Saudi Arabia: the particular 
administrative laws and codes which govern the unilateral authority of Saudi public 
authorities, and the general rules and principles applied to contracts under Shariah.  
3.1.1 Types of Administrative Contracts  
Public contracts typically include regulatory features or provisions that are not analogous 
to those contained with private contracts, including clauses related to penalties, 
inspection and supervision, the formulation of detailed governmental plans, and so on.
177
 
At the outset, it is important to visualize that an administrative contract is not a type of 
contract, necessarily, but rather a category by which types of administrative contracts are 
analysed.  While this section serves to elucidate the features and the tensions of 
administrative contracts as a category, those features of the category will then have to be 
contextualized as specific types of contracts within the category defined as administrative 
contracts such as procurement contracts or concession contracts, for example. 
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Identifying the specific types of contracts that fall within the overall category of 
administrative contracts is a tedious and complicated process for the parties and the 
judicial authorities. Through years of adjudication and careful administrative and 
legislative regulations of the Council, certain types of administrative contracts have been 
created by function of law or used as part of the above classification process. The 
Procurement Law, alone, distinguished four of them. This section introduces two of the 
most commonly used types of contracts to “set the stage” for later analysis.   
3.1.1.1 Concession Contract  
The first contract type to be explored is the concession contract.  A concession contract is 
an agreement between the government (or most often Ministry in KSA) and a private 
entity, in which the private entity assumes the exclusive right to construct, operate, 
maintain a public service or utility (such as supplying water, gas, electricity, or sanitation 
services) for a given number of years.
178
 The private company assumes the risk in the 
endeavour, and is responsible for bringing equity and providing financing for the project, 
but is awarded with a monopoly over a particular service to the government.
179
 
Concession contracts create an environment where private capital and know-how can be 
mobilized to complement public resources enabling new investment in public 
infrastructure and services without increasing public debt.
180
 
KSA currently subcontracts its responsibilities for providing quality of life services to the 
public through concession contracts, including services for public utility, public works 
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concessions, and national resources concessions (such as mining operations).
181
 Not all 
concession contracts are governed by the Procurement Law
182
 or the Minerals Act, and 
are instead governed by the Council of Ministers.
183
 As will be discussed, historic 
decisions such as ARAMCO involve concession contracts and are a significant factor in 
not only the authorities of administrative contracts but in their arbitrability.  
For instance, through an executive act, the Council singled out oil concession contracts 
related to the exploitation of natural resources, such as petroleum and minerals, as an 
exclusive class of administrative contract in their own right.
184
  Subject to the executive 
act, the Council is conferred exclusive authority to grant rights to contractors to perform 
and execute public projects related to the exploitation of natural resources.
185
 Crucially, 
the executive act states that „no privilege is to be granted and no public resource is to be 
exploited without a law‟.186  
The difficulty is that very rarely does a Saudi regulation, which are frequently drafted in 
open-ended and indeterminate terms, provide clear statutory mandate, failing to define 
the scope and boundaries of delegated power to public officials. Thus, the Board has few 
guidelines for policing the functions and legality of administrative actions, or to make 
positive determinations of ultra vivre acts, illegality or administrative liability (as the 
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basis on a general right of compensation). These issues will be returned to later in this 
chapter. 
3.1.1.2 Public Works  
The second of the two prolifically used contracts, “public works” contracts, are currently 
the most lucrative contracts within the KSA.
187
 In these types of contracts the government 
contracts with private companies, or pseudo-private corporations, to build 
infrastructure.
188
 It is within this industry that the KSA has spent billions, and despite the 
current tenuous economic state, continues to push forward with infrastructural projects.  
Because a majority of these contracts are executed by foreign contractors, a mingling of 
interests, public and private, national and international naturally occurs.  It is here that the 
balancing of rights of parties is a catalyst for improved administrative law practices and a 
platform for reform.
189
 
The Council issues standard public works contracts under Art. 10 of the Procurement 
Law.  Similar to other “public” related terminology, however, no regulation or code 
provides a definition of “public works”, but inference suggests that this occurs through 
the contractual practice, which includes projects for construction of buildings, roads, 
bridges and civil engineering work.
190
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Despite KSA‟s initiatives to minimize the participation of foreign influence in its 
industries, these large infrastructure projects include requirements for mandatory 
solicitation of bids from international contractors and qualifications of unique expertise 
due to the high standard of execution necessary for these types of projects.
191
 This 
international requirement is indicative of the inevitable influence of foreign elements in 
KSA administrative law, and will continue to be a subject of study. 
3.1.2 Classification of Administrative Contracts and Expectations for 
Rights of Parties 
3.1.2.1 Inherent Inequality of the Parties to an Administrative Contract 
There is an inherent tension between the expectations of private parties and public parties 
in an administrative contract setting. This tension is not unique to the KSA due to the 
requirement that states must enter into contracts with private parties, in order to protect 
the sovereignty and for the wise use of taxpayer monies.  In the KSA, the validity, 
operation and arbitrability of these contracts are subject to the municipal law of the 
contracting state, in this case the administrative law of Saudi Arabia.  
The general nature of administrative contracts creates a legal relationship where the 
public authority, as party to an administrative contract, acts as both a contractor and as a 
political institution. By virtue of its political status, duty to protect the sovereignty and 
protect taxpayer funds, a public entity issues to itself broad public powers to pursue 
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regulatory or policy objectives on behalf of the general public or good.
192
 Public 
authorities, as well as the Board, may modify or rescind administrative contracts.
193
   
This ability to modify the performance of the contract may be stipulated in the terms of 
the agreement, mandated under national legislation or brought about through direct 
intervention by state or administrative decision.
194
 These powers are the inherent nature 
of administrative contracts and the ever-present tension in disputes.  This, of course, is 
unlike a normal setting for contracts where the parties have more equal footing to 
negotiate terms of the contract. The very nature of the administrative contract, 
immediately creates a dynamic of “inequality” in negotiating terms or fulfilling the 
obligations contained within a contract. 
In the KSA, any contract involving a public service concession, or to which the state or 
its representatives is a party, is subject to its legislative or judicial (re) classification as an 
“administrative contract”.195 In order to effectuate the classification process, the Board of 
Grievances formulated general principles from its judicial interpretations of the relevant 
legislation, which are commonly used as objective “tests” in determining the 
administrative nature of any contracts. While the test itself is objective, the application 
without precedent and without expounding upon specific terms highlights that the 
Board‟s administrative classification is subjective, non-technical nature.  
 
                                                     
192
 Christopher F. Forsyth and William Wade, Administrative Law (9
th
 ed., OUP 2004) 775  
193
 Implementation of Purchasing Regulations (Implementing Regulations), (n233), Art. 25 and Art. 29 
194
 Alhudaithy (n 94) 29 
195
 Khaled Mohammed Al-Jumah, „Arab State Contract Disputes: Lessons from the Past‟ (2002) 17(3) Arab 
Law Quarterly 215 
- 92 - 
3.1.2.2 Means of Determining the Character of Administrative Contracts 
The KSA government can enter into private or public contracts. When entering into a 
private contract, the KSA is treated no differently than a private party. Private contracts 
aim for mutual material and interest of the parties. Public contracts differ in that the 
government is, presumably, pursuing benefits on behalf of the public, not of its own self-
interest. The sheer importance of protecting the public interest is what makes the contract 
public. For instance, providing the public with water or sanitation services is more 
important than increasing the financial bottom-line profits of a private contractor. It is 
because of this nature that the private party to an administrative contract must 
intrinsically accept that it is on „unequal footing‟ with a public party.196 When a private 
party enters the realm of administrative contracts it is assumed that it is aware of this 
imbalanced nature, however the difficulty of the administrative relationship arises when 
the nature or classification of the contractual relationship is unknown until after a dispute 
arises or if it determined during the fulfilment of obligations of a contract that there are 
nuances of a commercial contract within the administrative contract. It is not necessarily 
that administrative contracts are inherently “unfair”, but rather that they become “unfair” 
to a private party when the nature of the contract is defined ex post facto.
197
 
Consider that private contracts tend to involve the sale of basic goods or property thereby 
falling within the Shariah court system. Whereas administrative contracts involve public 
interest and are subject to “special” rules causing them to be classified within a different 
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jurisdiction, where review is handled by the Board of Grievances.
198
 While either type of 
contract uses the same basic elements of offer and acceptance, consideration, and a legal 
objective to establish validity, the “special” nature of administrative contracts is often 
undefined, ambiguous and misleading.
199
 This necessitates courts to do a factual analysis 
under accepted criteria to determine whether they are private or administrative, leaving 
the private party at the mercy of subjective review and determination of nature, and 
therefore the laws that may or may not support their position.
200
  
An administrative contract is not, however solely defined by judicial determination.  
Administrative contracts can also be classified by function of law.  The general nature of 
an administrative contract is one which includes an administrative entity as a party, is 
subject to adjudication by an administrative judicial authority, contains special or unusual 
provisions giving privileges to the administrative party, and whose purpose is to serve or 
benefit the public at-large. If a contract fails to include the final two aspects (it does not 
contain privilege provisions to the public party and does not serve the public at large), it 
is often deemed to be private. It is rather confusing because while private categorization 
usually places the parties in the jurisdiction of the Shariah courts, there are circumstances 
where private commercial contracts can be subject to the jurisdiction of the Board of 
Grievances. This creates even murkier waters for the private party. 
Procurement contracts are often the subject of these murky evaluations. However, KSA 
Codes, Decrees, or Regulations do provide some clarity to the private party by specifying 
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certain conditions that should equate to a contract being classified as administrative. This 
can include types of procurement contracts, contracts related to specific subjects or 
ministries, or contracts involving certain parties. Silence or omission of any of these 
conditions by the law triggers a judicial determination as to the nature and characteristics 
of the contract as administrative or non-administrative. 
3.1.2.3 Function of Law 
An administrative contract by function of law happens in any of the following three 
instances: 1) it is one that is specifically defined by an actual law (regulation), 2) it is 
defined by the final objective or scope of an infrastructure (or procurement related) 
project, or 3) it has granted contractual powers to a public administration or compulsory 
powers of review to the administrative judicial authorities. Any and all cases involving an 
administrative authority, transactions, liabilities, or privileges agreed upon or undertaken 
to ensure the progress of a public interest, such as public works, sales of immovable 
property, use of public buildings, or conflicts in municipality fees would all be classified 
as administrative.
201
   
The mere participation of a public party is insufficient to meet the function of law 
standard. There must be an element of public interest or need in the contract and related 
responsibilities and it cannot be a ministry specific or daily operational need.  For 
instance, lease agreements for a fleet of ministry vehicles or contracts with independent 
legal consultants are not administrative contracts because there is not a broader public 
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benefit; these contracts are for the functional health of the ministry. The same logic 
applies to contracts for office supplies or machinery, regardless of whether they go 
through a type of procurement process.
202
 A contract to purchase reams of papers, 
computers, or red staplers is not considered administrative, but private between the public 
entity and the private distributor or supplier.   
Where the confusion sets in is that even though contracts with „specific or daily 
operational needs‟ aspects are classified as private, they still fall within the jurisdiction of 
the Board of Grievances, which has adjudicative authority over any contract, whether 
commercial or administrative, that includes a public entity as a party.  The „specific or 
daily operational needs‟ aspects can therefore become one element that would go into a 
judicial determination of the nature of a contract, but would not necessarily be the sole 
determining factor.
203
 
Private parties can typically rely on a generally accepted premise that the following types 
of procurement or purchasing contracts are classified as administrative, by either the 
Procurement Law or Article 6 the Purchasing Law, which specifically mandates that all 
government works and procurements apply to the administrative rules including, but not 
limited to: concession contracts, public works contracts, public supply contracts, public 
transportation contracts, public loan contracts, as well as maintenance and operation 
contracts.
204
 This may provide parties with some degree of certainty and confidence, 
though as will be discussed and analysed further in this thesis, the dividing line between 
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commercial and public agreement is not clear-cut. The competent authorities in Saudi 
Arabia have historically favoured a more expansive definition of the class of agreements 
or state acts which are treated as “administrative” rather than commercial, thereby barring 
state actions from arbitral or judicial determination of state liability. 
3.1.2.4 Judicial Determination 
Judicial determination in administrative contracts is by either the Board of Grievances, or 
a quasi-judicial body within the Council of Ministers. The Board of Grievances also often 
serves as the appellate body for the Council of Ministers. Correlating to public entities in 
an administrative contract, the Board has the sovereign, independent, and unilateral 
authority to modify, classify (or re-classify), rescind, or terminate an administrative 
contract as well as to issue sanctions and penalties against either party. A majority of the 
cases brought before the Board are by an aggrieved contractor (private party) against a 
public entity and the jurist is most commonly considering the lawful or unlawful nature 
of the actions of the public entity in the scope of the contract.  
In recent years, the Board has classified an increasing number of contracts as 
administrative in direct correlation to the explosive infrastructure and industrial growth of 
KSA. The subject matter of these contracts tends to be a public agency that has 
contracted with a private party to meet a public need. They also tend to involve some 
modicum of government funds or subsidies being integrated into the contract or as part of 
the operational budget of the initiating entity. Case illustrations include decisions in 
which all other aspects of a party appear to be private and independent from public 
agency, but who participate in the government tender and procurement process as well as 
- 97 - 
receive some form of government financial assistance; for example, the King Faisal 
Specialist Hospital (KFSH), Electricity Companies, and Saudi Arabian Airlines 
(Saudi).
205
 These contracts with external parties are classified as administrative because 
the entities subject themselves to the Government Tenders and Procurement Law when 
entering into these contracts. All three of them also receive some sort of funding or 
subsidies from the government.  
The basis of the Government‟s administrative classification for these types of entities is 
couched in its obligation to protect public funds. Again, even these examples personify 
the difficulties in classification and the blurring of lines between administrative and 
commercial matters, thus the thematic dilemma of administrative contracts; and the 
immense challenge the Board faces in its deliberations for classification.   
3.1.3 Elements and Classification of Administrative Contracts 
The Board, and the Council in its administrative and quasi-judicial capacities, have 
developed identifying markers and tests to assist in their identification, classification, and 
adjudication of disputes within these contracts. Any analysis of the treatment of public 
contracts begins with the understanding that an administrative contract is a contract 
between a public party and a private party for the benefit of society. The public party is 
not contracting for itself, but is in essence a broker for the interests of the public whom 
which it serves, and from whose pinnacle authority is the reason both parties even have 
the opportunity to contract. This requires the public party, as the broker, to have 
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precedence in formation, oversight, and execution of the contract.
206
 This is an imbalance 
of rights that is non-negotiable, must be accepted by the private contractor, and is an 
emblematic feature of judicial determination of administrative contracts.  
On this issue, the Board of Grievances has said: 
Public contracts are distinguished from private contracts in that, because of 
their importance (for example, the need for the public services which the 
public contract aims to provide), the public benefit is favoured over that of 
the private individual. The two contracting parties in a private contract aim to 
realise material and private interest. It is different in a public contract, since 
the government does not pursue its own private interest but contracts for the 
public benefit. These contracts are concerned with public services, which 
must operate efficiently and on time.
207
 
Specifically, in establishing an administrative contract by judicial determination, the 
threshold analysis involves three legal prongs or criteria and is the overarching 
framework for determining if a contract is “administrative” based on its elements and 
nature.
208
 This can often be a laborious analysis because administrative contracts may 
have hybrid or ambiguous character, having features, which are identified with private or 
commercial document or agreement. The Board has developed the specific criteria based 
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on repetition of factual scenarios, considerations of existing law, and their own inherent 
discretion.
209
 A jurist shall examine the following, whether:  
 One of the parties to the contract is a public (administrative) authority. 
 The objective or ratione materiae of the contract is the achievement of a public 
good or benefit. 
 The contract contains provisions that are not typically found in private contracts 
(unusual or special).
210
 
3.1.3.1 Public (Administrative) Authority Criterion 
The Board‟s assessment of whether a public authority is party of the case is typically 
swift if a ministry, municipality, or prominent administrative agency is a named party. 
The Basic Law assists in this identification through its references to the three branches of 
government; the executive, financial and administrative authorities bestowed upon the 
Council; and its recognition of two types of public authority: corporate bodies and those 
which receive state funding
211
 e.g. public corporations like ARAMCO or public bodies 
like the Ministry of Finance. Institutions such as universities, the General Presidency for 
Girls‟ Education and the Grain Silos and Flour Mills Organisation are all public 
corporations who receive state funding, and were created by laws and regulations like 
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those which establish ministries, but have their own corporate laws instead of being 
regulated by Acts of the Council. They stand as examples of public authorities.
212
 
In contrast, if such an entity or agency is not involved, the Board applies “sub-tests” to 
determine what types of parties are involved, asking: „(1) is the agency established as any 
other governmental agency? (2) Do the purposes for the establishment of the agency fall 
within the traditional functions of the state? And (3) Are the employees of that particular 
agency considered to be public employees?
213
  
From this rule, it is often summarized that if an entity has authority to act like an 
administrative party and is in some manner funded by the state, then they are most likely 
given the designation as such by the Board. For example, the Board considered a case 
involving the Saudi Red Crescent Agency where it found the Agency to have public 
authority because of its creation by Royal Decree; and because similar to a Ministry, its 
operating laws and procedures were also approved by Royal Decree.
214
 Other contrasting 
comparisons with this sub-test can be made using three almost entirely private entities 
previously mentioned; the King Faisal Specialist Hospital (KFSH), the Electric 
Companies and Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia)
215
 whose labour relationship is subject to 
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private law but other parts of their operations are subject to public purpose, the Public 
Procurement Law
216
 or serving a public interest.
217
  
Each of these can be applied to the sub-test as follows: 
(1) How was the entity formed, including but not limited to, by resolution, regulation, 
governmental department, public/private consortium? (All, but the last, of these would 
indicate a public authority): All three are private, but were somehow formed by Royal 
Decree or through government financial endorsement.  
(2) What general authority or decision-making powers were given as part of formation 
or authorization of entity? Where does its funding come from and was the entity tasked 
with a public project or government defined scope as part of its formation?  All of them 
have their own company laws and Boards of Directors, but receive government funding 
of some sort.  Additionally, all three of them subject their procurement activities and 
contracts to the Public Procurement Code. 
(3) Are the employees given the same benefits, held to the same job standards or 
policies, as stipulated to in for example an employee handbook, and essentially 
interchangeable with government employees? All three entities manage their employees 
under the Labor Laws instead of the Civil Employee Law. 
Each of these organizations have mainly characteristics of a private entity, but they are 
treated as public entities (or authority) and their contracts are classified as administrative, 
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because their contracts involve public interest, public funding, and are subjected to the 
procurement law.
218
   
Accordingly, this private-public distinction is one of the more difficult comparisons to 
make within an administrative contract. Even this sub-test can be convoluted in 
application due to the pervasiveness of joint ventures, public-private-partnerships (PPPs), 
public entities acting as private companies, “Saudisation” requirements that promote 
employment for Saudi nationals,
219
 and parallels of municipal laws governing employees 
with the same legal rights as other government employees.
220
 This aspect is a bit more 
ambiguous when examining an otherwise public entity acting in a seemingly private, 
commercial manner.
221
 In such instances of ambiguity, the Board often moves to the 
remaining two criteria in its considerations.  
3.1.3.2 Public Interest Criterion 
When ambiguity prevails from the above analysis, the Board will examine whether the 
purpose of a contract falls within the scope of a public interest, good, service, welfare or 
utility. While sources of KSA law, including the public procurement code, have failed to 
define terms such as “public interest” or “public service” an understanding of such 
definitions are based on a need identified in the public, which the government has a 
responsibility to discharge, to the full access and equal benefit of every person, and at a 
collective cost of the whole, through mechanisms such as taxes. Further, based on the 
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Board‟s pattern of decision-making under this prong, a working definition of this 
criterion would be: „any activity that is formed, managed, and supervised by a public 
agency with the intention of satisfying public needs in the public interest.‟222 Common 
examples of public interest projects or contracts include public works: building roads or 
installing utility lines; health services: building hospitals and clinics; basic humanitarian 
needs: housing complexes and schools; and cultural benefits: building museums and 
performing arts centres.
223
 
Often these involve carrying out a publicly mandated service to provide an infrastructure 
service. Entities engaging in these types of projects might be promoting commerce and 
infrastructure, but the purpose of the project is improving public welfare.
224
 In contrast, 
however, when the Board has found that a public authority engaged in a contract for its 
personal financial gain it is not considered to be in the public interest.
225
 The Board tends 
to accept a public interest where there is ownership by a public authority and benefits as 
well as access to society as a whole. This criterion is the least ambiguous of the three, but 
the third criterion is the Achilles heel that shifts a contract entirely to an administrative 
classification.  
3.1.3.3 Special or Unusual Provisions Criterion 
The Board may classify a contract as administrative if it contains special or unique 
clauses, not typically found in private or commercial contracts, i.e. “...it includes a clause 
or several clauses granting the administrative entity rights that are different in nature or 
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substance to those which would be accepted by a person of his own free will and accord 
within the frame of the civil or commercial laws...”226 [emphasis added]. As previously 
discussed, there are almost universally accepted provisions and practices to contract law, 
but administrative law, by its nature, veers from that standard and requires clauses which 
cause an imbalance of interest and parity within the contract, in favour of the public 
entity for the benefit of the public good. French jurists call this power the doctrine of 
necessity.
227
 These provisions allow agencies to be more effective and efficient in 
carrying out their missions.
228
 
In civil or commercial contracts between two private parties, the public authority is given 
a certain autonomy, control, and power over the contract and the other party. Inherently, 
this means that contracting parties are consenting to be governed by a regulatory scheme 
including, for instance, clauses related to inspection and supervision, the formulation of 
detailed governmental plans, rescission, and so on.
229 
 Moreover, the administrative 
agency has the unprecedented authority to pursue unilateral actions that would not be 
condoned in a civil or commercial contract, under typical international contractual 
practice, or in agreements between two private parties in Saudi Arabia.  
A private party also has obligations that arise under an administrative contract that are not 
compulsory in private contracts, such as mandatory continued performance of the 
contract despite a “change in circumstance”, i.e., non-payment by the public party, what 
amounts to “frustration” or interruption of performance, or the existence of a dispute 
                                                     
226
 Ibid., 81 
227
 S Al-Tamaui, General Principles of Administrative Contracts (5th ed. Dar AI-Feker AI-Arabi, 1991) 60, 
27 
228
 Ibid., 82; See also, Al-Jarbou (n 212)  
229
 „Saudi Chambers of Commerce, The Finance Difficulties which Face Saudi Contractors‟ (n 26)  
- 105 - 
being adjudicated by an administrative court. For instance, a public party has the 
administrative authority of control over the subject matter of the contract; the right to 
adapt the contract to any changing needs of public interest, regardless of whether this 
authority is expressly given in the contract; and the right to impose penalties on a 
contractor, including termination, without obtaining permission of the Board or any 
judicial body.
230
   
In the KSA context, the Procurement Code provides examples of these vast privileges 
including empowering the government to “extend the contract deadline, terminate the 
contract before the due date, to perform the contract at the contractor‟s expense if he 
defaults in his performance, and to bar the contractor from taking away tools, equipment 
and materials which are on the site and to use them to complete the work.”231 
Statutory law and the Board‟s jurisprudence does however, set minor limitations and 
parameters to this authority of adaptation.
232
 These include limiting the percentage of 
change in scope of the project; limiting changes to the percentage of cost or payment to 
performance ratios; and prohibiting modification or termination after completion of the 
contract.
233
 The restrictions on the public party‟s ability to modify a contract price 
without the consent of the private party, is a Shariah principle in the right of a person to 
be paid per the terms of an agreement and under the doctrine of fairness and good faith 
between the parties. 
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The Board has recognized these “extraordinary powers” to be: 
Administrative in nature but technically contractual: If the [agency] relies on 
contractual relationships to take certain actions such as modifying the 
contractor‟s obligation, imposing penalties, suspending the contractor‟s 
operations, or any other actions that the administrative contract empowers the 
contracting [agency] with, such actions taken by the contracting [agency] within 
the contractual relationship are not considered administrative decisions; rather, 
they are considered part of the contractual relationship.
234
  
In other words, the public party was taking action of a nature that it was explicitly 
authorized to do in the contract, e.g. public works contracts that are formulaic in their 
inclusion of the unilateral powers of the public party. Therefore, the Board evaluates the 
actions taken in both a traditional, contractual content sense as well as an administrative 
light, using notions of Shariah contract law principles and terms such as financial 
equilibrium, terms and conditions, or fairness to the parties.
235
 
3.1.3.4 Summary 
The power of the administrative authority to unilaterally modify the contract to „adapt to 
the changing needs of the public welfare even when the contract does not expressly give 
it that right,‟ is a springboard consideration in the nature and function of administrative 
contracts.
236
 It gives credence to how classification, or (re) classification of parties and 
contracts as well as the exploitation of administrative authority, by either the public entity 
                                                     
234
 Ibid. 
235
 Al-Saleh, „Decisions on Capital Structure in a Zakat Environment with Prohibition of Riba: The Case of 
Saudi Arabia‟ (2009) 10 The Journal of Risk Finance 460-476 
236
 Ibid., 84; See also, Al-Jarbou (n 212); Badran (n 202)  
- 107 - 
or the Board, manifests real consequences and concerns regarding what actual rights the 
parties may or may not have within the parameters of each contract.  
For instance, any protests to the unilateral nature of the modifications, by the private 
party (even if it was not understood by either party during formation of the contract that 
the public entity was in-fact an administrative authority, but was “re-classified” as such 
by the Board of Grievances) is not taken into consideration. Further it becomes evident 
that maintained mutuality is not a pre-requisite to these actions under an administrative 
contract, thereby limiting assumed defences by a private party. The feigned adequate 
substitute and consolation is that a private party may still make a specific grievance claim 
in relation to its limited rights under an administrative contract. Therefore, the existence, 
or not, of doctrines like “rule of law” or “separation of powers” or “change in 
circumstances” become necessary considerations. 
These are classic issues of administrative law. The litany of potential concerns includes 
an undue burden on the private entity to meet undefined or shifting deliverables and 
deadlines; the risk of a private party entering an agreement only to “discover” after-the-
fact that the other party is a public authority, thereby altering the nature and terms of the 
contract altogether; and a private party being left without compensation or recourse 
despite partial or full performance under perceived contractual obligations. These risks 
and concerns pertaining to unilateral actions are often exacerbated or alleviated through 
statutory and common provisions, or jurisprudence, which govern contractual issues 
under Saudi Law.  
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3.1.4 The Applicability of Contract Law Defences and Principles to 
Administrative Contracts 
The vast majority of the risks and exposure in administrative contracts intentionally, by 
design, falls to the private or non-administrative entity. The private party has only a few 
rights under an administrative contract, namely a right to compensation and financial 
equilibrium; a right for extenuating circumstances to be considered in evaluation of 
performance and compensation; and the right to bring grievances before the Board.
237
 
Thus in comparing the explicit rights for each party below, this section demonstrates the 
truly lopsided nature of administrative contracts and the magnitude of the power vested in 
the public entity. 
3.1.4.1  Cancellation or Termination 
Cancellation of a project is judged based on the performance, behaviour, or even 
attributes of the private party or foreign entity, not the public party. Certain actions or 
circumstances permit cancellation and consequences of such cancellation may be 
assessed due to the alleged fault or non-fault of the contractor or private party.
238
 These 
rules may be established in various Saudi Arabian statutes, but they have equal 
application to commercial or administrative contracts.  
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If a contract is cancelled due to “fault” the contractor may not have right to compensation 
and is subject to additional penalties. Bribery with a public authority, for instance, would 
be subject to immediate termination of the administrative contract, resulting damages, as 
well as potential criminal charges and civil liabilities.
239
  Article 53(d) of the Saudi Arabia 
Procurement Law stipulates that bankruptcy or insolvency of the private party is grounds 
for immediate rescinding of an administrative contract.
240
 Assignment of execution of the 
contract, or subcontract, by the contractor to a subcontractor, without the prior, written 
permission of the government entity is also valid grounds for termination. 
Fact-specific scenarios in other cases, such as death of the party assigned performance 
under the contract or failure to perform, dictate whether a contract can be cancelled.  In 
the circumstance of death, the public entity can assess whether the contractual award and 
performance was dependant on the personal qualifications of the deceased or whether the 
contract can be re-assigned to the heir or successor to the contractor‟s role and obligation.  
Failure to perform is another example.  If the contractor is at fault, they have fifteen days 
to resume performance or the contract shall be cancelled and penalties imposed.
241
  
However, if the facts are more convoluted as to why performance is or has not occurred, 
there may be leniency in cancellation, for example force majeure is only accepted in 
situations of absolute impossibility, events beyond a party‟s control, not unduly 
burdensome scenarios.
242
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The public authority or government agency has the right to terminate a contract for public 
interest, but this is considered to be cancellation, without fault of the contractor and the 
contractor retains their right to compensation.
243
 
3.1.4.2 Sanctions or Penalties 
A government entity has the full authority to sanction or penalize a contractor who fails 
to perform, improperly executes, untimely performs, or generally violates contractual 
terms and obligations.  These may include financial penalties, boycotting the use of the 
contractor for future projects, termination, and issuing public sanctions in accordance 
with Shariah Law.
244
 In addition to its own punitive powers, the Board of Grievances may 
evaluate the appropriateness of the sanction on a case-by-case basis, but this subjective 
practice heightens the potential exposure and risk for any foreign partner or private party. 
3.1.4.3 Delays in Performance and Mandatory Performance  
Saudi law dictates that if a private party or foreign entity seeks juris clarification or 
grievance proceedings against a public entity, for any unilateral authority the public entity 
may exercise during the scope and duration of a contract, the private party or foreign 
entity must continue to perform its obligations under the contract unless or until such 
time as the Board determines otherwise. The Board of Grievances has that in an 
administrative contract, it is imperative to give priority to the public interests over private 
interest. Therefore, it is impermissible for the contractor „to refuse to carry out his 
contractual obligations or the pleas of fault of the [agency]. Instead, he has to continue 
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carrying out his contractual obligations, if he can, and after the completion of the 
contract, he can seek compensation for all damages and losses.
245
  
This requirement is “unwaiveable” and is detrimental to a contractor who is obligated to 
perform regardless of whether they are burdened with “self-financing” a project until a 
dispute is settled, or continue on a performance path that may or may not be subject to 
drastic change depending on if the Board decides that a reformation of the scope of a 
project was within the public party‟s authority. 
3.1.4.4 Failure to Pay 
A contractor‟s only recourse in an administrative contract is through the Board of 
Grievances.  In the absence of clear guidance under the KSA Purchasing and 
Procurement Laws, if a public party fails to pay the contractor in accordance to the 
agreed upon terms and price, (even to the point of rendering a contractor insolvent as a 
result of forcing the contractor to self-finance the project during a period of mandated 
continued performance) the contractor cannot obtain a “mechanics lien” for services 
performed, nor an injunction, nor obtain a bond.
246
 In fact, regardless of whether a 
contractor is properly paid upon partial or full performance; the public entity alters the 
payment terms or price during the course of the contract; or as a result of some other 
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action or potential breach by either party, the contractor remains obligated to perform and 
seek payment only after-the-fact from the Board of Grievances.
247
 
3.1.4.5 Limitations on Damages  
Contractors are barred under Shariah law from collecting liquidated or anticipated 
damages. Under Shariah law, discussed below, the aforementioned interest (riba) and 
aleatory contracts (gharar) are considered to be self-interested in nature and against the 
good of the community or public, therefore it restricts damages to “actual” damages, with 
no projections of future or potential damages allowed in traditional calculations.  It is 
irrelevant whether parties provide for liquidated damages under an administrative 
contract during formation, as the Board will prohibit them. 
3.1.4.6 Sanctions and Public Shame 
Consequences can be severe for private parties and foreign entities for any finding of 
breach, default, or wrongdoing under a contract. The Board, in addition to whatever fines 
or penalties may be assessed against the party, may require the contractor to pay for a 
published “exposure” of their actions in two local newspapers and boycott their ability to 
conduct business in Saudi Arabia for a period not to exceed five years.
248
 As for a public 
entity which breaches a contract, consequences can be similar but are also subject to the 
full force of Shariah law and principles, discussed below.  
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These are not just statutory or theoretical scenarios for how unilateral authority may be 
exercised within an administrative contract, certain cases have exposed the exacerbated 
risks and the potential distortion associated with these contracts. For example, cases have 
cited instances of a contractor being forced to continue performance despite non-payment 
by the public party;
249
 or a public party rescinding a contract, replacing the contractor, 
and refusing the pay the original contractor because the contractor had attempted to stop 
performance based on the public authority‟s unilateral action to change the place of the 
contract.
250
 Another case involved the Ministry of Health prematurely rescinding a 
contract and giving a second contractor a promissory note stating he would be operating 
at the expense of the original contractor, until such time as the funds for the contract 
could be obtained from the Finance Ministry.
251
 The Board, rightfully, rejected the case 
against the original contractor.
252
 In this instance, the public party, not only wrongfully 
rescinded the original contract, but it violated procurement laws by giving the second 
contractor a promissory note, amounting to an unenforceable contract. An important 
observation that will be expanded upon later is that all of these actions were in drastic 
opposition to the contractual principles of Shariah law as well. 
In order to fully understand the discrepancy of rights, obligations, and risks of the parties‟ 
under a Saudi law governed administrative contract, it is useful to return to one of the 
central pivots of this thesis: to what extent do Saudi public authorities i.e. the Council of 
Ministers and particular administrative agencies, have a duty to protect the rights and 
freedoms of private parties under accepted doctrines of public and private law, and more 
                                                     
249
 Case no. 215/T/1, dated 1418 AH (1988) 
250
 Case no. 241/K, dated 1396 AH (1976) 
251
 Case no. 142/K/1, dated 1415 AH (1985) 
252
 Ibid.       
- 114 - 
importantly under the constitutional-like rules of Islamic Shariah. These issues will be 
unpacked and discussed in the below sections. 
3.2  Conceptualising the Relationship Between Public and Private Law in the 
Administrative Contract: Conflict or Compatibility  
As we have seen above, the relevant laws of Saudi Arabia are based on a fundamental 
private-public distinction. First there is the category of private contracts, subject to rules 
contained in Saudi Arabia‟s Civil and Commercial Code. Second there is the category of 
administrative contracts largely governed by the distinctive rules and (extra-legal) 
principles of public law. Finally, public law also defines the special privileges of the state 
sovereign, or the discretionary power vested in public authorities by virtue of the doctrine 
of delegated powers.   
In connection with the third point, powers conferred upon a public authority under the 
Saudi legal system are not always traceable to a statutory warrant or executive 
“authorisation”. Absent constitutional constraints or separated powers, Saudi authorities 
such as the Council of Ministers and other regulatory agencies exercise virtually 
unlimited discretionary power. This is best exemplified by ad hoc or unreasonable use of 
public policy defences to justify state acts, including unilateral undertakings of a 
contractual nature, and the retrospective recession or revocation of obligations or 
undertakings which bind them, irrespective of the fairness, predictability or legality of 
such actions. This has particular implications from a classic public and private law 
perspective.  
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The administrative law requirement of procedural fairness in closely connected with the 
regulatory ideal of legal certainty and, in private law, the good faith protection of the 
substantive legitimate expectations of a private individual who organizes their affairs 
based on the unilateral promises or representations of a public authority, even if these 
representations are not expressed in the form of binding agreement.
253
 If this argument 
holds true, the contractual bargain must be enforced, and not resiled from without good 
reason. This simple idea finds an obvious corollary in the private law concept of estoppel 
or justified reliance, but the question posed here is this: With the administrative contract, 
have we already crossed the conceptual barrier established between public and private 
law?  
The legal concept of legitimate expectations is the doctrinal expression of an enduring 
political ideal or value: trust. Absent this trust, rule of law risks being replaced by rule by 
power or coercion. The protection of legitimate expectations has been championed in the 
rulings of courts across the globe by courts who have endorsed an increasingly 
substantive conception of the aforementioned doctrine.
254
 The legitimate expectations 
were upheld by the Hong Kong Court of Appeals, which affirmed that the doctrine 
„facilitates the task of governance in so far as the subjects bound by administrative 
decision and acts should feel able to put their faith in what their government says and 
does‟.255 In connection with the above, the Indian supreme court went further to rule that 
„the existence of a legitimate expectation may even in the absence of a right of private 
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law, justify its recognition in public law‟.256 This concept has also been accorded 
recognition by the European Court of Justice.
257
  
At root, the doctrine of legitimate expectations is fundamentally concerned with negating 
or constraining the abuse of administrative discretionary power. But while the value of 
trust in government as a whole presents no special doctrinal or theoretical difficulty at the 
more general level, even if the practical operation of this concept will be subject to the 
vagaries of politics, the same cannot be said at the level of a specific administrative act or 
decree. It is open to question, for instance, whether the doctrine of legitimate expectations 
can be simply expanded to cover the trust (justified reliance) that a private individual, in 
this case a private contractor, reposes in a public authority in the context of an 
administrative contract. After all, while non-administrative contracts focus on fairness, 
equality, and justice, administrative contracts allow for less “mutuality” in the contract 
obligations and materiality of terms because public entities are allowed unilateral 
modification, reformation, and cancellation authority in the name of public interest and 
sovereignty.
258
 Therefore, a breach of substantive legitimate expectations which is 
reflected in the agreed terms of contract, as governed by the ordinary rules of contract 
law, may still constitute an entirely lawful and intra vires act which binds both parties 
from the standpoint of public law. Substantive protection of the contractual expectation 
on which a party justifiably relies can therefore be denied, on the grounds of public 
interest, or on the basis of the “no fetter principle” in cases where the exercise of 
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discretionary unilateral authority falls within the scope of powers vested upon that body 
or official.  
On this logic, courts cannot challenge the merits of unilateral decision on grounds of 
public policy which is a matter reserved for the government and its representatives. As 
the Pemex decision discussed in chapter 5 suggests, there are however procedural, if not 
substantive limits, on the exercise of unilateral authority, including those which in being 
retroactively applied infringe basic standards of procedural fairness so as to render 
unilateral undertaking voidable, while permitting discharge of the private party by the 
tribunal, from any obligation imposed on it through an improper or unfair exercise of 
public power.
259
  
The above has bearing when considering the legality of administrative action under the 
Saudi framework of administrative law and associated mechanisms of judicial review. As 
such suggested in chapter 2, there may be no clear way of determining whether the 
administrative actions of KSA‟s executive organs, such as the Council of Ministers, or 
regulatory agencies falls within the bounds of legality, and is consequently binding on 
authorities or private parties. Such procedural irregularities are most likely to occur when 
subject matter of the act or decision is not explicitly regulated under statute or codified 
law. This limitation of the KSA administrative law system (and public law framework) 
has not been sufficiently accounted for the extant scholarship, leading to a widespread 
misconception around the role of Shariah in the sphere of public and private law.  
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It is commonly implied that the more problematic aspects of contract construction and 
adjudication in Saudi Arabia derive from the Islamic foundation of its constitution.
260
 
However, this is to misunderstand the spirit and principles underlying Islamic law which 
require that a mutual or unilateral undertaking be upheld in good faith. Reflected in the 
case of Saudi Arabia vs. Saudi Arabian- American Oil Company (ARAMCO), the 
Arbitration Tribunal noted that „Moslem law does not distinguish between a treaty, a 
contract of public or administrative law and a contract of civil, commercial law‟,261 the 
inherent nature of the administrative contract that creates this dynamic of “inequality” 
seems, accordingly, contrary to requirements set forth in Shariah law.  
If an administrative contract is still a contract, and as such underlying the most basic 
premise of administrative contracts are the tenets of contract construction, under what 
circumstances can a unilateral action be found to breach a legitimate contractual 
expectation? Pertinent to the above discussion, the next section considers the treatment of 
contracts under Islamic law or Shariah. It is, as suggested above, implied that Islamic law 
is founded on rules and traditions anomalous to the Western model of contract law and 
dispute resolution. 
3.3  An Islamic Perspective on Contract Law and Theory 
In common with other jurisdictions, Islamic Shariah mandates that every lawful contract 
must be observed. It is explicitly affirmed in the Quran that all Muslims have a religious 
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duty to fulfil their contractual obligations in good faith and with firm determination. 
Several passages of the holy text make explicit reference to these duties:  
„Oye who believe fulfil the contractual obligations‟,262  
„And fulfil you covenant with me and as I fulfil my covenant with you‟,263 and,  
„[T]hey keep their promises whenever they promise‟.264  
In Islamic legal literature, the word „contract‟ is used in two ways.6 The first offers a 
more general definition. „Contract‟ is the term given to every action, covenant, oath or 
promise undertaken with a specific intent and determination - including unilateral 
undertakings, both public and private, e.g. repayment of a debt, or the promise to hold 
funds in trust or fulfil an oath of marriage.
265
 In the Quran, the word “contract” is the 
more general term given to the duty to honour personal obligations.
266
 The term „contract‟ 
is also used to denote a more specific meaning, in this case referring to an agreement 
resulting from a mutual undertaking based on consent. Most Islamic jurists have 
accepted, for instance, that a contract is concluded when corporeal goods or property are 
exchanged between two persons of sound mind and capacity.
267
 Notably, the Hanafi 
School has determined that a sale of contract is formed when a coveted item is exchanged 
for another, orally or by deed. 
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As with other common law jurisdictions, all individuals have freedom to contract under 
Shariah law. However, the degree of freedom of contract is governed by the prohibitions 
in the Quran and Sunnah, and as applied by scholars and independent jurists.
268
 Shariah 
law also does not distinguish between public contract and commercial law, instead 
expecting all persons to honour their word.
269
 The Quran prescribes believers „not to 
devour your assets among yourselves in vanity, except in trading by your consent.‟270 
Accordingly, these tenets are at the heart of the contractual relationship be it a normal or 
“non-administrative” contract which may nonetheless have public law type regularities or 
which otherwise implicate issues of public interest or welfare.   
3.3.1  Contractual Restrictions under Shariah 
The basic requirements, or “sale conditions”, for construction of a valid contract within 
Shariah law mirror those of standard contractual practice. Shariah requires mutual 
consent, capacity, agreed upon terms and conditions, agreed upon price or benefit, and 
Shariah based consideration. The actions and decisions by parties during formation and 
performance of a contract in Saudi Arabia encompass these more universally accepted 
tenets.   
As stated, Shariah law does not distinguish between public contracts and commercial 
law, these tenets equally apply to all types of contracts, including those of sale, 
procurement, or services. Terms and conditions become a secondary-evaluative concern 
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in determining the validity of a contract, specifically, a contract cannot lead to 
“Muhrram” (an issue forbidden under Shariah law).271 Examples of “Muhrram”, 
forbidden issues include riba (“usury”)272 and gharar (speculation, deception or 
excessive risk).
273
 Contracts that contain facid or fayed (immorally one-sided, non-
equilibrium based, or obstructionist in nature) clauses are also grounds for finding a 
contract to be invalid, unlawful, or voidable.
274
 These provisions are thematically applied 
throughout every stage of administrative contracts from formation to performance to 
dispute resolution, including matters of arbitration and award.
275
 They also tend to be the 
most accepted and understood  
practices of contract law within KSA. 
3.3.2 Shariah and the Administrative Contract 
As further analysis in this study will show, secondary sources in Saudi Arabia‟s Shariah 
Law have adopted many of these tests, practices, and theories in determining the validity, 
lawfulness, void ability, and enforceability of contracts. On its face, the KSA has the 
operative procedures for defining a contract as administrative. So, while there might be a 
seemingly inherent Shariah law tension, there is nothing on the surface that makes Saudi 
administrative law any different than other states. Distinctions from general Islamic 
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Shariah law administrative practices, and those of other countries, remain in extent of 
codification, terminology, and jurisprudence application. 
The guiding principle of being faithful to your word and the idea of consent are core 
elements to contracts within Shariah law. Understood this way, there is no conflict, ab 
initio, between the doctrine of administrative freedom exercised in the public interest 
(„unfettered discretion‟) and the Islamic conception of, and normative commitment to, 
sanctity of contract. That is to say, a court enforcing a legitimate expectation created by 
an undertaking, by word or by deed, made by an official would not be violating the no-
fetter principle
276
 since the court would merely be upholding the terms of the contract in 
good faith (which, arguably, falls within the scope of administrative court‟s powers), 
rather than substituting its own judgement for that of the law-maker by reviewing the 
merits of the public authority‟s decision i.e. what constitutes a legitimate breach in the 
public interest or equitable allocation of resources (which may attract criticisms on 
grounds of judicial overreach).
277
 In this sense, some equivalent to the private law 
concepts of promissory estoppel (enforcement of contractual obligations) or equity 
(compensation for losses suffered by the private party in the event of non-performance or 
non-satisfaction) in the treatment of public contracts would provide sufficient protection 
for the private party without going so far as treating all undertakings as binding, without 
consideration of the wider public interest.  
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These become controversial themes when applied to administrative contracts, which may 
waive issues of being consistent or faithful to one‟s word and in foregoing consent when 
retroactive actions or reclassification occurs within the contract, or by an administrative 
authority.
278
 As will be argued throughout this thesis, the concept of consent seems to be 
vague and diminished in contractual practice, despite the seemingly clear language of 
Shariah law.  
These issues will be discussed in the next section, focusing on a comparative analysis of 
strict and flexible theories of contract interpretation. This will provide a basis on which to 
analyse Islamic and civil law perspectives on the balance that should be struck between 
the principle of sanctity of contract, and the countervailing doctrine of „changed 
circumstances‟. This higher level analysis will then be used to assess more practical 
questions around the extent to which the performance of an administrative contract can 
be unilaterally modified and the rights and obligations of both parties in such 
circumstances in different legal systems. This will allow for a comparison of Islamic 
principles of contract law and their application to administrative contracts in general vis-
a-vis the rights of contractors under the prevailing framework governing administrative 
contracts under Saudi codified and common law.  
3.3.3 The Application of Contract Principles to Unilateral Authority: 
Lessons from other civil law systems 
Contract law is the core set of rules and principles regulating the formation, validity and 
operation of commercial and trade related exchange relationships, and the obligations 
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arising from these legal forms. The principles governing contract law lies in private law 
theory and its raison d‟etre – the sanctity of contract – in legal systems everywhere, 
Islamic and Western alike.
279
 On the other hand, is worth noting that the doctrine of 
change of circumstances has long been recognised as a customary principle of 
international law and as a principle of contract law, which is recognised by civil law 
systems such as Egypt and France.
280
 „A contract is said to be frustrated when a 
supervening event occurs which so fundamentally affects the performance of the contract 
that in the eyes of the law the contract comes to an end and both parties are discharged 
from any duty to perform.‟281 The next section examines the relationship between the 
legitimate exercise of unilateral authority and the contractual defences such as the 
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus/change of circumstance. 
3.3.3.1 The Customary Law Status of the Doctrine of Changed 
Circumstances under International Law 
Remarkably, the principle of “changed circumstances” or rebus sic stantibus may apply 
under international law even if a “change of circumstances” clause is not included in the 
agreement in dispute itself.
282
 Indeed, the rebus sic stantibus doctrine has been elevated 
to a general principle of international law, as embodied by Article 62 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.
283
 The principle, however, has been narrowly 
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construed by the supranational courts. In rendering its judgment in Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project case, the ICJ formulated the following test: „a fundamental change of 
circumstances must have been unforeseen‟284 with the Court adding that the plea of a 
„fundamental change of circumstances be applied only in exceptional circumstances.‟285 
It is worth keeping in mind that while this provision provides a disadvantaged party with 
grounds to request renegotiation or withdrawal from an agreement, international law is 
largely concerned with a particular kind of agreement: those concluded in treaties by way 
of state consent.
286
 However, there is some ambiguity over whether this principle might 
also apply, in certain limited and exceptional circumstances, to agreements concluded 
between a state or state entity and a private party. On this point the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) has said:  
Article 62 is a strong argument for the existence of a general legal 
principle (of changed circumstances) which might also be relevant to 
transnational contract with or between private parties.
287
 
Yet, even if a general principle exists, the legal effects or application of such a principle 
remains uncertain and highly contested. For instance, does the acceptance of such a 
principle impose a duty on States to renegotiate transnational agreements involving a 
private firm or entity? Developing Islamic countries are naturally suspicious of arguments 
which expand the scope of international rules which can be wielded against states and 
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state agreements to protect the interests of large corporations, for instance where a change 
in circumstances has onerously effected the economic equilibrium of the original 
contract. Any attempt by an international court or tribunal to displace the concept of 
sanctity of contracts in favour of a duty of renegotiation or contractual adaption or 
compensation would, at the very least, dilute or diminish the exclusivity of state law and 
local customs in the resolution of contractual dispute, while undermining the 
jurisdictional priority of national courts.   
In light of the above, the next section will consider the rules governing the doctrine of 
„changed circumstances‟ under civil law systems. The section will also assess how 
national courts have policed the exercise of unilateral authority in respect of 
administrative contracts, particularly where contractual change has resulted in non-
performance of the contract or otherwise resulted in some form of loss or hardship for a 
private party.  
3.3.4 Civil Law Systems: A Comparative Analysis of Changed 
Circumstances in France  
As Saudi Arabia most closely represents a civil law system, clear analogies can be drawn 
between the law governing contractual performance in KSA and other civil law 
jurisdictions such as French law. The principle of sanctity of contract is strictly upheld in 
the French model.   
While French law recognises defences to contractual performance, these are strictly 
construed and are generally limited to cases of impossibility resulting from a judicial 
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determination of force majeure.
288
 The doctrine of force majeure is traditionally defined 
as the presence of an unforeseeable and irresistible event which renders a contract 
impossible.
289
 Even here, the defence can be overridden if there is a contractual clause to 
the contrary. Furthermore, the burden of proof lies on the party seeking relief to 
demonstrate not only that the contract was rendered impossible, but also that the 
occurrence of unforeseen event was not the fault of either party.
290
 Crucially, evidence of 
a change in circumstance does not provide adequate grounds for relief from contract 
performance. However, the strict adherence to the principle of sanctity of contract is, 
importantly, tempered by other provisions of the French Civil Code
291
 aimed to protect 
the rights of private parties, namely the requirements of good faith
292
 and equity.
293
 
Public bodies or governments are not immune to these requirements of good faith and 
equity and must respect these principles in connection with the performance of 
administrative contract. Most of the nominate forms of public contract i.e. public works, 
public concessions and procurement contracts implement EU directives Public 
Procurement directive (Nr 2004-17/CE and 2004/18/CE) which while not directly 
effective are nonetheless subject to review by the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
The directives have since then been implemented in France in the French Public 
Procurement Code (CMP or Code des Marchés Publics) and under the French ordinance 
Nr 2005-649 (dated 06/06/2005) which together, define and delimit the powers of the 
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relevant public authorities who can enter into contracts relating to regulated ultilities 
sectors.  
In the above regard, the French Conseil d‟Etat has over a series of judicial decisions 
developed the French doctrine of “imprévision” as applied to contracts entered into with a 
state or administrative authority.
294
 In this regard it is worth noting that the regulation of 
administrative contracts is fairly well defined, following the implementation of the Public 
procurement EU directives (Nr 2004-17/CE and 2004/18/CE) in France.  
The effect of this doctrine is to enable the competent French courts to modify or adapt the 
terms of contract following the occurrence of an unforeseen circumstance, should its 
continued performance unfairly or inequitably impact the economic equilibrium of the 
contract. It should be noted however that the courts have set a high threshold for a 
successful determination and application of the principle of imprévision. Non-performing 
parties must demonstrate that the potential losses suffered by the changed circumstances 
are significant.
295
 
Thus, under French law, a contract can be terminated and/or the contractual obligations 
owed by one of both parties discharged only when the loss bearing party can demonstrate 
that the change in the economic equilibrium is both irremediable and final.
296
 It is worth 
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bearing in mind that the French doctrine of imprévision bears relevance to the subject of 
this thesis, in so far as these defences specifically apply to contracts entered into with 
states and/or state enterprises.
297
 Furthermore, as will be discussed below, the general 
concept of frustration and impossibility has been influential in the development of the 
similar provisions in the Civil Codes of many Islamic and Arab countries.  
3.3.4.1 Islamic Law Systems: A Comparative Analysis of Changed 
Circumstances in Egypt 
The Egyptian Civil Code, similar to the French Code, recognises certain contractual 
defences to non-performance in changed circumstances.
 
Under the Egyptian system, a 
defence of changed circumstances will only be upheld and applied if the event in question 
is unforeseeable, and where a direct causal link can be established between the changed 
circumstances and the impossibility or contractual performance.
298
 Furthermore, the non-
performing or debtor party must demonstrate that continued performance of the contract 
as originally contemplated would threaten the party with exorbitant losses.
299
 Once 
satisfied that all of these tests have been met, the competent Egyptian court is vested with 
powers to adapt or modify contractual obligations. However, the court has a duty to 
ensure that any modification or adaptation is reasonable, proportionate (to potential 
hardship suffered) and takes sufficient account of the rights and interests of both parties. 
Moreover, while the court can adapt the terms of the contract, under Egyptian law the 
contract cannot be discharged or terminated. That is to say, the Egyptian courts do not 
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have competence to fully discharge the parties of their duties under contract or require 
both parties to dissolve the contractual bond entirely.
300
  
However, Articles 668–673 of the Egyptian Civil Code (known as the “Code”) explicitly 
provides that public contracts concluded with governmental authorities or state entities 
should be afforded special or differential treatment from ordinary contracts governed by 
the ordinary law of contract (governed under the Egyptian Commercial Code). Similar to 
KSA, this seemingly gives the state the power to unilaterally intervene in the 
performance of a contract in pursuit of public interest considerations and to do so by 
imposing general regulations of an extra-contractual nature (i.e. the exercise of Royal 
power or through retrospective acts or decisions which amend the terms of the contract 
through non-statutory executive decisions).
301
 
 While, the Code implies that a contract can only be terminated or renegotiated on the 
government‟s request,302 in other respects, it provides greater scope for flexibility in the 
construction of administrative contracts; including provisions that allow for the adaption 
and renegotiation of a contract which imposes an undue hardship or burden on one or 
both parties.
303
  
As with France, the Egyptian administrative system is embedded from within a 
developed from a more developed system of codified law. As such, the laws governing 
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the treatment of administrative contracts, including the unilateral authority of the 
administration to modify such contracts, benefits from greater degree of clarity and 
specificity than is the case under the Saudi legal system (largely because of the Egyptian 
government‟s comprehensive attempt to codify rules governing the identification and 
treatment of administrative contracts).  
However, a criticism that can be posed to the French, Egyptian and Saudi legal system is 
the failure to define both the scope of regulation and scope of review, which governs the 
relationship between the administration and the private contractor or concessionaire. For 
instance, while the Egyptian Civil Code does delineate the relevant duties and 
responsibilities of a public utility concessionaire to its consumers,
304
 it remains silent on 
the question of the rights and duties owed by a public authority to a concessionaire.  
The Egyptian Conseil d‟Etat has stepped in to fill the legal vacuum and close the 
legislative “gap”.  The court has held that the unilateral public power exercised by the 
state is not restricted to the nominate forms of public contract (e.g. public service 
concessions, public works, and public procurement contracts) explicitly and 
prospectively identified and regulated under the statutory Code.
305
 This wider discretion 
therefore, allows the Conseil to subjectively define not only what unilateral authority may 
be, but in whether a change of circumstances effects an administrative contract, 
legitimate expectations of the parties, or even the arbitrability of such contracts.  
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This takes us to a crucial point in our comparative discussion. While France and Egypt 
provide rich comparisons, a closer examination of how Islamic Shariah law is unique in 
its approach to changed circumstances and concepts of unilateral authority is better 
applicable to KSA‟s system, which is more heavily reliant on Shariah law within its 
administrative law. Or more specifically, what does a judicial body take under 
consideration while exercising ijihad in its duties of review and determination under 
Islamic law. 
3.3.4.2 Islamic Law Systems: The Comparative Analysis of General 
Shariah Principles on Changed Circumstances to Contractual 
Authority 
As stated above, the Islamic legal tradition places great onus on the good faith 
performance of contracts and the related principle of pacta sunt servanda.
87 
Further, 
Shariah law mandates that a person shall not take advantage of the misfortune of 
another, as such may be the case with a change of circumstances in relation to a 
contractual arrangement.
306
 However, commonly accepted interpretations of Islamic 
sources do allow for contractual defences to non-performance to account for an 
unforeseeable change in circumstances. 
In Islamic Law, dissolution of contract occurs after a valid (sahih) contract has been 
formed, whereas the annulment of contract is only applicable to an invalid contract 
(ghayer sahih). 
307
 Islamic jurists tend to distinguish between two modes of contractual 
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dissolution. The first results from the cessation (zawal) of contract through the effective 
execution and performance of contractual obligations, thereby ending of the contract.
308
  
The second way in which a contract can be rendered dissolute (inhilal) is by the 
termination of a contract after it has been concluded but before contractual obligations 
have been performed. Dissolution of the contract can only occur with mutual agreement 
of both parties, and as a result of frustration of contract, or by breach of contract. 
Accordingly, the first category refers to discharge of contract by performance of contract, 
whereas the second type involves the discharge of contract by agreement, breach of 
contract, and frustration.   
Under the latter conception, breach of contract, and frustration, can provide grounds for 
the discharge of contractual obligations if the frustration results from an unforeseen or 
supervening event, which renders the contract impossible, or otherwise results in losses 
beyond the control of parties.
309
 For instance, there is doctrinal acceptance among Islamic 
jurists that supervening events or circumstances which render a contract impossible or 
unlawful imposes may impose undue difficulties on the party, and therefore can provide 
grounds on which the contract can be discharged, or otherwise offer a partial or full 
defence against breaches.
310
 Under Islam, frustration can be applied in a manner that 
ensures that an undue burden or loss will be eliminated or compensated (al-darar yuzal) 
for instance in respect of the doctrine of mistake, hardship and impossibility.
311
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Under these conceptions, a judge that applies Islamic contract principles is empowered to 
modify or adapt the parties‟ obligations in a manner that balances between the rights and 
interests of both parties.
 
The judge is also at liberty to terminate the contract if such an 
action is of mutual benefit to both parties, and if compensation is awarded to the loss 
bearing party.
 
The important point here is that the concept of discharge by performance is 
broadly construed in the Islamic context, therefore allowing for a much higher degree of 
flexibility in the enforcement and construction of contractual rights and obligations.  
To the above point, passages of the Quran express the divine belief that Allah does not 
wish to place undue burdens on his subjects, and seeks to relieve them of excessive 
physical or economic hardships. Religious authority provides specific legal defences 
which can be applied to relieve a party of these duties, or to excuse contractual non-
performance resulting from unintentional or unavoidable acts.  The below verses of the 
Quran can be cited in this regard. 
 Allah intends ever facility for you; He does not want to put to difficulties;312  
 On no soul does Allah place a burden greater than it can bear;313  
 Allah has imposed no difficulties on you.314  
Extrapolating from these verses, it is evident that a law that enforces obligations in blind 
indifference to the undue or unjust burden this may impose on a party is inconsistent with 
the spirit and text of Islamic conceptions of rights and justice. Thus, Islam calls for a 
purposive or teleological interpretation of law, inviting rulers, jurists and courts to 
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consider the justice of legal (contractual) outcomes when applying and enforcing the law. 
In short, Islamic theories of law eschew formalism in favour of a natural law conception 
of justice (sometimes known as or policy orientated theory of contract law).
315
 This 
relationship between law and morality is not confined to the sphere of contract law and 
construction, but extends to all forms of law making and adjudication, in all areas of life, 
public and private.
316
  
Specifically, the Islamic conception of hardship or “changed circumstances” provides a 
mechanism under contractual defences, including a claim for compensation as discussed 
below, can be invoked to avoid inflicting an economic harm or injustice upon the private 
party to a contract. In this regard, the Prophet Mohammed has said, „la darar wala dirar 
fi alslam,‟317 the translation of which is that the law should not oblige or enforce 
individuals to endure harm, injustice or unfair loss. One can therefore reasonably assume 
that something equivalent to the concept of frustration is a mandatory principle of all 
Islamic legal systems, and in this case Saudi Arabia.  
In the context of an administrative contract, a contract may be avoided if its performance 
becomes extremely burdensome for the private party,
318
 These changes must be 
unforeseeable at the time of concluding the contract; materially affect the substance of the 
contract and thus, render the contract impossible or unduly onerous.
 
 Moreover, the event 
resulting in the changed circumstances must not be the fault of either party, and should lie 
beyond both parties control.
 
 Finally, the hardship suffered by the party must be 
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significant and exceed the financial benefits that would be gained from a continuation of 
the contract.  
The above ideas may have significant bearing on the powers of Saudi public authorities 
such as the power to unilaterally modify or rescind their obligations under an 
administrative contract, usually on a discretionary basis, and their duties under Islam. 
When performance of a contract is rendered impossible or problematic, the law should 
not bind the parties to the fulfilment of these promises, without opportunities to 
challenge or contest the decision, if doing so will result in an excessive hardship for one 
or both parties.  
3.3.4.3 The Islamic Concept of Changed Circumstances Applied to 
Administrative Contracts within Saudi Arabia 
As previously discussed, a distinction can be drawn between private law contracts and 
public law contracts. By extension, different principles govern the validity, performance 
and enforcement of each type of contract, even under the doctrine of changed 
circumstances.  
In the context of an administrative contract within KSA, the private party cannot rely on 
changed circumstances, such as the doctrine of frustration, to escape obligations held 
under the contract if non-performance of those obligations is judged detrimental to the 
public interest or public policy. The private party is, accordingly, required to continue 
performance of the contract, even where the event is unavoidable, and no fault or 
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omission can be established on the part of either party.
319
 From the perspective of 
ordinary contract law, such an outcome would seem inequitable or even strip the very 
object and purposes of the doctrine of its coherency and protective value. A private party 
is liable to accrue significant losses from continuance of the contract because of damages, 
disruption or delay arisen from a supervening event. To remedy these concerns, the 
doctrine of unforeseen events does not apply with full effect to the private contractor in 
countries including Kuwait and Egypt.
320
 The consequence is that the public authority is 
required to share the financial burden, even if it has not suffered losses of its own.   
In practice, as evidence indicates, public authorities will oftentimes suffer the greater 
proportion of losses as a result of events over which it had no or little control; a burden 
which a public agency, and by implication the state itself, assumes as part of its broader 
duty to protect and safeguard the public interest. The protection of the public interest is 
recognised by Islam, a principle known as Maslahah. Maslahah or public interest is an 
essential influence in the development of the Shariah and was known as the only 
overriding objective of the Shariah which encompasses all measures beneficial to 
people.
321
 That being said, there are two principles with are distinctly applicable to the 
administrative contracts in particular. Both principles fall under the umbrella of defences 
or exceptions to the doctrine of frustration of contracts, specifically the doctrine of 
impossibility. The first concerns the French principle of administrative risk.
322
 This 
principle is applied in circumstances under which the administrative authority who has 
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entered into the contract introduces a change or modification into the execution of the 
contract which acts, causally, as a trigger for an unforeseen event, thereby rendering 
continued performance impossible.  Furthermore, if the contractual modification is the 
result of an ultra vires act – wherein the administrative authority exercises a power which 
has not been lawfully conferred upon it – or if the action itself contains an illegality, then 
the public authority must assume financial liability for any losses suffered by the private 
contractors as a consequence of the contract being rendered impossible.  
The second doctrine which produces particular legal effects when applied to the 
administrative contract, as distinct from the commercial or civil law contract, relates to 
presence of significant of economic or physical hardship.
323
 Under ordinary contract law, 
any hardship suffered in the performance of obligations held under contract is considered 
part of the usual risks assumed by private parties upon entering into a contract. Certain 
exceptions may, however, apply when the hardship in question is of a degree or character, 
which is reasonably anticipated by the parties, thereby triggering grounds for the judicial 
or quasi-judicial rendering of a contractual impossibility. This in turn provides grounds 
for the losing party to seek partial compensation for any costs incurred from the 
unforeseen hardship.
324
  Economic or physical hardships are not confined to “force 
majeure” and may extend to scenarios previously known to the party seeking 
compensation.
325
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The Board of Grievances court has dealt with these issues in the context of commercial 
clauses in an administrative contract. In one case, the court held that a change in a 
commercial government set fuel prices in a contract may be subject to the doctrine of 
frustration, on fulfilment of two conditions: the price increase imposes an undue burden 
on the private party, as compared with usual commercial standards.  Secondly, if the price 
change was introduced after the conclusion of the contract.
326
 One further illustration of a 
set of factual circumstances under which the hardship doctrine may be successfully 
applied is when parties have contracted to a public service concession to mine resources 
on a particular site, only to discover some geological or public safety related obstacle to 
the continuation of the project. The same might also apply to injunction on the building 
of a school in an area found to have high levels of background radiation. Each of these 
examples might also be encompassed by the broader doctrine of contractual impossibility, 
blurring the line between the former and the narrower doctrinal category of hardship as 
grounds for compensation. It would appear therefore that the doctrine of unforeseen 
events and impossibility have a much wider scope and legal effects, entitling private 
parties who suffer losses to a general right of compensation.
327
  
However, it is worth noting that Saudi Arabia does not provide for a general statutory 
compensation scheme which governs the circumstances under which the state is liable for 
losses suffered by a private individual, through fault or unforeseen circumstances. More 
generally, practice seems to suggest that the doctrine of hardship, administrative risk, 
mistake or impossibility is applied more narrowly in disputes involving administrative 
contracts.  
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A quantitative floor on losses has not been established by Saudi administrative courts, but 
the decisions of the Board suggest a private party would have to demonstrate significant 
or unusual loss before they could sue a Saudi authority or institution for financial relief.  
The Board, has held: „If any supervening events occurred during a performance of the 
administrative contract which caused an abnormal loss, the contractor can claim for 
compensation from administrative body.‟328  Moreover, the decision of the Board 
suggests that the party can only claim for actual pecuniary losses and not for future or 
anticipated losses. 
It is open to question whether the practice of the Board is consistent with the general 
principles of Islam. Under Islamic conceptions, losses and risks must be distributed 
among both parties, regardless of the nature of the contract being performed, or the 
identity of the actors who have formed it.
329
 If a contractual bargain proves to be less 
desirable than originally anticipated e.g. because services have been procured at prices 
greatly in excess of the market, or because of a change in circumstances, the public 
authority may have no choice but to live with the consequences.
330
 Facts do, however, 
have to be taken into account and the substantive protection of a substantive expectation 
should be carefully weighed and balanced against other public policy considerations, 
including the protection of the wider public welfare, goods and needs. It is nonetheless 
difficult to see how this can be achieved if Saudi courts are under no obligation to base 
their decision on sensitive appraisal of the contingencies of each case, and to do so with 
reasoned and published decisions, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
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3.3.4.4 Summary 
Just as a number of common law legal systems tend to converge around common 
principles of administrative law, contract law is deeply rooted in a general theory of 
private law, and in the evolving norms and customs of the law merchant, and in the 
newest forms of international commercial law i.e. international treaties and emerging 
forms of transnational “soft” law.331 What we have discovered from the brief comparative 
study of civil and Islamic law systems, focusing on France and Egypt, is that most legal 
systems give recognition to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Most, moreover, call for 
a strict interpretation of the sanctity of contract. This principle continues to be a 
fundamental tenet of all contract law models and theories, regardless of whether the 
contract is regulated as public or private contract, or is judicially determined to have the 
nature or regulatory (public interest) purposes of either.
332
 Yet, it is equally clear that no 
legal system subscribes to an absolute or fixed interpretation of this principle, although 
some systems adopt a stricter approach than others. Islamic contract law models, like 
their secular civil or common law counterparts, recognise that a contract loses its validity 
and effectiveness when the very subject or objective of the contract is radically changed 
following an unforeseen circumstance. 
By contrast, the above analysis suggests that the Islamic legal tradition allows for a 
greater degree of flexibility in contracts and contractual renegotiation, primarily by 
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providing contractual defences or relief to parties who are likely to suffer exorbitant loss 
or hardship as a result of continued performance of a contract (by enabling parties to seek 
compensation or renegotiate the contract, discussed below). This concept is more widely 
accepted in countries with a civil law tradition, and particularly in respect of contracts 
entered into with governments, having public law elements. The relevant provisions of 
Egyptian law, for instance, empower courts to adapt the terms of the contract when a 
change in circumstances radically disturbs the economic equilibrium underlying the 
original terms of the contract, to the detriment to the weaker party, as will be discussed in 
greater detail below. French law, by comparison, places greater onus on the sanctity of a 
contract and French courts are less prone to interfere with the negotiated term of a 
contract, even when the contract has been concluded with a public authority. It would 
seem therefore that Islamic legal systems tend to more fully embrace the concept of 
unilateral modification and mutual re-negotiability of long-term contracts in cases of 
extreme change or hardship.  
3.4  The Relationship between Public and Private: Comparative Analysis of the 
Scope and Limits of Unilateral Authority 
As discussed above, civil law courts are increasingly more prepared to accept that the 
actions or statements of a public authority on which a private individual or entity relies 
can sometimes create an enforceable obligation to satisfy a legitimate expectation.
333
 
From the standpoint of private law, there is no doctrinal difficulty in the substantive 
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protection of legitimate expectation about the idea that a private party must fulfil its end 
of a contractual bargain, regardless of whether that contract is formed through mutual 
consent or by means of a unilateral undertaking or representation.  Contract law protects 
the other parties‟ reliance on these unilateral representations, and the expectation it 
creates. The sanctity of the contract remains intact.
334
  
This is all very good in the context of a bilateral exchange relationship between two 
parties of equal standing. Yet, we know that public law rests on a different set of value 
assumptions. Public authorities, or so it is assumed, do not act in accordance with their 
own self-interest when making decisions. They are accountable to the public. The task of 
balancing between the rights of affected individuals and the wider needs of society has 
always been the province of public law.
335
 When making these decisions, the public 
authority is required to take a number of factors into account, social, political and 
economic (how to budget for a public project, and prioritise resources and interests 
etc.).
336
 Conventional wisdom has it that courts are not institutionally fit to determine 
whether the decisions made by public authority are either sound or judicious, since they 
do not have a full understanding of the factors involved. Nor do courts have the statutory 
authority to do perform this function. The substantive protection of a legitimate 
expectation would, on this view, constitute an “unacceptable fetter” on the decision-
maker‟s power because it would cast the judge into the role of law-maker, which is an 
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infringement of the principle of delegated power.
337
 But this reasoning only stands if we 
close the distance between the principle of unfettered unilateral authority and a much 
older constitutional ideal – separation of powers principle.338 
While this chapter discussed unilateral authority in specific terms of the contract itself 
and public authorities, a broader understanding of unilateral authority is common to all 
administrative law systems.  Intrinsically connected to the idea of sovereignty, and indeed 
the existential extension of its practice, unilateral authority is also a matter of what may 
establish subject matter jurisdiction within contractual or administrative matters.  It is this 
authority, or its absence, which defines an administrative or commercial act. The rule 
accepted by all administrative law jurisdictions is that an “exorbitant” or “excessive” 
authority or clause must exist for there to be an administrative act.  An administrative act 
is necessary for there to be an administrative contract. Again, the purpose of this is for the 
government to have the means and ways of protecting the good of the whole and to 
perform its duties to the public. 
3.4.1 Similarities between the Administrative Regimes of France, Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia 
Similar to KSA, the mechanism of unilateral authority is the public party‟s authority to 
amend, terminate or rescind a contract with a private party.
339
 The administrative 
contract, or the notion of “Le Contrat Administratif” as it is called in French and Egyptian 
doctrines, is a tool unique to civil law legal systems, and as already analyzed within KSA 
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jurisdiction, the elements of such contract are benefits to public interest, the participation 
of a public party with a private entity, and the inclusion of “excessive or special” clauses, 
“Les Clauses Exorbitantes.”340 Some administrative scholars have coined these clauses as 
“nationalization clauses”.341 The development of these authorities was based a French 
theory and practice for providing public services that are uninterrupted, consistent, and 
regular, also known as “Principe du Deroulement des Utilities Publiques avec Regularite 
et Continuite”.342 This principle is the cornerstone for French and Egyptian jurisprudence 
and doctrine, which „elucidates the unilateral and unlimited powers exercised by the 
state.‟343  
3.4.2 Differences between the Saudi Framework on Administrative 
Contracts and Egypt and France 
What may be the most important contemporary distinction in this practice between KSA 
and other civil administrative systems, is that the requirement that an administrative 
contract must contain an “exorbitant clause”, thereby confirming the parties‟ intentions to 
adopt public law stipulations, does not align with KSA‟s practice of re-classifying 
contracts through the Board or of the potential lack of capacity or consent of parties who 
are subject to the regime of reclassification. Thus, the existence of these “exorbitant” 
clauses or unilateral authorities, and whether or not they indicate the parties‟ awareness of 
the nature of the contract, becomes an issue beyond consent to one of substantive and 
procedural due process, or administrative justice, within administrative contracts. In 
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classification of administrative contracts, France and Egypt use similar evaluation criteria 
to Saudi Arabia, but France requires two out of three criteria to be met in order for a 
contract to be classified as “administrative”, whereas Egypt requires all three.344  They 
both similarly accept that a contract can be named administrative under the law. 
3.4.3 The Islamic Dimension: Key Differences between French and Islamic 
Systems 
While there are significant areas of overlap between Western and Islamic theories and 
doctrines of contract law, there is, potentially, one significant point of departure between 
the two, with bearing on the arbitrability of administrative contracts: the freedom of 
parties to choose applicable law. This analysis is particularly applicable to the legal 
systems of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. 
In Western practice, it is commonly accepted that contracting parties should be free to 
choose for themselves which laws regulate their agreement and which Courts or 
arbitrators preside over any dispute that arises. Under Islamic law, the freedom to choose 
applicable law and jurisdiction does not have formal basis under the recognised sources 
of Islamic law. As Atai writes, “Islam recognises the concept of freedom of contract 
therefore the parties can choose Shariah principles as the governing law of the contract. 
They can also choose the jurisdiction of the courts of a designated country as the forum 
for resolving disputes between the contracting parties. However, the application of 
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Islamic principles by the selected forum depends on the laws of the country in which the 
enforcement is sought.”345 
Saudi courts do recognise the validity of the freedom of parties to choose applicable law. 
However, there is little case law to support the claim that courts in Saudi Arabia
 
are 
willing to hear any case relating to dispute in contracts that include choice of applicable 
law or arbitration agreement because the case is out of the jurisdiction of the court. This 
is especially in the case of administrative contracts, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. Such a hostile approach was demonstrated in a case involving a dispute between 
a Saudi company and a Swedish company where the commercial court ruled to refused 
to hear the disputes relating to the supplementary contact as there is an arbitration 
agreement in the main contract,
346
 and the other case involving both a Saudi company 
and a British company where the court‟s decision refusing to hear the case was due to 
parties‟ agreement in choosing non-Saudi law.347  
3.5  Conclusion 
An argument in favour of a private law approach to contract construction and choice of 
law in administrative contracts may, however, prove futile. In the context of Saudi 
Arabia, administrative contracts are classified as such under the applicable laws or 
(discretionary) decision making processes precisely in order to circumvent a private law 
analysis – specifically on the question of when a substantive expectation ought to be 
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substantively protected. But this only brings a familiar “constitutional” dilemma into 
fresh relief. A court can only be accused of improperly fettering the unilateral authority 
or discretion of a public authority in the context of an administrative contract, when the 
authority has been divested with statutory power to act in accordance with its designated 
powers. But what if the regulation or executive act in question fails to define the scope of 
powers with any clarity or precision.  
The substantive protection of legitimate expectations relating to administrative contract 
ultimately boils down to a fairly pedestrian set of issues already well known to public 
lawyers: was the public authority exercising a lawful i.e. statutory power to enter into the 
contract and, more importantly, to bind itself to contractual type expectation. Through 
this argumentative step, the focus moves from the “substantive” question of how courts 
ought to balance between rights and interests to the procedural issue of whether a public 
authorities exercise competence to form, perform or modify a contract in the first place. 
As Craig puts it “The decision as to whether legitimate expectations can or should ever 
have a substantive as opposed to procedural impact is...simply another way of asking the 
question...as to whether an ultra vires representation should ever be held to bind”.348  
In the Saudi context, this analytical shift allows us to explore to related issues. Saudi 
Arabia‟s legislative and judicial structure gives the Board ultimate discretion and final 
authority upon completion of a contract or in dispute resolution proceedings.
349
  The 
Board shall apply its authority to a litany of probative issues ranging from the 
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determinative nature of the contract or parties; the right to unilateral modification; and 
the permissibility of an arbitration clause.  It has the power of nullification and 
reclassification of any administrative contract, arbitration clause, proceedings, or arbitral 
awards, on the basis of violations of Shariah law, public policy, or failure to obtain prior 
permissions for arbitration matters from the Council of Ministers or the King, as Prime 
Minister.
350
 
Any re-classification by the Board or voiding of a contract based on a lack of 
permissibility in arbitration proceedings may also be retroactive in nature with significant 
financial, sub-contractual, and obligatory repercussions.
 351
 Unlike similar Shariah or 
civil law systems, these decisions are inalterably binding for all domestic, private, public 
and foreign parties within Saudi Arabia. Such consequences raise legal considerations of 
mutuality, material disclosure, capacity, and good faith. 
Procedurally, a private, or foreign party is left impotent of the ability to exercise objective 
basic rights to choice of law, language, venue, arbitrator, and rule of law.
352
  They also 
have little relief from interim measures, such as injunctions, which are rarely granted, or 
in binding dispute resolution matters, as the Board often fails to enforce arbitral awards 
and there is no higher authority with which to file an appeal.
353
  A Saudi court can simply 
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refuse to recognize proceedings or rulings issued by international or foreign judicial or 
semi-judicial bodies.
354
   
Shariah contractual concepts, the doctrine of sovereignty and legitimate expectations 
have all been discussed within this chapter. However, in the broader context of 
arbitration, the invoking of such justifications as public policy, national interest and 
communal morality based law in administrative contract determinations becomes a 
larger, more complicated element under arbitration agreements with foreign or private 
entities.  Specifically, it gives rise to issues of procedural and due processes, the balance 
of legitimate interests with inherent private rights, and contracts based in predictability 
and harmonization. We have deduced the doctrinal issues of contracts within both 
Shariah and public administrative law within KSA, as well as conducted a brief 
comparison to other administrative civil law systems.  The next chapter carries this 
inquiry into how this will relate to matters of arbitration. 
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Chapter 4 
The Arbitration Framework in Saudi Arabia and the Treatment of Administrative 
Contracts Involving the Saudi Government 
This chapter will assess the requirements applied to arbitration agreements in 
administrative contracts. Focus will be directed to the relevant provisions of Saudi law, 
focusing on the Saudi 2012 Arbitration Law. Issues around the validity, formality 
requirements and related issues of choice of law and venue will be discussed and 
assessed. This chapter will consider the specific challenges that confront private parties 
who seek to enter into arbitration agreements with Saudi governmental authorities, using 
the types of contracts grouped under the umbrella of “administrative contracts”, as 
delineated in the previous chapter.  
In the broadest context, as was seen in the previous chapters, an administrative contract is 
one involving a government body or a subject matter of a public kind.  Arbitration 
functions as “a private method of dispute resolution chosen by the parties themselves as 
an effective way of putting an end to disputes between them, without recourse to the 
court of law.”355 To describe its form, rather than function, Arbitration can either be a 
clause within a contract, such as a concession or public works contract, known as an 
arbitration clause or it can be altogether a separate contract between the parties, known as 
an arbitration agreement.
356
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When talking about arbitration in administrative law in the KSA, we are simply talking 
about a specific method of dispute resolution with a government body or involving a 
public subject matter that does not involve the court system.  Generally speaking, 
arbitration is one of several methods for resolving legal issues.  It has procedural and 
substantive qualities that can be advantageous as a resolution mechanism, but the use of 
such in an administrative context depends upon the government‟s perception of its 
autonomy. 
What can be seen so far in understanding administrative law in the KSA is that the 
seemingly subtle gradations of and minor differences with other administrative law 
systems, which are mostly rooted in how to protect sovereignty, results in drastically 
different outward appearances, both domestically and internationally.  As will be seen in 
this thesis, the strict methods by which KSA protects its sovereignty is not confined to 
administrative law, but rather extends itself into the realm of arbitration, making this 
avenue of dispute resolution with a public entity all but impossible. 
4.1 History and Background 
Prior to the adoption of SAL 2012, arbitration was governed by the 1983 Royal Decree 
known as M/146,
357
 along with its Executive Regulations promulgated by Prime Minister 
Resolution No. 7/2021 and dated 8/911405.
358
 Under this law, the Saudi Board of 
Grievances
395
exercised exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to the enforcement of 
domestic and foreign arbitral awards.
396
 In view of the mandatory status of Shariah law, 
in addition to a number of other regulatory restrictions on the types of disputes which can 
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be referred for arbitration, the availability of arbitral recourse under Saudi law proved, in 
practice, to be fraught with difficulties and highly circumscribed. Even if domestic or 
foreign parties were successful in bringing arbitration before a non-Saudi arbitrator or 
tribunal, there was no guarantee that the enforcement of a foreign award would be 
executed in practice. Under the previous 1983 Act, commercial disputes between private 
parties were subject to oversight by the Board who would act as supervising judge. 
Accordingly, the Board was entrusted with wide powers to determine the validity and 
enforceability of an arbitration award, and to assess whether an award violated mandatory 
provisions of Shariah Law.  
An administrative contract, however, is more likely to be rendered procedurally in-
arbitrable from the outset, irrespective of the validity of the underlying contract or the 
public policy implications of the contract‟s subject or purpose. In practice, Saudi 
governmental authorities are denied access to arbitration as a matter of law.  Moreover, 
the very purpose of this rule – the rendering of governmental disputes non-arbitrable 
absent the express consent of the Prime Minister – is to preclude the application of a non-
Saudi choice-of-law which may constrain or supplant KSA‟s expansive definition of 
public policy.   
To gain a deeper understanding of the treatment of arbitration agreements and clauses 
within administrative contracts, it is necessary to first consider the landmark arbitral 
decision would come to shape KSA‟s arbitration laws for decades to come.  
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4.2   The ARAMCO Dispute: Pushing Arbitration to a Dead End in Saudi 
Arabia? 
Arbitration was allowed to deal with administrative contract until the Saudi Government 
reacted to the result arising from the dispute between Arabian American Oil Company 
(ARAMCO)
359
 and the Saudi government in the 1960s, with Resolution No.58 of 1963 
imposing a blanket restriction on arbitration clauses and agreements in contracts entered 
into with members of the Saudi government. This represented a major turning point in 
Saudi Arabian arbitration. The case concerned an arbitration relating to the interpretation 
of a concession agreement concluded on May 29, 1933 between the Saudi Arabian 
government and Arabian American Oil Company („ARAMCO‟). The facts of this dispute 
concerned a contract concluded between the Saudi Arabian government and Aristotle 
Onassis, the Greek shipping tycoon (Onassis Agreement). Under the terms of the 
contract, the company Aristotle was assigned a thirty-year right of priority to transport oil 
from Saudi Arabia. ARAMCO sought to challenge the Onassis contract on the grounds 
that it conflicted with an agreement it had previously entered into with Saudi Arabia.  
The Saudi Arabian government subsequently adopted Royal Decree No. 5737 of 
09/0411954 subject to which the Onassis Agreement was accorded equivalent legal status 
to the ARAMCO concession agreement. In essence, by promulgating this Decree, the 
Saudi government essentially sought to amend the contract by act of law. The legal effect 
of the Royal Decree was to deprive both the Greek and Arabian American companies of 
an exclusive right to transportation. ARAMCO challenged the legality of the state action 
on the grounds that the Onassis Agreement constituted a flagrant breach of internationally 
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recognised customs and practices applied in the global oil industry. ARAMCO 
subsequently brought a dispute before an international tribunal.   
In its written submissions to the tribunal, the Saudi government relied upon two 
arguments. The first was that the contract in question was administrative rather than 
commercial in nature, principally because the agreement has been concluded with the 
Saudi government as a public service concession. In other words, the agreement 
constituted a “state act “and was therefore subject to its unilateral amendment or 
revocation in pursuit of the public interest, and as an exercise of state sovereignty. From 
these premises, the Saudi government put forward a second argument. The counsel for 
the KSA government contended that the concession agreement of 1933 (concluded with 
ARAMCO) did not exempt ARAMCO from binding effects of retrospectively enacted 
law, in this case by means of the exercise of royal power by the Saudi government in its 
sovereign capacity.
360
  On this reasoning, the Onassis agreement had been elevated to the 
law of the land and therefore could not be treated as a commercial contract made subject 
to the international or domestic rules of private law. The Arbitral Tribunal law however 
rejected this argument, opining that the Onassis Agreement did not constitute a law or 
governmental regulation, conventionally understood.  
The Tribunal also considered the nature of the contract in dispute itself. Drawing on 
French administrative law, the arbitral body concluded that the character of the contract 
in dispute more closely resembled a commercial agreement than the enumerated 
categories of public contracts under French law i.e. contracts relating to the concessions 
of public utilities, public procurements, and public works. In reaching its decision, the 
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Tribunal made reference to the fact that agreement conferred (property) rights to both the 
private and state party (ARAMCO was found to have a vested interest in the control and 
use of the petroleum based natural resource). Finally, the Tribunal deduced that the 
agreement was primarily entered into for the mutual economic benefit of both parties and 
not as a means of facilitating a public good or service, even if the execution of the 
agreement served some incidental public interest.
361
 Building on the reasoning of the 
ARAMCO Tribunal, the Onassis Agreement, as will be discussed in chapter 5, can be 
seen to be a paradigmatic example of a transnational or international state contract. The 
defining feature of a transnational state contract is it hybrid character which combines 
both international and domestic elements and regulatory and commercial features. In this 
sense, such contracts muddy the classic distinction maintained between treaties or 
contracts, or private and public law.  
As will be explored in more detail in below sections, the most contentious aspect of the 
Tribunal reasoning and award was its observations on the mandatory status of Islamic law 
in the Saudi legal order and public policy. Adopting a rather dismissive attitude, the 
Tribunal proffered that Islamic law lacked sufficient provisions or settled standards so as 
to be wielded in connection with the construction of complex commercial instruments, 
such as an oil concession agreement. Owing to the absence of consistently applied 
standards, the Tribunal averred that Shariah could not be governing law of the dispute.
362
 
The Tribunal opted instead to apply a variant of lex mercatoria, and, to this end, relied 
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heavily on common contractual usages and principles applied to international oil and 
petroleum contracts.  
The dismissal of Shariah law by the tribunal is the crux of the substantive 
momentousness to KSA and matters of arbitration. KSA did not protest arbitration of the 
ARAMCO dispute nor the use of an international panel nor did they carte blanche argue 
that an arbitration panel lacked the right to review administrative contacts. Further, they 
did not dispute whether public or private law as the bonafide “choice of law” in the 
matter. Instead, KSA reacted to what they perceived as a gross misinterpretation of and 
bias against Shariah law by the international tribunal, and an utter failure to respect much 
less consider Shariah as the proper or even supplemental “choice of law”.  KSA might 
have chosen to educate the international community on Shariah law and its parallels to 
lex mercatoria or pacta sunt servanda, as well as to insist on more reasoned ways of 
incorporating Shariah law into international contracts and arbitration proceedings. As 
will be discussed throughout the rest of this chapter and the remaining chapters, KSA 
instead chose to take an arguably extreme positioning. This positioning could be 
perceived as an over-reaction and, circumstances of administrative contracts and 
arbitrability might be very different versions of themselves in today‟s KSA had the 
ARAMACO tribunal understood and properly applied Shariah law. 
A landmark decision, ARAMCO has dramatically shaped KSA‟s arbitration laws, 
practices and economic policy. Many of the ensuing consequences of the decision were 
less than positive. Chief among the steps taken by the KSA government in the aftermath 
of the award was the Council of Minister‟s decision to issue Resolution No.58 of 1963. 
This Resolution imposed a blanket restriction on arbitration clauses and agreements in 
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contracts entered into with members of the Saudi government, a decision that was later 
supplemented by the Ministry of Commerce Circular of 1979.
363
 Again, Res. 58 will be 
further discussed, but its legacy is seen through continued restrictions to arbitration in 
SAL 2012. 
The power of local courts, and in particular the Board, has been significantly further 
curtailed under the new SAL 2012. Notwithstanding these reforms, parties seeking to 
resolve disputes relating to administrative contracts are likely to encounter a myriad of 
procedural and substantive hurdles, before they are able to initiate arbitral proceedings. 
In many respects, any enquiry into the recognition and enforcement of arbitration 
agreements and clauses in administrative contract would seem to draw the reader into a 
closed alley or dead end. After all, Article 10(2) of the New Saudi Arbitration Law 2012 
(“SAL”)364 states “[t]he government authorities may only agree to arbitration after the 
approval of the president of the Council of Ministers, unless there is a special legal 
provision authorizing it.” Moreover, there has never been a single case documented since 
the implementation of the SAL where approval has been granted nor has there been a 
special legal provision authorizing arbitration. In view of the above, it is difficult to 
escape the conclusion that arbitration is simply not an available avenue of dispute 
resolution in the administrative law context. Thus, in some ways, knowing these legal 
parameters and associated facts, ends the discussion.   
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But, if one takes into account the historical context and evolution of arbitration in the 
KSA, and the role of Shariah law and its application to KSA arbitration in a rapidly 
modernising economy, then one is also prone to conclude that the current laws on 
administrative contracts nor arbitration are neither absolute nor immune to international 
or foreign rules or interventions. This chapter and the following chapters build on the 
evolution of arbitration and the interconnectedness in a global economy to show, in due 
course that more adaptable arbitration laws will come.   
It is worth briefly, but explicitly, connecting arbitration agreements or clauses as 
administrative contracts or provisions.  First, as identified above, there is the procedural 
threshold of governmental consent before an agreement can be arbitrated. But even 
before this, there is the question of whether an arbitration agreement is valid perforce. 
This raises questions about formality and capacity. Assuming the agreement meets the 
general requirements of Islamic contract law, there is also the secondary question of legal 
capacity. Islamic Shariah provides specific rules that both arbitrators, and contractors, 
must satisfy before they are judged to have capacity.
365
 These are more or less consistent 
with the formality requirements of other common law systems. Any party who consents 
to arbitration in the context of an administrative contract must also bear in mind that the 
clause or agreement will only be valid if the other party has capacity, by virtue of 
consent, to enter into such an agreement.  As such, they impliedly receive the same or 
similar treatment and considerations by legislative and judicial bodies.  
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The next section will consider the formality and arbitrability requirement imposed on 
arbitration agreements of any kind under Saudi law. This will prepare the ground for a 
more detailed discussion of the regulation and treatment of arbitration clauses and 
agreements in administrative contracts, as determined by the applicable choice of law. 
4.2.1 The Saudi Arabia Constitution and Basis for All Law and All Human 
Behaviour: Shariah 
In Saudi Arabia, analysis of all law and human behaviour begins and ends in the Shariah 
law context.  In the context of its characteristics as a legal doctrine, Shariah serves a 
similar purpose to that of a Constitution, because all legal analyses must pass the scrutiny 
of it before reaching any other conclusions. However, it is here, ab initio that western 
notions of constitutions and Shariah law part ways. While western notions on 
fundamental principles of law are rooted in their separation from religion, the 
underwriting principal of Shariah law is that Islam is the source of constitutional and 
legal basis for the Saudi legal regime.
366
 
Under the law of the Hanbali School of thought, parties to a transaction are free to select 
the terms of their choosing, so long as these terms do not transgress established Islamic 
legal principles of Shariah. This „freedom to contract‟ principle established within 
Shariah mirrors the “freedom to contract” principle that is a foundation for international 
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arbitration norms. It is from this common denominator principle that SAL 2012 
incorporates the fundamentals of the UNICTRAL model.  
As Wakim has argued, and as discussed in chapter 3, the best approximation to the 
concept of public policy under Shariahis the concept of 'general interest'. The general rule 
is that: „[i]t is a must for all Muslims to comply with contractual provisions except for 
those which authorize what is forbidden or forbid what is authorized, for example those 
which prohibit speculative contracts (Gharar) and those that forbid usurious interest 
(Riba).‟367 Thus, any contract based on speculation or contract clauses which rely upon 
the occurrence of a specified, yet uncertain event i.e. an insurance contract will be 
deemed null and void.   
In the above regard, an arbitration agreement presents a doctrinal challenge from the 
perspective of Islamic Shariah, since it takes the form of a contract in which the parties 
agree to arbitrate a future or expected dispute.  Pursuant to the doctrine of Gharar, an 
arbitration could, in principle, be regarded as void if seen as being premised on the 
occurrence of an uncertain and unexpected event. In practice, however, the law of Saudi 
Arabia recognises the right to arbitrate future dispute and to have the award enforced on 
its conclusion. It should, however, be borne in mind that an „arbitral award supporting 
aleatory contract or aleatory clauses, other than the arbitration clause itself, may be 
considered contrary to public policy.‟368 
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4.2.2 Formality Requirements of an Agreement to Arbitrate 
Under the new SAL 2012 regulation, parties may agree to submit a specific existing 
dispute to arbitration even if litigation has commenced, providing parties may agree in 
advance to submit to arbitration any dispute arising from a specific contract. 
In the Saudi context, it is incumbent upon parties, particularly private parties to an 
arbitration agreement, to ensure that an arbitration clause satisfies the formality 
requirements, as specified under Saudi regulations and Islamic Shariah. As Ballantyne 
notes, „even where the [Shariah] is not applied in current practice, there could be a 
reversion to it in any particular arbitration…and [knowledge of it is] increasingly 
important for practitioners.‟ 
While Islamic Shariah recognises some oral contracts as valid, under SAL 2012 
arbitration agreements must be given in writing.
369
 Failure to satisfy this formal 
requirement renders an undertaking to arbitrate future disputes null and unenforceable. 
While arbitration agreements cannot be concluded orally, written exchanges through 
electronic communication can be treated as formative of an arbitration agreement.
370
  The 
inclusion of an arbitration clause is usually considered dispositive evidence of the mutual 
intention of both parties to refer to future disputes to arbitration, subject to final review 
by a competent Saudi court.
371
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The existing regulations do not provide for a model arbitration clause to which parties are 
expected to conform in drafting their own agreements. On a prima facie reading of the 
new arbitration and enforcement regulations, as well as the governing principles of 
Islamic Shariah, parties have autonomy to establish the terms of their contractual 
relationship. 
372
 
It would appear therefore that the general rule is that foreign (or Saudi nationals) are free 
to contract with another Saudi party and to negotiate the specific rules and terms that will 
govern arbitration, whether by conclusion of a separate arbitration agreement or through 
the inclusion of arbitration clause within contract to be performed. This is, however, one 
crucial exception to this rule. Respect for freedom of contract and formal equality under 
contracts does not extend to contracts formed between the Saudi government and private 
party, foreign or national. The private party does not enjoy “shared” contractual rights 
with the state official. As such, a private party does not enjoy freedom (of contract), equal 
standing or general participatory rights under the contract, extending to any general right 
to refer future disputes to a non-governmental arbitration body.
373
 This may, however, go 
against the fairness and contractual principles of Shariah law discussed in previous 
chapters, therefore providing a basis to have the Regulation brought into question. 
4.2.3 Subject Matter Arbitrability of Administrative Contract 
Arbitrability and public policy are the most common grounds for refusing the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral award in Saudi Arabia.  This is especially in the case of 
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disputes with the government. Public policy, as it is defined in Saudi Arabia, is construed 
expansively and the relevant arbitration laws fail to enumerate a list of exhaustive 
grounds on which a dispute can be rendered non-arbitrable or the enforcement of an 
arbitral award can be refused. As will be discussed below in the context of the updated 
SAL 2012, the absence of a clear definition of “public policy” has significant bearing on 
the class of disputes which the Saudi government has designated, by means of a 
prospective law or regulation, or retrospective exercise of royal power, to be non-
arbitrable on procedural or substantive grounds. The subject-matter arbitrability of certain 
disputes, including disputes involving public contracts, remains woefully undefined, 
despite the recent reforms to laws governing arbitration in KSA.  The legal situation is 
exacerbated owing to the fact that Shariah is considered part of KSA‟s public policy. It 
will be recalled that the ARAMCO tribunal attributed the failures of the Saudi legal 
system to the incomplete or unsettled nature of Islamic Shariah. Yet, this thesis reaffirms 
the view that this type of attribution oversimplifies the problem. Islamic law, as the 
previous chapter explored, is highly sympathetic to the rights of private individuals and 
seeks to uphold the good faith interpretation of contracts. That is, this thesis argues that 
there is no real conflict between Islamic approaches to arbitration and international 
approaches.  The problem lies ultimately with the failure to subject the exercise of public 
power to robust legal constraints, applied consistently.  
Tellingly, the new SAL 2012 does not significantly depart from the previous law in one 
crucial respect. Saudi Arabian government entities are, prima facie, precluded from 
entering into contracts that nominate arbitration as a method of dispute resolution. 
Denying a private party the means to settle disputes arbitration (and to set the terms of the 
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legal relationship under the principal contract) does not only reduce the autonomy and 
mutuality of both parties, it may also significantly affect the outcome of a dispute, or 
deprive that party of effective remedies altogether.
374
 Again, this approach contradicts 
with Shariah teachings on equality of rights examined in chapter 3. 
4.2.4 Choice of Law 
In most jurisdictions, a party to a commercial arbitration agreement can select the law 
they deem appropriate to govern their agreement.
375
 If national law is chosen, arbitrators 
are obligated to apply that law.
376
 Parties may elect to apply international law to govern 
their agreement.
377
 Alternatively, parties may choose some combination of international 
law, national law, and general principles of law
378
 In such circumstances, the arbitral 
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tribunal may consider whether the various legal systems converge on points of law.
379
 
When those legal systems result in divergent legal outcomes, arbitrators will tend to give 
most weight to common customs and usages in the relevant field or industry, as we have 
seen in the ARAMCO dispute. 
In the received wisdom, commercial arbitration is regarded principally, if not exclusively, 
as a form of private international law.
380
 Though there is little doubt that arbitration is a 
mechanism used to resolve disputes between private entities, including states who act as 
private actors in state contracts, international commercial arbitration is also influenced 
and impacted by the norms and principles of public international law, as highlighted by 
the central role played by the New York Convention.
381
 
In determining what rules ought to apply, or which rules should prevail in the event of a 
conflict (of rules or jurisdiction), tribunals may call upon both principles of public and 
private international law. Private international law is the body of rules used to decide the 
laws applicable to arbitration. Indeed, a properly constituted arbitral may be required to 
call upon various law in the course determining the applicable procedural and substantive 
law relied upon a tribunal in arbitration can be numerous and diverse. The law applicable 
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to the contract, known as the lex causae, will determine the tribunal‟s interpretation of the 
rights and obligations arising from the contract in dispute. 
382
 The proper law of the 
contract is usually the law of the state in which the contract is being performed, a 
principle known as the “closest connection” rule.383 The law of the seat of the arbitration, 
or lex fori, is generally determined accordance with the governing procedures of the 
tribunal. These procedures may be ad hoc (informal or pre-arbitration procedures), treaty 
based or institutionalised.
384
  In the latter of the above examples, tribunals are given 
wider latitude to auto-determine their own competency and jurisdiction to consider the 
admissibility and merits of a dispute referred to them.
385
 
Finally, the law of the arbitration agreement is the governing law of the validity of 
arbitration agreement. While the law of the arbitration agreement is not typically different 
from the substantive law of the contract, this is not always the case. Moreover, it is 
important to distinguish the law of the contract and the law of the arbitration agreement, 
since the latter has significant bearing on the scope of a tribunal‟s jurisdiction as 
discussed below. 
It is worth mentioning one other category of applicable law known as the law of 
reference. This is the law governing the arbitration clauses, or other clauses of the 
underlying contract which make specific reference to arbitration. In most cases, the 
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applicable law is usually the same as the substantive law of the arbitration agreement. In 
exceptional circumstances, however, there may be a variance between specific clauses 
and the law governing the arbitration agreement. The parties may subsequently execute a 
separate or standalone agreement in which it is determined that certain aspects of the 
contract or the arbitration agreement, which might include specific contractual or 
regulatory issues, be governed by the (administrative or public) law of the contracting 
state.   
The successful recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award by Saudi courts is 
perhaps best secured through the inclusion of a standard arbitration clause in a 
contract.
386
 However, a Saudi national or foreign private entity who concludes a contract 
with a host government may not be able to insist upon, or even negotiate, the applicable 
choice of law of an arbitration agreement, or propose a contractual forum selection 
clause. In the rare event that the Saudi government has consented to arbitrate a public 
contract, the proceedings will prima facie be governed by Saudi constitutional (Shariah) 
law and relevant regulations, and, accordingly, made subject to the ultimate jurisdiction 
of its courts, in accordance with Resolution 58. The questions then weigh the validity of 
Resolution 58 against the principles of Shariah law and the traditions of the KSA. 
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4.2.5 Arbitration Agreements in Administrative Contracts 
Arbitration agreements or clauses often retain a hybrid character themselves of both 
public and private elements. In some situations, the public administration involved 
establishes the private law rules in its arbitration agreements or clauses, and then we 
consider if it withdraws the relevant contracts from the description of administrative 
contracts.  This action is one of sovereignty, where a government determines how a 
contract will be described regardless of its actual parties or features. Therefore, our 
examinations will include the layers of evaluation of the arbitration language itself as 
well as the underlying or connected contract.  Classification of one or both of the 
agreements as administrative spurs legal and scholarly debate, but Saudi Arabia is not 
unique in defining arbitration agreements or clauses as administrative based on their 
tandem or inclusive function to the overarching administrative contract.  
4.2.6 Comparative Definitions of Arbitration Agreements or Clauses as 
Administrative Contracts  
By comparison and contrast, jurisprudence in both Egypt and France consider a contract 
administrative whenever its purpose or objective involves execution of a public facility, 
such as the execution of public works (roads, bridges, and tunnels), or an undertaking to 
collect the municipal fees.  In France, whose administrative law is highly developed, the 
judge may declare a contract as an administrative one with respect to several criteria, one 
pertaining to the contracting entity (a personal criteria), and one pertaining to the 
contract‟s content (a material criteria).  In theory, a contract is administrative if one of the 
contracting parties is a public entity.  In the case where both the contracting parties are 
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public entities, French precedents have confirmed the existence of a “presumption of 
administrative quality”.387 This presumption may be overturned if the contract does 
nothing but create private engagements that have no relation with public interest.   
A contract between two private contracting parties is generally a private law contract, 
even if one of the private contracting parties is in charge of the execution of a public 
service, according to French law.
388
 However, in one case, the administrative law judge 
applied the criteria regarding a representation mandate, which led to qualify such a 
contract as an administrative contract, on the basis that one of the parties acts for a public 
entity.
389
  Further, under established French law, clauses exorbitant render a contract an 
administrative one by “granting of rights to the parties or charge them with obligations of 
foreign nature to those obligations which are freely agreed to generally by any person 
within the framework of civil and commercial laws.”390 
In these situations, a contract may be deemed administrative if there is:   
i. The possibility for the contracting authority to terminate the contract,391 but 
not in case of non-performance of certain obligations;
392
 
ii. The possibility for the contracting authority to direct, supervise or monitor the 
execution of the contract;
393
 or 
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iii.  The possibility for the party contracting with the government to directly 
deduct taxes, though this is not the case if it is the administration that carries 
out such deduction on behalf of the contracting party.
394
 
Drawing on the French view, in distilling the foregoing, a contract or arbitration 
agreement might therefore be classified as an administrative contract in any one of the 
following situations: (1) the government itself, i.e., The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, is an 
express party; (2) a legally-recognised governmental entity is a party; (3) the entity is 
100% government owned and controlled; (4) the government has invested in and claims a 
partial ownership to the company, but does not control it; (5) it involves a matter of 
public concern; or (6) it includes a clause exorbitant.  This may therefore subject judicial 
jurisdiction to the Administrative Judicial Body, formerly the branch of the Board of 
Grievances,
395
 as discussed below.   
Article 10(2) of SAL 2012 does not use the phrase “administrative contract” when 
invoking the Prime Minister approval requirement.  Nor does it in any way, shape or form 
invoke the body of administrative law previously described.  Instead, it states, much more 
narrowly: “Government bodies may not agree to enter into arbitration agreements except 
upon approval by the Prime Minister, unless allowed by a special provision of law.”  
Applied to the categories distilled above, only Categories (1) and (2) would seem to meet 
the plain language of the law, with Category (3) leaning in that direction.  The remaining 
categories, equally plainly, would demand an expanded definition of “government 
bodies” to require Prime Minister approval. 
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For our purposes going forward in this Chapter, we will employ the phrase 
“administrative contract” to mean any contract that satisfies the definition set forth in 
Article 10(2) of The New Law of Arbitration, to wit: That “Government bodies may not 
agree to enter into arbitration agreements except upon approval by the Prime Minister, 
unless allowed by a special provision of law.” In the next section, the broader application 
and reforms introduced under the new SAL 2012 will be considered and critically 
appraised with a view to identifying how it might apply to administrative contracts. 
4.3   The New Arbitration Law (“SAL 2012”): A Change in Practice or Stifled 
Progress? 
Saudi Arabia has set forth in its Vision 2030 to rival the success of UAE‟s arbitration 
systems, in becoming the next arbitration leader for the Gulf region. Moreover, the 
Kingdom‟s membership to important international arbitration frameworks, including, the 
NYC should be treated as significant progress towards Saudi Arabia‟s embrace of 
international arbitration, while its newly established Saudi Arabian Commercial Centre 
for Arbitration, and integration with Vision 2030 signifies a new domestic promotion of 
arbitration.
396
 
SAL 2012 was devised as a corrective to the perceived failures of the “old” arbitration 
law, which had hitherto been criticised as being ill adapted to the increased flow of global 
interactions and new pressures to Saudi‟s oil rich economy.397 Viewed through this lens, 
one might argue that SAL 2012 is an attempt to bring two related objectives into greater 
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harmony: the freedom of parties to arbitration agreement to select the laws and 
procedures which will govern in the event of a dispute, on the one hand, and, respect for 
formal principles of Shariah law.  However, it remains open to considerable doubt 
whether the SAL 2012 has successfully reconciled its guiding aims. 
These challenges are intensified in respect of the administrative contract. In its current 
form SAL 2012 may yet hinder, rather than safeguard the sanctity of the arbitral process, 
in the context of arbitrating administrative contracts. However, an analysis of its general 
framework, the procedural powers of the arbitration tribunal, and challenges associated 
with enforcement clauses, suggests that parties seeking to arbitrate disputes in the context 
of administrative contracts are presented with significant challenges.  
4.3.1 The Arbitration Framework in Saudi Arabia 
Borrowing heavily from UNCITRAL Model Law, the New Saudi Law sets forth rules 
similar to those followed by leading Western arbitration institutions, including the 
European Union,
398
 member European Union states,
399
 and even the United States
400
.   
Influenced by the harmonising pull of international regulation on national practice, SAL 
2012 draws on elements of UNCITRAL Model Law and other leading international 
arbitration regimes, including rules codified under the International Court of Commerce 
(ICC) or the London Court of Investment Arbitration (LCIA) as the basis for sound 
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reform.
401
 In keeping with best international arbitration practices, parties are afforded 
considerable freedom to select the rules and procedures applicable to arbitral proceedings 
under SAL 2012.  Such reforms can be seen to reflect and embody established principles 
and values of modern contractual law, including freedom of contract, arbitral finality
402
 
and party autonomy.
403
 
On a prima facie reading of the 2012 New Arbitration Law, the parties are afforded 
substantial freedom of contract.  Among other things, the parties enjoy freedom to choose 
the substantive law,
404
 a foreign seat of arbitration;
405
 select the procedural rules to the 
extent that such application does not contravene the principles of Shariah law,
406
 and 
finality of awards 
SAL 2012 attempts to avoid the inherent risk from the previous framework regarding 
finality of an arbitral award.
407
 Ideally an arbitration award would be final and binding 
without subsequent approval by the Saudi Board of Grievances (verses the Old Saudi 
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Law which, required Board approval in every case).
408
 As was illustrated in Jadawel 
International (Saudi Arabia) v. Emaar Property PJSC (UAE)
409
the risk of subjective 
review and refusal to enforce an arbitral award is of grave concern to private parties. In 
this case, the award was submitted to the Board for enforcement. In its review, the Board 
proceeded to re-examine the merits of case and not only did it decline to enforce the 
result reached by the arbitration tribunal, it reversed the award and ordered Emaar to pay 
damages to Jadawel. Differently, SAL 2012 delineates the specific legal authority under 
which the supervising court can review the arbitral award. The next section outlines 
these, and other important reforms. 
4.3.2 Key Reforms of the New Arbitration Law 
Article 49 of SAL 2102 states „[a]rbitration awards rendered in accordance with the 
provisions of this Law are not subject to appeal, except for an action to nullify an 
arbitration award filed in accordance with the provisions of this Law.‟410  This means that 
a party seeking to challenge an award made by the arbitral tribunal can only do so 
through a nullification process, which greatly diminishes the extent by which a 
supervising court can reconsider the merits previously considered, significantly 
strengthening the doctrine of res judicata.  The binding nature of awards that SAL 2012 
seeks embody is again reinforced by Article 50(4).  Under Article 50(4)
411
 a court tasked 
with determining whether to nullify an arbitral award is legally required not to „examin[e] 
the facts and merits of the dispute when it has been engaged to make a nullification 
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decision‟.  Only pursuant to Article 50(2) does a reviewing court have the capability to 
engage in a more in depth review of the arbitral award, and it can only do so here if it 
deems sua sponte that there is a possible violation of Islamic Shariah, the award violates 
the Kingdom‟s public policy, there was an agreement between the parties, or that one of 
the issues arbitrated was not covered in the arbitration agreement.
412
 
SAL 2012 also affords the parties wider discretion over setting procedural rules for the 
governance of the arbitration.
413
 Of first procedural consideration is Article 11.  Article 
11(1) obligates the court „seized of the dispute‟ to deem the matter inadmissible whenever 
a respondent demands arbitration before raising any claims or defences.
414
  
Contemporaneously, Article 11(2) does not preclude arbitral proceedings from 
commencing even though a court that has received the dispute, has yet to rule the matter 
inadmissible.
415
  Article 11 essentially renders fruitless any party‟s attempt to use the 
court system to delay an otherwise appropriately arbitral matter, which expedites the 
matter and prevents undue use of the judicial system.      
In relation to administrative contract, Article 11 is also significant because of what it does 
not say.  Article 11 does not mention either Shariah compliance or prime minister 
approval of a public entity as prerequisites to its determination that it will not hear the 
matter. The implications of these omissions are broad. On the one hand, it could be a 
mistake that would need to legislatively addressed, or it could be that the drafters 
believed that these two omissions were handled elsewhere.  However, if is not a mistaken 
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omission, it could imply that the Courts are simultaneously encouraging arbitration as a 
method of dispute resolution and the limited use of the court system when a valid 
arbitration agreement exists among the parties. When viewed in light of the overall 
evolutionary progress of arbitration in the KSA system, an argument could be made that 
this is another sign of the government‟s attempts to make a better business environment 
within the kingdom.  
Arbitration seems to be impliedly favoured over use of the court system in Article 15 as 
well. Explicitly, Article 15 is straightforward: it empowers a court of competent 
jurisdiction to select the arbitrator or arbitrators when the parties fail to do so, but before 
so doing it directly confirms the freedom of the parties to select their own arbitrators, 
even for resolution of disputes involving administrative contracts.
416
  While the 
arbitrators must be qualified, as set forth in Article 14,
417
 in a real-life scenario the parties 
might select arbitrators more moderate in their application of Shariah and even liberal in 
their application of a Prime Minister approval component.  Without any published 
decisions, this remains speculative in nature, but also implies that KSA is very subtly and 
incrementally softening its grip on sovereignty, leading to a greater likelihood that 
arbitration can be a tool used in the administrative law setting.   
The loosening sovereign grip can also be theoretically implied by the separability or 
severability doctrine laid out in Article 21.  In general, severability clauses are designed 
to permit parties to raise claims that would attack the validity of the underlying contract 
without undermining and rendering the very tool for raising such claims also invalid. This 
                                                     
416
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is why the severability clause exists, and is a common clause amongst parties throughout 
the world.  In KSA, hypothetically, a party could negotiate that the government agency it 
wishes to form a binding contract with, as a condition precedent to the contract, first 
receive the written approval of arbitration from the Prime Minister.
418
  If the arbitration 
clause was deemed validly obtained, then theoretically a party could engage the 
government entity in arbitration on the voidability of an underlying contract with only 
limited oversight from the judicial system. Importantly, it would almost remove complete 
control of the sovereignty other than that afforded to the government by Shariah law or 
public policy of the Kingdom.   
Furthermore, Article 38(1) of the Regulations stipulates: 
“After ensuring that the rules of Islamic Shariah and the laws of the Kingdom are 
not contravened, the arbitral tribunal shall, in the course of hearing the dispute, 
proceed as follows: (a) It shall apply the rules agreed upon by the parties to the 
subject matter of the dispute; if the parties to the dispute have agreed to the 
implementation of the laws of a particular country, the substantive rules of that 
law, excluding the rules related to conflict of laws, shall be implemented, unless 
agreed otherwise.” 
It is noteworthy that Article 38(1)(a) has a striking resemblance to Article 28(1) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985 (as amended in 2006). This is an important step to 
improving the attractiveness of the arbitration of environment of the KSA.  It means that 
a contract containing a Saudi-seated arbitration clause can be governed by the laws of 
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another jurisdiction provided that, in applying the substantive rules of the governing law 
of the contract to the subject matter of the dispute, the arbitral tribunal ensures that such 
rules do not violate the rules of Islamic Shariah and the laws of Saudi Arabia. In practice, 
this will mean that the parties will be more likely to select an arbitrator that is 
knowledgeable about both Shariah law and the law of the selected jurisdiction, which 
could manifest new methods of making the rules of both jurisdictions to reach a 
compliant and satisfactory result between the parties. 
4.3.3 Procedural Powers of the Tribunal 
In a further departure from SAL 1983, SAL 2012 confers additional powers on both the 
arbitral tribunal and the parties that foster freedom of contract and efficiency of process.  
As a first example, Article 14 now qualifies an arbitrator by requiring that he have full 
capacity, good conduct and a degree in Shariah law if he is the presiding arbitrator of a 
panel. Where previously the arbitrator had to be Muslim.  By slightly altering from a 
requirement that the arbitrator be a practising Muslim to one where the arbitrator must 
rather have an education in Shariah, the KSA is perhaps opening the door to a less 
restrictive approach to the interpretation of Shariah, and overturning precedent set by 
ARAMCO. KSA may be altering its own perceptions of interactions in internationalised 
or administrative contracts. At the very least the change certainly creates a legal 
environment for a multi-faceted and more instructive interpretation of Shariah 
requirements.  
Of the procedural aspects of SAL 2012, Article 20 is a most insightful revelation of what 
KSA‟s intentions are with its sovereign grip within the future of arbitration in 
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administrative contracts.  In ARAMCO, one of KSA‟s defences was that it could challenge 
the arbitration tribunal‟s authority using the principle of sovereignty. KSA‟s position was 
that it could simply remove the case altogether from the arbitral tribunal‟s jurisdiction.  
The arbitral tribunal, of course, rejected this defence, confirming that it had the 
jurisdiction to determine its own competence.
419
 
Over half a century after the ARAMCO decision, where the KSA took the position that its 
sovereignty could not be challenged in arbitration (reinforced by Resolution 58), the KSA 
adopted Article 20. Article 20 embraces the position taken by the ARAMCO arbitral 
tribunal in its rejection of the KSA‟s position.   It empowers the arbitrator to determine 
his own jurisdiction before adjudicating the merits, giving him the option to combine the 
two if it is desirable, just as the arbitrator posited and KSA opposed in ARAMCO.   
Among developed nations, it is a quite common legal doctrine.  The French call it the 
doctrine of Competence-Competence meaning simply that the tribunal that is seized of 
the dispute has the competence to determine whether it is the competent tribunal to be 
seized of it.
420
 In other words, the tribunal has the broad competence to determine the 
more doctrinal question of competence in an individual dispute.
421
  Imagine the scenario 
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without Article 20‟s grant of authority to the arbitral tribunal. In that scenario, a party not 
wanting to arbitrate could simply take the matter to the overseeing court to determine the 
arbitration tribunal‟s competence.  Article 20‟s design is for the efficiency of arbitration 
as an effective tool for dispute resolution.  The construction of the above-mentioned 
provision also keeps matters out of the court system unnecessarily.   
As it relates to KSA‟s understanding of its sovereignty, a hypothetical is in order. Under 
Article 20, technically, the scenario could exist where a government authority is involved 
in a dispute and the parties to the contract developed and agreed to a valid arbitration 
agreement.  This scenario would put the KSA in the very position that it faced in 
ARAMCO, where it would have to acknowledge the arbitral tribunal‟s authority over its 
own, now unable to remove the matter from arbitration. While Article 10(2), as will be 
discussed later, currently prevents this scenario from becoming a likely one, Article 20 
does reveal how close the KSA is coming to a paradigm shift. 
KSA‟s increasingly self-aware shifts in perspective of its sovereignty are also conveyed 
by accumulative-effect throughout the body of arbitration laws. When looked at together, 
SAL 2012‟s characteristics seem to fit inside a greater interconnected realm of 
international law.  For example, Article 28 permits that „[t]he parties to arbitration may 
agree on a place of arbitration in the Kingdom or abroad.‟  Likewise, if no agreement is 
between the parties, the arbitral tribunal is tasked with selecting a location.  Interestingly, 
when the matter defaults to the arbitration tribunal for selection, it too is not bound to the 
Kingdom for a choice of venue.  Only must the tribunal select a location based upon „due 
                                                                                                                                                              
Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 January 2004, 11 ICSID Reports 273; SGS v. Pakistan, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, 8 ICSID Reports 406, paras. 43-74, 147-173 
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consideration to the circumstances of the dispute and the convenience of the place to the 
parties.‟  Of similar colour, Article 29 does not mandate that the language of the 
arbitration be Arabic.  Rather, Arabic is the default language, but „another language or 
languages [can be] agreed upon by the parties or decided by the Arbitration Tribunal.‟  
More robustly, Articles 23 and 39(5) impart procedural powers in the Arbitral Tribunal to 
“take…conservatory measures”, ensure “financial guarantees” and “issue interlocutory 
awards”, each having the effect of gaining confidence of those using it as an effective 
dispute resolution tool.   
Together, these procedural mechanisms serve a multitude of purposes, all culminating in 
a possibility of a more reliable and more efficient arbitration system for the resolution of 
matters between parties. This has the indirect effect of creating a better business 
environment, which ultimately fulfils KSA‟s goals of diversifying and strengthening its 
economy.  More indirectly and more subtly, the minor language adjustments indicate 
shifts in KSA‟s relationship with Shariah law and to its own sovereignty.  But as will be 
seen through an analysis of still more of SAL 2012, arbitration in an administrative 
context will require major amendments if it is ever going to be considered a reliable 
dispute resolution system for those desiring to enter contact with a KSA public entity.    
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4.3.4 Challenge and Enforcement 
Perhaps the most compelling virtues of arbitration are that the issued awards are, with 
few exceptions, unappealable final decisions.
422
 The arbitrative process is also attractive 
because it avoids the cost, delay and uncertainty of findings that come from a trial before 
a judge or jury.  However, some form of review is necessary.  Thus, while Article 49 of 
SAL 2012 affirms that awards are final and non-appealable, it does nonetheless authorise 
a method for setting certain awards aside.  Interconnected thereto, Article 8 allows 
awards in international commercial arbitration to be reviewed by a competent Riyadh 
Court of Appeals (unless agreed to otherwise).   
Article 50(1) numerically follows Article 49 and is also sequentially logical.  Article 50 
delineates the specific scenarios that trigger an otherwise unappealable review. The 
following circumstances warrant review or appeal to a competent court of proper 
jurisdiction: invalidity of arbitration agreement, incapacity of the parties, breach of due 
process, beyond scope of submission, irregularities of tribunal‟s composition, and totality 
of the circumstances. 
The most obstructive subsection to the private party arbitrating with the KSA government 
is Article 50(1)(b), which says that at the time of entering into the contract, both parties 
must have capacity. Taking into consideration that SAL Article 10(2) and Resolution 58 
of the Basic Laws each codify specific language declaring that the power to approve 
arbitration by a government entity is exclusively one that rests with the Prime Minister, 
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Article 50(1)(b) merely serves to highlight the overwhelming advantageous position that 
the KSA places itself in when arbitrating administrative contracts.  Theoretically, 
however, arbitration could be permitted for a government entity, and would therefore 
satisfy simultaneously all 3 criteria, one in the same. 
Also raising questions over the stability of Saudi arbitral process is the totality of 
circumstances clause which reads: „if the Arbitral Tribunal does not take into 
consideration the conditions that should be provided in the arbitral award in a manner that 
affects its content, or if the arbitral proceedings are tainted by nullity affecting the award.‟  
This clause requires that for an arbitration to succeed in its finality, that it must apply all 
legal provisions agreed to by the parties to the subject matter.
423
 The problem here is that 
legal provisions are a matter of interpretation, and provide vast arrays of grey area on 
which one could challenge the arbitral award.  Again, the more opportunity to challenge 
the award, in turn, destabilizes the process as an effective one, and thus makes the 
business climate hazardous. Likewise, the all-encompassing language of subsection 1(g) 
allowing for an appeal when the arbitrator fails to consider “conditions”, provides 
additional broad-sweeping subjective selectivity for allowing for an appeal of an arbitral 
award.  With no written precedent, nor written opinions to historically establish trends for 
these subsections, the unreliability unravels its effectiveness.
424
 
While Article 50(1) (a-g) are challenges to an arbitral award that a party can make, 
Article 50(2) provides for self-assessed responsibilities of the arbitral tribunal to 
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determine whether an award should be annulled.  It states: The competent court seized 
with the action for nullity shall rule sua sponte for the annulment of the arbitral award if 
its contents violate the provisions of Islamic Shariah, the public policy in the Kingdom, 
the agreement between the parties, or is the subject matter of the dispute is one of the 
issues that are not included in the arbitration in accordance with this law. 
The first analysis here, is that the sua sponte duty commanded of the arbitrator is that 
after an award has been made, only then is the arbitrator invested with the power to 
review for its Shariah compliance.  Interestingly, the temporal methodology for this 
particular sua sponte action inherently violates Gharar (a Shariah principle) in its duty to 
protect Shariah. 
425
 Perhaps more importantly, is that the parties could go through an 
entire arbitration process and then, on the basis of an arbitrator‟s application of Shariah, 
after the award has been agreed upon, must then set aside the award.
426
  This process 
contravenes logic and is detrimental to the arbitral process.  Of substantive importance is 
that there is little historical basis for how Shariah law might be violated, because there 
are no written records to work from. 
427
 
Complicating matters further for arbitrators is the juxtaposition of Shariah law against the 
backdrop of KSA public policy, which was the basis for the Prime Minister‟s permission 
for arbitration. Article 50(2) authorises a Saudi local court to annul an award or portions 
thereof sua sponte if the arbitral award transgresses either Shariah or KSA‟s public 
                                                     
425
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policy, the agreement of the parties, or the permitted subject of the arbitration.  The 
conundrum of the Prime Minister approval requirement is eloquently brought out here.  
On the one hand, it could be argued that Prime Minister approval, i.e., the King‟s 
approval, is per se a requirement of public policy on near equal-footing to Shariah.  On 
the other hand, the same Article upholds the sanctity of the parties‟ agreement, thus 
creating a collision of results where the parties agreed to submit to arbitration without 
first obtaining official Prime Minister approval. It is this tension that leads this author to 
conclude that doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and reliance, or a time bar resolution for 
asserting Prime Minister non-approval, would better balance the competing interests of 
public and private parties, government and private economy. 
Creating even more ambiguity is Article 54, which denies an automatic stay to challenge 
arbitration awards absent “serious reasons.” Experts suggest “serious reasons” would 
include palpable violations of Shariah law or public policy.  Thus, if Prime Minister 
approval invokes public policy, thereby making it a “serious reason,” arbitral awards 
stemming from administrative contracts would likely be stayed pending challenge.  This 
article leans heavily against arbitrating administrative contracts even if it were more 
readily permitted by law, due to the uncertainty of enforcement involved.  
When comparing SAL 2012 to the former SAL 1983, and in consideration of the modern 
historical events that shaped them, one can see that the KSA has evolved into an 
organism that is growing in similarity to what are considered international arbitration 
norms.  SAL 2012 does contain “arbitration-friendly” rules that mirror those that derive 
from the UNCITRAL Model Law such as the doctrine of self-determining jurisdiction 
and separability.  However, when SAL 2012 is compared to policies of Egypt and France 
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who also have some variation of an approval provision, KSA is more restrictive. Egypt‟s, 
provision has historically been similarly controversial to KSA‟s, but has been „softened‟ 
due to efforts in reform since the Arab Spring.
428
  France, has not only embraced a new 
and general form of Public-Private Partnership, the “Contrat de Partenariat Contrat de 
Partenariat” (literally, “Partnership Contract”), requiring among others an arbitration 
provision;
 429
 it has created dual tracts for domestic and international administrative 
contracts, thereby obviating the need for a blanket prohibition on arbitration.
 430
 Its 
success is in passage of precise legislation imposing strict requirements for when 
Minister approval is necessary, how it should be obtained, by whom it should be obtained 
and with detailed compliance guidelines.
431
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Conversely, SAL 2012 remains subject to the nuance and uncertainty of Saudi Shariah 
legal application and, with respect to administrative contracts, Prime Minister approval 
over what entities might qualify as “government bodies”.  While the „great leap‟ forward 
is thus offset in practice, when analysing the provisions, evidence hints that the 
possibility of arbitration could arise, and KSA could follow the softened or clear paths 
forged by Egypt and France. 
4.4    Lessons from France and Egypt on Public Policy - The Key Obstacle in 
Saudi Administrative Contracts 
As suggested above, SAL 2012 does not yet adequately delineate the scope of subject-
matter arbitrability, including the extent to which disputes implicating matters of public 
policy may be set aside or otherwise deemed inarbitrable. This leads to a considerable 
amount of uncertainty over the categories of contracts which are arbitrable and the extent 
to which arbitrators, domestic or international, have the power to determine such matters. 
Likewise, while SAL 2012 seems to give recognition to the principle of party autonomy, 
it is difficult to ascertain the degree of freedom offered to parties in determining the 
manner and forum in which they could settle their disputes, particularly when matters of 
public policy are implicated. This section considers the arbitration frameworks of both 
France and Egypt with a focus on finding similarities between them.  
4.4.1 The French Position on Public Policy 
Prior to 1980, despite being obligated as a signatory of the New York Convention to 
adhere to the agreed upon international standards, French courts appeared to give greater 
weight to local laws of France in the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral 
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awards. However, in 1980 and 1981, France established its first basic law of arbitration in 
the French Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).432 Considered ground-breaking at the time, 
it legitimized and encouraged the use of arbitration. It also distinguished between the use 
of domestic and international arbitration, choosing to maintain the sovereignty of the 
state and protection of public policy, in the midst of increased international 
cooperation.
433
 
In the 30 years that followed, the Code remained unchanged, but rather was fine-tuned 
through case law and the use of the arbitration tribunals. In 2011, the government 
announced sweeping reforms to the arbitration laws.
434
 These reforms primarily 
incorporated case law that had developed in the last three decades, clarified the new civil 
procedures for arbitration, and allowed easy access to both the arbitration system as well 
as means of understanding what parties should expect by participating in the process in 
France.
435
 
As with the new SAL 2012, the 2011 French arbitration law continues its distinctions 
between domestic
436
 and international arbitration.
437
Accordingly, the French system sets 
examples of a dual-approach to arbitration that can be both compared to SAL 2012 as 
well as serve as a means of reforming KSA‟s dual approach. For instance, unlike SAL 
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2012 which requires written agreements, Article 1422 of the 2011 French law requires 
parties in a domestic arbitration to put agreements in writing, such writing can be a casual 
reference and contain omissions of specific terms and similarly, Article 1507 provides 
that international arbitration agreements can come in any form agreed to by the parties, 
i.e. oral or written. But similar to SAL 2012‟s loosening of Arabic requirements and 
provisions for efficiency in arbitration proceedings: Article 1515 allows documents 
submitted in enforcement proceedings to be in a language other than French; Articles 
1486, 1506, and 1519 shorten the time periods for review or annulment of awards in 
order to encourage efficiency and speed in the process; while similar provisions allow 
parties to preemptively forego appeal of an award altogether or to agree to automatic 
enforcement. Further, Article 1448 reinforces the “competence-competence” practice by 
the tribunals. Finally, unlike KSA where compliance with Shariah law is always a 
consideration, a claim related to an arbitration agreement in France is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the state court only if the agreement is ''manifestly void or manifestly 
inapplicable'' (new Articles 1448 and 1465). This is not unlike considerations of public 
policy in recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements or awards seen in both 
KSA and France. 
Under the 2011 French arbitration law, an application for setting aside a valid 
international award will be granted in very limited circumstances. Articles 1514 and 1520 
of the amended CCP enumerates the grounds which a French court may consider when 
deciding whether to set aside a foreign or international award. Generally speaking, an 
award can be annulled or invalidated if certain procedural conditions have not been met 
i.e. where procedural irregularities can be demonstrated in the conduct of the tribunal 
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(e.g. where there the tribunal has acted beyond its competence), in the proceedings 
themselves (manifest fairness or irregularity in submission of arguments, gathering of 
facts and so on), or in respect of the substance of the award itself (the award addresses 
issues which fall outside of the scope of the arbitration agreement).
438
 An arbitration 
award may also be found to be invalid if arbitral recourse is not available under the terms 
of the agreement, or when the underlying agreement cannot be arbitrated as a matter of 
French law.
439
 
Crucially, the French Arbitration law goes further to delineate, precisely the five grounds 
where a court can refuse enforcement of an award.
440
 The most contentious of these 
grounds is the non-enforcement of an award found to have contravened French public 
policy. Here we find a further similarity between the French model of arbitration law and 
that which has been established in KSA. Until relatively recently, any dispute involving 
an administrative contract was inarbitrable under the French Civil Code, and, therefore, 
could not be referred to arbitration. However, the decisions of the French courts over the 
past few decades have led to a gradual relaxation of this norm.  A judgment rendered by 
the Cour de Cassation in Hilmarton saw the French courts adopt a less-restrictive 
approach on the basis that the mere fact that a subject matter of a dispute was subject to 
public policy was not, in of itself, grounds for rendering that dispute non-arbitrable.
441
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As for domestic arbitration, Articles 1488 and 1492 of the CCP stipulate that an arbitral 
award made in France is subject to its being set aside if it is found to be contrary to public 
policy
442
 This concept enables the courts to determine whether an award is consistent 
with French public and legal values as a condition of enforcing the award in the French 
legal order.
443
 In practice, as statistics suggest, French courts have very rarely annulled an 
arbitral award on grounds of a public policy exception. That said, while France provides a 
strong model for reform for KSA in creating a robust dual arbitration system, it too still 
struggles with balancing international public policy and domestic public policy.  
Prior to 2012, the French courts set a high bar for non-enforceability, and it was generally 
accepted that a public policy violation must be “flagrant, effective and concrete” before 
this ground could give rise to annulment.
444
 However, in the years following the new 
2011 law, the French courts have been in disagreement about the standard for annulment 
based on violation of domestic public policy versus international public policy, with the 
Court of Appeals holding that the violation must be “clear and concrete”445 and the Cour 
de Cassation holding: “The judge acting in the set aside proceeding is able to rule on the 
admissibility of the award into the French legal system. He is not acting as the judge for 
the case which the parties agreed to submit to arbitration”. 446 In other words, the Cour de 
Cassation seems to be stating that the judge may act upon any perceived or possible 
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violation of public policy of the French system, not based on international public policy 
or laws which may have been used to issue the award. It is a step back from pro-
international arbitration to prioritizing domestic public policy. 
A decision by the Conseil d‟Etat in November 2016, seems to support a more hard-line 
approach to even that taken by the Cour de Cassation in protecting domestic public 
policy. The Conseil d‟Etat annulled an arbitral award involving an international party 
based on violations of public policy within an administrative contract.
447
  This is the first 
time the Conseil has done so in recent times and has garnered the attention of the 
international community.  It is not yet known whether this will be the new standard for 
annulment based on public policy violations in French administrative contracts and 
arbitration agreements; or whether this was a more isolated incident, heavily reliant on 
subjective facts of the individual case. 
If it is a new standard it would indicate France‟s arbitration law and case law has 
progressed from more rigid reluctance to allow international influence in arbitration to 
pro-arbitration participation in both domestic and international disputes to now being a 
bit hazy on when or how a public policy exception or violation should be acknowledged 
or enforced within arbitration agreements or awards. If it is an isolated incident, the 
French courts will have to more clearly define public policy and delineate expectations 
for parties.  For KSA, this can be used as a case study between their use of Shariah, 
domestic, and international laws within their arbitration system. 
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4.4.2 The Egyptian Position on Public Policy 
As suggested in previous chapters, the Egyptian legal order sources from a variety of 
legal traditions, most notably English common law, Islamic Shariah and the French Civil 
Code.  Egyptian laws, codified or otherwise, are subject to judicial review by the 
Egyptian Supreme Court and the Council of State,
448
 with the latter of these bodies 
exercising a supervisory function by reviewing the legality and enforceability of 
administrative decisions. While Egyptian courts continue to observe the requirements of 
Islamic Shariah, the direct influence of Islamic law on the development of the Egyptian 
legal order has grown more muted over the past decade, in large part because of 
commercial demands for contract and arbitration laws which have been harmonised to 
international commercial standards, codes and practices.  
Arbitration in Egypt is regulated and governed under the new Egyptian Arbitration Law, 
which came into force in 1994 ("Egypt Arbitration Law").
449
  In many respects, countries 
such as Saudi Arabia have taken their lead from earlier innovations in Egyptian 
arbitration law, one of the first Arab countries to embrace international arbitration 
standards through its adoption of the provisions of UNCITRAL Model Law. 
450
 Egypt is 
also a signatory of the New York Convention.
451
 
The Egyptian Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure 1994 is largely consistent with 
international arbitration standards and practices. On issues relating to capacity and 
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arbitrability, Article 11 of Egyptian Arbitration Law mandates that “arbitration is not 
permitted in matters where compromise is not allowed.”452 Disputes can only be 
arbitrated if, the contractual disagreement can be settled by means of mutual compromise, 
by two parties who are capable of legally disposing of their rights (to pursue alternative 
remedies in the courts).
453
 
In the face of increased commercial demand, Egypt promulgated the Egypt Arbitration 
Act no. 27 of 1994 (as amended by Law no. 9 of 1997).  Pursuant to the provisions of 
UNICTRAL Model Law, the 1994 act applies the same rules to international and 
domestic arbitration. This is a different approach from the KSA and French dual 
arbitration systems. Furthermore, consistent with common international practice, the Act 
expressly affirms the principles of party autonomy, while curtailing the power of local 
courts. These commitments were largely achieved by specifying a list of exhaustive 
grounds on which a valid arbitral award can be set aside. 
454
 Notably, however, the Act 
does establish a separate basis for the annulment of acts on grounds of public policy, as 
stipulated in Article 58.
455
 One obvious point of departure between the new Egyptian and 
Saudi Arbitration laws is the possible impact of Shariah law on the procedural and 
substantive dimensions of foreign and domestic arbitration in both countries, respectively. 
As suggested above, scholars have discerned a noticeable retreat from Shariah in the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitration clauses and agreements.
456
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In contrast with KSA, the Egyptian courts have adopted a more open attitude to enforcing 
arbitral awards, and is generally regarded as a hospitable environment in which to initiate 
arbitration proceedings. Article 55-58 of the Egypt‟s Arbitration Law stipulates that a 
request to enforce a foreign and final award will be upheld if the following conditions are 
satisfied:  the award does not conflict with a previous precedent or ruling of the Egyptian 
court; does not contravene Egyptian public order norms; and only if the party has been 
given adequate and reasonable notice of the award and the request to enforce it. Unlike 
KSA it does not mention compliance with Shariah law, but it does rely on public policy 
norms. 
Crucially, administrative contracts have been recognised by the Egyptian courts as 
arbitrable disputes in some limited cases. The most important case in this regard is the 
Cairo Court of Appeal's decision in the Silver Night case.
457
 In this case, the Egyptian 
Antiquities Organization petitioned the court set aside an award based on a dispute 
involving a construction contract between an English contractor and the Egyptian 
Antiquities Organization. Under the applicable rules of Egyptian law, this contract was 
subject to its regulation as an administrative contract (since one of the parties to the 
contract was an Egyptian public authority), thus rendering the underlying contract non-
arbitrable. In a landmark decision, the Court of Appeal ruled that dispute arising from 
administrative contract could in certain and highly limited circumstances be settled by 
arbitration under the Egyptian Arbitration Act 1994.  
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The Egyptian Court de Cassation also addressed the scope and limits of public policy in 
the Amal Tourism case of 2007.
458
 In this case, an Egyptian authority, in this case the 
Ministry of Tourism, filed a petition requesting the Court to annul an award on subject-
matter grounds. The contract underlying an arbitral award concerned the sale of land over 
which the state of Egypt asserted a sovereign right of ownership, thereby violating public 
policy. However, the Court de Cassation rejected the claim by reopening the dispute and 
assessing the facts in dispute. This ruling was important for two reasons. First, it suggests 
that Egyptian courts have set a high threshold for both governmental and private parties 
before they are willing to consider public policy arguments as grounds for annulment. 
Furthermore, Egyptian courts sua sponte reserve the right to reopen disputes and to 
review an arbitral award issued by a tribunal outside Egyptian jurisdiction, on the merits. 
In this sense, Egyptian national courts defend their status as a “court of last resort”, 
primarily by asserting ultimate jurisdiction and competence to scrutinise the arbitrability 
or public policy implications of arbitral award.  However, while this evidently 
undermines the finality of an arbitral award, the Egyptian courts have imposed limits on 
the scope of their own supervisory and review functions, while rejecting the requests of 
public authorities to set aside valid awards on public policy grounds, without good 
reason. Other cases, however, demonstrate the Egyptian courts attempts to reconcile its 
own local norms and laws, including Shariah, with respect for international rules and the 
decisions of domestic and international arbitral tribunals.
459
 One case for example, 
involved a contract with a government entity in which an arbitration award was annulled 
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then revised based on considerations of: the international laws of the ICC, mandatory 
laws of Egypt and its public policy; and violations of Shariah law by use of riba.
460
  
On the other hand, this case confirmed that religious concerns continue to play an 
important role in the regulation of arbitration in Egypt and can, in some cases, provide 
grounds for the nullification or non-enforcement of arbitral awards. From the perspective 
of the private or foreign private party, the Egyptian framework would seem to benefit 
from a degree of legal certainty and predictability that is lacking in its comparative 
equivalent in KSA. However, difficulties remain. Nowhere in the Egyptian 1994 Act is 
“public policy” explicitly defined. Similarly, the Act imposes no threshold or standard on 
the circumstance or criteria that must be met, in terms of subject matter or degree of 
seriousness, before a dispute can be deemed non-arbitrable.   
4.4.3  Public Policy in Saudi Arabia 
In contrast with other Islamic countries such as Egypt, Islamic law has far greater 
influence on public policy in Saudi Arabia. Saudi courts are required to consider Islamic 
norms and the relevant Royal decrees as having equal weight when determining whether 
public policy has been violated. One implication is that any instrument, agreement or 
contract understood to violate Shariah would be deemed contrary to public policy in 
Saudi Arabia. However, Saudi authorities are also under a duty to consider the public 
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interest. If a conflict arises between a regulation and Islamic norms, the Saudi authorities, 
as a matter of constitutional priority, are required to consider a dispute within the 
framework of Shariah law at the first instance, which is then balanced against the public 
interest. Interestingly, the Saudi government has enumerated a list of commercial 
activities that cannot be arbitrated for public interest reasons.
461
 
4.4.3.1   The application of Shariah and the effects of the ARAMCO 
decision 
Contrary to the current legal obstacles that make arbitration with KSA government 
entities all but impossible, the peoples of the Arabian Peninsula have long used 
arbitration as a tool for resolving disputes. Arbitration in the Muslim world is a sanctified 
method of dispute resolution rooted in Shariah law.
462
 
However, as illustrated in the case of ARAMCO, the tradition of using arbitration as an 
effective dispute resolution tool has faced major setbacks in modern history. In 
arbitration, Shariah principles, for better and for worse, serve as clearly delineated 
boundaries that arbitrators must work within in order to resolve disputes. These 
boundaries, do not of course carve out exceptions in the realm of administrative 
contracts.
463
 Within Shariah law, the fundamental principle of haram is defined as: that 
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which is forbidden and against Shariah principles.
464
 In any KSA arbitration, as 
previously stated, all awards must conform to the principles of Shariah or, conversely, 
must not contravene Shariah principles.   
However, the purpose or intent of Shariah principles must be discussed separately than 
the effects of Shariah principles. The intent for the strict enforcement of the substantive 
Shariah principles serves to protect Muslims. However, by fulfilling that purpose, the 
enforcement actually has a contrary effect. The strict enforcement of principles harms the 
ability of KSA businesses to enter contracts with those outside of the Muslim world, who 
adhere to different principles. The result is dissonance and deterrence. The effects of 
course make their way into the realm of administrative contracts.  For instance, Shariah 
principles that prohibit the payment of interest or the recovery of “speculative” damages 
such as good will, future profits, or future appreciation, provide discord in modern 
international contract negotiation where those provisions are commonplace; 
consequently, such remedies are not recoverable by the government or the private party in 
any dispute arising under Saudi Arbitration law.   
The most cited example related to public policy is the prohibition of riba.
465
 In fact, 
interest-related transactions are not deemed illegal under KSA law. Rather, such 
transactions are merely considered void and unenforceable under a Shariah law 
interpretation. What does this mean for arbitrations of disputes arising under 
administrative contracts? The answer is straight-forward. Shariah compliant arbitrators 
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will not and cannot award interest, in any way, shape or form. If such an award is issued, 
it will be reviewable by the Saudi Courts and subject to nullification because it is not 
Shariah compliant. Thus, matter-of-factly, KSA courts and judicial tribunals, including 
the Board of Grievances arbitrators, do not award interest for disputes arising under 
administrative contracts. It is, however, important to note that any interest provisions in 
such administrative contracts are usually severable.
466
 This means that an administrative 
contract will not be considered void or voidable solely because that contract includes an 
interest-related provision(s).     
The irony of this is that while the principle behind riba is clear, how it as adhered to, and 
thus the interpretive effects, seem to provide ambiguous results on a case-by-case basis, 
each to the favour of the Muslim party, and if there are two Muslim parties, to the more 
powerful Muslim party (in the case of the banks).  If the concept of interest is to the 
advantage of a Muslim party (e.g. a bank or a public entity), then riba does not have to be 
prescribed to, whereas, if it is to the disadvantage, the principle of riba can be invoked to 
the Muslim parties‟ financial benefit.  Considering the Shariah principle about 
uncertainty, below, the effect of an ambiguous interpretation of riba seems to 
simultaneously violate gharar. 
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4.4.3.2 The effect of “Gharar” (gambling or uncertainty) on the validity 
and enforceability of arbitration agreements 
Shariah abhors an uncertain contract.  For a contract to be valid under Shariah law, it 
must be free from uncertainty.
467
 This is also known as “the rule against gharar.”468 In 
this regard Saleh states: “... any transaction should be devoid of uncertainty and 
speculation, and this ... [can] only be secured by the contracting parties‟ having perfect 
knowledge of the counter-values intended to be exchanged as a result of their transaction 
...”469[emphasis added]. In other words, it is a near impossibility to write a contract that is 
devoid of uncertainty. 
470
 A contract entered in this manner would be a clear violation of 
gharar, and thus not enforceable under Shariah law. 
Consider that a general arbitration agreement for future disputes plays an essential role 
when parties are in dispute. In Saudi Arabia, arbitration is not only a tool with history but 
it is a principle from the Quran, and thus is Shariah law. Thus, the Quran recognizes that 
parties will have disputes, and thus will not always be in agreement.  But in contracts, 
when they are entered to, it is expected that the parties have already dealt with all 
disputes prior to entering. Gharar presumes or commands that uncertainties become 
certainties as the result of the contract negotiation.  Thus, gharar seems to impose a 
temporal requirement on parties to make uncertainties certain, i.e. mutual understanding 
before contracting.
471
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It could be argued that a rigid interpretation of gharar contravenes the Shariah principle 
of arbitration and thus more interpretative analysis between these two concepts could lead 
to a more dynamic and usuable Shariah-based arbitration tool that would resonate as non-
obstructionist in the modern globalized world. 
While the Quran provides arbitration as a tool, the specificities and current 
interpretations of Gharar and Riba, are significant obstacles to effective arbitration.  The 
inconsistent application of these principles, in particular, is unlikely to inspire confidence 
in the modern business world and demand further research. However, Shariah concepts 
can be affected over time through causing a variety of interpretations of principals that 
lead to an evolutionary adjustment to the norm.
472
 Unlike the liberalized notions of the 
gradual adjustment of these principles, sovereignty is more steadfast in its definition. The 
mechanisms needed for change will only come in the form of amendment.  
4.4.3.3 The Impact of Sovereignty on the Validity and Enforcement of an 
Arbitration Agreement 
There is an important nuance in the discussion of how the doctrines of sovereignty and 
immunity apply to governmental actions and arbitration within the KSA. In generally 
understood international norms, sovereignty is the supreme authority of the state to 
govern itself, while immunity can be defined as a legal doctrine by which the sovereign 
or state cannot commit a legal wrong and is immune from civil suit or criminal 
prosecution.  This principle is commonly expressed by the popular legal maxim rex non 
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potest peccare, meaning "the king can do no wrong”.473 The objective behind sovereignty 
is to provide stability to the state and its people.   
Contrastingly, in Muslim countries such as the KSA, Allah is the supreme authority, not 
the state.  Meaning, even the state does not have supreme authority over itself.   The word 
of Allah is to Whom all human beings are subordinate, including kings and their 
kingdoms. Accordingly, Shariah law, as the law of Allah, does not recognize the concepts 
of sovereignty or sovereign immunity.
474
 Following this logic, therefore, the KSA cannot 
recognize itself as immune in the name of protecting its sovereignty because it is not 
sovereign, Allah is supreme.  However, in the name of public policy and maintaining 
legal existence as a state in the global community, it is in KSA‟s interest to acknowledge 
and leverage the doctrines of sovereignty and immunity. 
In terms of arbitration agreements and awards, this translates to questions of whether the 
State can validly protect its sovereignty by refusing to acknowledge or enforce 
arbitration. If the above logic on immunity in KSA is applied, it means there is no 
inherent immunity to protect the state‟s assets from attachment, such as in arbitration 
proceedings or an arbitral award. In practice, however, were any attachment required 
through arbitration proceedings, it would essentially have the same effect as the general 
principles of sovereign immunity, because the government officials can choose to deny or 
refuse any attachment based on sovereignty, public policy or principles of Shariah law.
475
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An important caveat is that KSA‟s tribunals and the Board of Grievances may exercise 
immunity if they so choose but they must always be in compliance with and prioritize 
Shariah law over actions of sovereignty or immunity; regardless of the consequences in 
public policy.  
In principle, Shariah law, puts private parties and the government on more equal-footing, 
than non-Islamic based systems. Accordingly, as the doctrine of sovereignty does not find 
its authority in Shariah law and prohibiting arbitration is an act of immunity; from a 
Shariah law perspective, there is nothing wrong with arbitrating administrative contracts.  
Instead, the prohibition becomes an issue of domestic or international law, not a solemn 
protection of Shariah law. 
Therefore the KSA must be careful in using Shariah law as protection of sovereignty, the 
„authority of the state‟, including obstructing any challenge to it through arbitration, less 
it risks placing ideals of sovereignty above Allah and principles of Shariah law. For 
example, KSA‟s „over-reaction‟ to the ARAMCO award476was an attempt to recover its 
„lost‟ sovereignty by means of Resolution No. 58 (Resolution 58) 1963; however, it was 
not an action supported by Shariah law, but one of domestic public policy interests of the 
state.
477
 Such public policy decisions can have the contrary effect of protecting Shariah 
law, and instead create a ripple of other public policy conflicts, i.e. Resolution No. 58. 
While Res. No 58 is evidently based on the underlying principle of governmental 
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consent, as an expression of political autonomy, it is in conflict with international public 
and policy norms, encompassing pacta sunt servanda (sancity of contract) and with a 
understanding of Shariah law. The effect is to undermine contractual certainty while 
reinforcing prejudice against KSA‟s „closed‟ system of governance. An action supported 
by Shariah law would have been to promote the education and use of Shariah law in 
international tribunals, which arguably, may have led to a different result in ARAMCO.  
4.4.4 Summary  
Fifty years on, that reactionary position of ARAMCO has finally begun to ease with the 
enactment of the SAL 2012.
478
 KSA‟s commitment to arbitration was reinforced by its 
intention to create Saudi Arabia as the centre of arbitration in the Middle East. SAL 2012 
and the corresponding “Enforcement Law”479 have been lauded as another step toward 
regional and international integration, though the remaining sovereignty protecting 
provisions within SAL 2012 serve as a reminder of the delicacy of the evolutionary 
process of the arbitration of administrative contracts in the KSA. SAL 2012 is the first 
clear signal of KSA‟s intent to join a global and modernized economy,480 for UNCITRAL 
reflects a global consensus that there is a need for uniformity in the primary rules of 
international arbitration practice.    
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The new mechanisms in place only take the KSA so far in its quest to provide a more 
attractive business environment, and the most challenging obstacles to arbitrating 
administrative contracts remain. However, obstacles are not an impossibility.  
In contrast with customary norms and practices of Shariah, SAL 2012 does contain a host 
of arbitration-friendly provisions.
481
 In the researcher‟s view, outside of the Board and 
Shariah courts, in other cases still, a more specialised judicial or administrative body may 
be the appropriate venue. It is worth noting, and quite significantly, that Article 54 of The 
New Arbitration Law makes one thing clear: Shariah and Saudi public policies do not 
automatically bar enforcement of an arbitral award that might contravene their 
sensibilities.  The award will remain enforceable except where the claimant includes in its 
challenge a claim to preclude enforcement and the court decides on it.   
This necessarily raises the question whether an arbitration award arising from a dispute 
over an administrative contract might also remain enforceable absent the Council of 
Ministers or (the King‟s) approval except where the claimant includes in its challenge a 
claim to preclude enforcement and the court decides on it.  In other words, it appears that 
Article 54 embraces notions of waiver, estoppel and fairness that, if applied to Shariah 
law, would certainly seem applicable to other provisions such as Prime Minister consent 
to arbitration. It remains open to question therefore whether administrative contracts are 
always inarbitrable, but for explicit consent of the King.  
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The dynamic interplay between Shariah law‟s supreme authority and the effects thereon 
KSA‟s necessity to protect sovereignty despite having none before Allah, is not the only 
feature that is affecting the current obstruction of arbitration in an administrative context. 
A spate of major oil-related disputes occurring in the international arena have deterred 
many Gulf countries from settling their disputes through international arbitration.
482
  The 
next section will consider the seemingly unlikely scenario in which foreign or 
international rules may be applied to administrative contract entered into with the Saudi 
government, preparing the ground for a discussion of the impact of international and 
comparative laws and jurisprudence on the treatment and dispute resolution of 
administrative contracts performed in the KSA. 
4.5    The Applicable Law of an Arbitration Agreement in An  Administrative 
Contract 
As has been discussed throughout this chapter, there is evidence to suggest that the Saudi 
government has, in recent years, been more willing to consent to arbitration of a dispute 
involving the Saudi government, which by implication extends to its “delegates” (public 
officials to whom power and decision making authority has been conferred).
483
 All 
private parties who enter into an agreement with the Saudi government will be governed 
by the applicable law of the contract, which is often the same as the law of the arbitration 
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agreement. Any foreign party contemplating arbitration in respect of a contract formed 
with a Saudi or national should be aware of the pitfalls.
484
 
As discussed, there is no strict separation of powers between the principal executive 
organ of the state – the Council of Ministers, who has at its head the King of Saudi 
Arabia– and the main administrative court, the Board of Grievances. Given the weak or 
questionable independence of adjudicative bodies from political functions, the State 
essentially acts as both contractor in an administrative contract, and ultimate arbitrator of 
justice. Opportunities for private parties to get a fair hearing – at the level of 
administrative justice and adjudication of contractual disputes – is, consequently, placed 
into peril. In view of these constitutional challenges, it is little wonder that a private party 
may prefer to settle their disputes through a neutral forum, moderated by independent 
experts who apply apolitical rules or international private law, to achieve mutually 
agreeable solutions, unfettered by public opinion or state intervention.  
This has important implications in respect of the applicable law of the arbitration, which 
in most cases will be the applicable law of the contract. In pragmatic terms, private 
parties who satisfy the consent to arbitrate requirement will still have good reason to 
approach the conclusion of arbitration agreements with care and precision.  Contractual 
certainty and prior understanding of potential public order issues, as well as some 
knowledge of Islamic Shariah, will provide private parties with some protection against 
the substantial discretionary power of courts and other adjudicative bodies in Saudi 
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Arabia.
485
 Model clauses or provisions borrowed from other arbitration frameworks may 
also help to minimise legal risks that the terms of agreement will be (deliberately) 
misconstrued, disregarded or even set aside should it be judged in conflict with Saudi 
regulations, policy or Shariah.
486
 
There is however one constitutional basis for legal constraint which Saudi authorities 
cannot deny or escape. By virtue of its own constitutional instruments and declarations, 
the Saudi government absolute power is limited only by the Shariah compliance 
requirement. As such, it is advisable that the governing law of the contract be based on 
Saudi law, or at least the laws of another Islamic country with similar jurisprudential 
traditions, for instance a Gulf Country state.
487
 To avoid the problems of politically 
charged contract construction, the arbitrator should have knowledge of both the 
commercial and Islamic laws applicable in Saudi Arabia.
488
 
On the other hand, as the earlier discussion on the treatment of administrative contracts 
under Saudi municipal law in chapter 2 and 3 have shown, parties to administrative 
contract, may face significant risks. Foreign parties, in particular, face challenges when 
dealing with the local laws and institutions of an unfamiliar or unpredictable legal 
system.  To avoid uncertainty or unfavourable decisional outcomes, private foreign 
parties will typically seek to exclude the application of national laws in all aspects of 
contractual execution or dispute resolution. To this end, they may look to include 
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contractual or arbitration clauses in the terms of the agreement which are designed to 
exclude or limit the scope and applicability of mandatory national laws, including choice 
of law rules, stabilisation clauses, and mandatory arbitration clauses.
489
 
In any event, as will be discussed in further detail in chapter 5 and 6, the Saudi 
government would have good reason to assert that an administrative contract falls subject 
to the exclusive jurisdiction of its own national laws and courts, for practical reasons (the 
contract was performed on its territories, thus satisfying the “closest connection” rule) 
and on public order or sovereignty grounds (the subject matter of the contract relates to 
issues of public and policy, matters which are traditionally reserved for the state).
490
 
Indeed, with respect to contracts involving international law, KSA Resolution 58 
provides: 
“The choice of law governing any dispute to which a government authority is party is to 
be determined „in accordance with the established general principles of private 
international law‟, the most important of which … is the principle of the application of 
the law pertaining to the place of execution [execution meaning place of 
performance]…Government authorities are not permitted to choose a foreign law to 
govern their relationship with individuals  companies or private organisations… No 
government authority is permitted to conclude a contract that contains any clause 
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subjecting such authority to the jurisdiction of any foreign court or other adjudicatory 
body…”491 [emphasis added] 
Of course, the nature and subject matter of the contract itself may be in dispute (is it 
commercial or public „in kind‟?), raising thorny questions over the competency of a non-
Saudi court to tribunal to determine preliminary issues of arbitrability or its capacity to 
assert substantive jurisdiction over the terms of the dispute, as was the case in ARAMCO.  
For the moment, let us assume that the laws governing an administrative contract entered 
into with a foreign party is neither immaterial nor self-evidently clear.  Three possible 
scenarios can be identified.  
 The absence of an explicit choice of law clause in the agreement;  
 Little or no dispositive evidence to suggest that the parties had intended to choose 
the laws of another legal system as the applicable forum and law of the 
(arbitration) agreement and proper law of the contract  
 That, both parties had failed to nominate, through mutual agreement, a contractual 
forum or law selection clauses, which would allow the arbitrators to determine the 
applicable law of the contract, arbitration, as well as the law of the forum or terms 
of reference.
492
 
In the event that these choice of law issues have not been appropriately resolved with the 
consent of both parties, the only legal protection which may be available to a foreign 
party who has been denied justice in the national courts is to insist upon the initiation of 
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neutral dispute settlement mechanisms, principally through international or transnational 
arbitration proceedings, whether through an institutionalised mechanism of international 
arbitration (e.g. the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)) or by way of ad hoc 
participation in informal arbitration or pre arbitration schemes. The question posed is: 
should states be made to comply with and enforce the decisions of international tribunals, 
even when Saudi law explicitly constitutes the terms of the contract which is to be 
performed in accordance with the applicable law of the host state of Saudi Arabia. The 
applicable law, otherwise put, encompasses both national legislation and mandatory 
norms of Shariah. 
4.6    The Impact of Foreign or International Law on Arbitration in 
Administrative Contracts 
The probability that Saudi government or governmental parties will consent to be bound 
by a foreign choice of law clause remains an uncertain prospect, at least for the 
foreseeable future. What is less clear is whether an award against the government that has 
been decided on the basis of a foreign law has binding effect on the parties, under the 
relevant Saudi law. Shariah provides little guidance on this issue as the four leading 
Islamic schools have not reached a consensus on governing choice of law of an 
agreement and its legal effects.  
The predicament revolves around the question of which body, a tribunal or court, has 
competence to determine the applicable law of agreement when the agreement itself is 
unclear on the issue. For instance, which law is to prevail when there is a conflict 
between the nominated law of the arbitration agreement or clause (which reference 
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foreign law e.g. stabilisation clauses or choice of law clauses) and the proper law of the 
contract (which in the case of the administrative contract is determined by the governing 
public law rules of contracting state). Moreover, who decides? In other words, who has 
ultimate authority to resolve the conflict, national courts or an arbitration tribunal? 
If a dispute is raised over the governing law of the arbitration, the tribunal, or the national 
court where appropriate, may be called upon to refer the relevant statutory law, 
constitutional rules, principles of Shariah, as well as the relevant conflict of law rules. 
Under these circumstances, it is worth considering the three steps in choice of law, 
expressed choice, implied choice and closest and most real connection test, have been 
developed by the English courts to determine whether the arbitration agreement is 
separable from the underlying contract.
493
 
In relation to the first test, it is improbable that the Saudi governmental authorities would 
give express consent to a choice of governing law other than the applicable laws of the 
Saudi Arabia. It is more probable to assume that the Saudi government would intend for 
the governing law of the arbitration to be that of the proper law of contract, as determined 
by evaluation of the character and its clauses. Administrative contracts are therefore 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Saudi legal system. But herein lies the rub; 
administrative contracts are characterized by features and clauses which are not usually 
found in civil or commercial contracts, and thus not governed by ordinary private law. 
Instead, the contract is subject to regulation by the applicable rules of public law and 
policy, and perhaps to a lesser extent the relevant principles of Shariah.  
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In connection with the second test, it is possible that the arbitration agreement or specific 
clauses in relevant agreements make reference to a different choice of law. These would 
include contractual clauses that are designed to exclude or limit the scope and 
applicability of mandatory national laws.
494
 Nevertheless, the issue on enforcement of 
award made on tribunal‟s implied choice of law remains. 
In connection with the third test, a credible case could be made that an administrative 
contract performed in KSA is a prime example of a contract that satisfies the closest 
connection rule. From the standpoint of the Saudi Arabia, there is a clear nexus between 
the applicable law and the performance of the contract, which takes place in territory of 
the host state. One does not have to be dualist or state apologist to accept this view, and 
even the most pragmatic of lawyers can appreciate that the state of contractual 
performance is best positioned to oversee the day-to-day operation of the contract, and to 
apply its own laws as issues arise.
495
 
Ultimately, the validity of foreign arbitral awards will hinge on whether the governing 
law of arbitration clause should be treated as distinct from the contract – in this case an 
administrative contract – is contained (since the law of the contract is presumptively 
governed by the special public law rules which ordinarily govern administrative contracts 
in KSA as stipulated under resolution 58, above).  If the law specified in the governing 
law clause of an arbitration agreement is different from the law of the contract, the 
tribunal may be able to assume jurisdiction.  
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Movements in this direction will depend largely on whether national courts will impose 
limits on their discretionary power, for instance by giving effect to explicit statutory 
provisions of the SAL 2012 and to the general principles of Islamic Shariah, to the extent 
each give recognition and effect to fundamental principles of contract law: freedom of 
contract, good faith (or pacta sunt servanda) and party autonomy (the freedom to choose 
the applicable law and forum of dispute resolution).
496
 Yet, as has been made all too 
evident in recent disputes involving administrative contracts, the perennial tension 
between international regulation and its domestic enforcement will continue to impede 
progress in this area. Although states who jealously guard their sovereignty, will continue 
do so, in the courts and in international treaty based processes, it remains to be seen 
whether new Saudi regulations will bring about a shift in judicial and governmental 
attitudes, and with it greater respect and recognition of the finality of foreign award.
497
 
In the wider landscape, recourse to non-Saudi seated arbitration in any contract involving 
a foreign party, but especially when contracting with a governmental entity, may prove, 
ultimately, to be an exercise in futility.
498
 Faced with jurisdictional claims over disputes 
impacting issues over which the Saudi authorities seek to exercise absolute and sovereign 
control.  Saudi arbitrators, and arbitration centres, who are strictly policed by the relevant 
courts and enforcement judge, are unlikely to apply the rules and procedures of another 
legal system if these are conflict with the official law and policy of the government.  
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Rather, they may be prone to uphold, rather than challenge, the exclusivity of the Saudi 
legal system over contractual issues or undertakings of public interest, or which 
undermine the unfettered discretionary authority of state organs.
499
 
Yet, the mere fact that the law of the host state is designated the applicable law by both 
parties does not itself detract from the factual reality of the internationalised character of 
the administrative contracts. What role then, if any, does or should international law play 
in an administrative contract in which municipal law is the exclusive choice of law? Can 
principles of public international law be used to moderate or control the performance of 
contracts subject to the municipal law of the host state? Or can a nexus between the 
contract and the rules of private international law be established by means of objective 
and subjective contract construction, from which the parties intention to „internationalise‟ 
the administrative contract, can be soundly presumed?
500
 The „choice of rules‟ of private 
international law, otherwise put, establish the contact point at which the contract and 
international law meet. Notwithstanding, choice of law issues are ultimately governed by 
“subjective” contractual elements which are determined by the parties themselves, 
including rules governing the nature and terms of the contract, choice of law clauses and 
– this is crucial – non state-dependent legal safeguards including a provision for 
international arbitration.
501
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The choices of the parties, including but not limited to: law, venue, and means of dispute 
resolution, are increasing in a paralleled complexity to that of the internationalised state 
contract.  Without an “international law” governing such agreements, and given the 
hybrid nature of the agreements as well as the multi-jurisdictional spheres of legal 
certainty decorated in shades of “grey”, it leads one to question how any disputes are in 
fact resolution. 
4.7    Conclusion 
This chapter argues for the need to balance the legitimate sovereign authority of the state 
and state law, with greater respect for, inter alia, the jurisdictional rules of leading 
international arbitration regimes and the norms of international law. Here the pull towards 
harmonisation though international arbitration would still be tempered by respect for 
established “rule of law” principles which are deeply rooted in national public and 
constitutional law, values and traditions. Moreover, to the extent that international 
arbitration tribunal are expected to observe principles related to procedural legality, the 
fair and reasonable expectations of international parties are also ensured.  While we will 
discuss these issues in the context of the internationalisation of state contracts and in-
depth case law analysis of arbitration of administrative contracts in the next two chapters, 
it shall all be funnelled through the filter of this current chapter of arbitration.  Therefore, 
a vital perspective should be made clear. 
For centuries,
502
 arbitration has been used in Saudi Arabia under Shariah.  In this author‟s 
view, allowing arbitration in administrative contracts in the modern world should be 
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embraced, not shunned.  As the chapters of this thesis have shown, certain positions will 
be asserted that significantly contravene Saudi Arbitration law and Constitutional 
mandates in the context of administrative contracts.  These positions would be countered 
and refused by the current system, however, the combination of Shariah law and modern 
interpretation of SAL 2012 may indicate a possibility of a valid incorporation of 
arbitration in administrative contracts. 
What will ultimately be proffered in the remaining discussions is that in the vast majority 
of cases, it is urged that the Prime Minister approve the arbitral component with the 
caveat that it be applied consistent with fundamental Saudi Arabia law, policy, and 
Shariah.  However, if Prime Minister‟s approval becomes a tool for legal upheaval or 
chaos, as it has in Egypt following the Arab Spring, it is urged that the condition of Prime 
Minister approval be abolished for the reasons outlined above and forthcoming in the 
concluding chapters.   
Traditional doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and fairness, the latter of which is expressly 
embraced by Shariah, would all support such a view, as would the express provisions of 
The New Arbitration Law.  The Quran itself accepts arbitration, providing: „If ye fear a 
breach between them, then appoint arbiters . . . If they wish for peace, God will cause 
their conciliation, for God hath full knowledge and is acquainted with all things.‟503  
There is, therefore, no reason why it should not apply with full vigour to administrative 
contracts to which the Islamic government is a party. It is through this declaratory 
endorsement of arbitration of administrative contracts that we move forward to the next 
chapters.  
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Chapter 5 
The Internationalisation of the Administrative Contracts:  Applying International 
Concepts to Domestic Public Contracts 
This chapter will attempt to explore the interface between international law concepts, 
internationally recognised principles of administrative law, and the laws applicable to an 
administrative contract in the state. The discussion on administrative contracts and 
arbitration has thus far been assessed from the perspective of Saudi law, in other words 
from the perspective of the national legal system. This chapter „flips‟ the focus to 1) the 
„internationalised‟ nature of state contracts, and 2) a growing recognition and 
convergence around the relevance and applicability of international public and private 
law concepts to administrative contracts.
504
  
For the purposes of this chapter, two key issues will be addressed which build on 
previous chapters. Firstly, the chapter will adopt a comparative perspective to explore the 
relevance and applicability of international concepts in the Saudi context. A second set of 
questions considers the role of international rules in the treatment of agreements 
concluded with a state or state entity. This section engages with familiar questions of 
legitimate authority, competency and jurisdiction in the settlement of disputes which have 
public and private elements, as well as foreign and domestic elements.  This chapter will 
consider the interrelationships between international law and administrative law in the 
determination of regulatory versus commercial contracts, and of the wider role of 
international rules and case law on the treatment and dispute resolution of state contracts. 
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This is an important question because Res. 58, the rule which restricts the conditions 
under which internationalised state contracts can be arbitrated, can be seen to be an 
expression of the state‟s absolute sovereignty and immunity from action, including 
through arbitration.   
  In the final analysis, this chapter considers whether the Resolution 58 conflict or cohere 
with both general principles of international and Shariah law by unpacking the issues 
associated with the governing law of the contract, which is a necessary precursor to an 
assessment of issues around the applicable law of the arbitration.  
5.1   The Rise of the Internationalised State Contract 
As it has been established, administrative contracts are subject to a separate legal regime: 
they are governed by the specific rules, doctrines and perogatives of public law and 
authority. It follows therefore that when an administrative contract is determined as such 
under i) the applicable statutory or delegated law or ii) through judicial determinations or 
judge-made law, the law applicable to any future contractual dispute will be the relevant 
public law rules and policies of the state in which the contract is being peformed. There 
are at least two ways in which an administrative contract, including any arbitration 
clauses within it,  can be seen to have double edged character, both of which have been 
alluded in previous chapters. 
The first concerns the treatment of contractual issues arising from a project or venture 
which does not fit neatly within the established categories of public regulation or 
commercial undertakings which are the usual preoccupation of private law and lawyers. 
Indeed, as suggested below, the administrative contract is a paradigmatic example of 
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state governance which eludes its confinement within the classic distinctions of public 
v private law/ international law v domestic/ the state authority v individual subject and 
so on.
505
  
In a market economy, characterised by glow flows of capital, finance, services and 
people, the state entity does not only structure the market by providing rules which allow 
individuals to plan their economic activities and to predict contractual outcomes. Rather, 
the state acts, increasingly, as both regulator and contractor,
506
 simultaneously setting the 
rules of contract formation while privately benefiting from the gains won from such 
transactions. These contracts can be described as having a “dual” regulatory and 
commercial character. With these developments, the imaginary line dividing an 
autonomous realm of public legal authority that neither interacts nor collides with the 
private world of economic life, no longer accurately describes the mixed nature of the 
state‟s complex relationship with private actors.507 
As the discussion on Saudi law on administrative contracts in chapter 3 and 4 has shown 
the value and binding effect of a contract is shaped to a large extent by the law applied to 
the contract. In the context of the KSA legal system, the functions of the public 
authority, and the obligations of the private party, will be structured and governed by 
the mandatory rules and unilateral decisions of a public authority, for instance in 
respect of procedures governing licensing, planning or state financing.
508
In this 
instance, the legal relationship between the state and individual is consequently more 
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regulatory in character. At other times, the state may act not as a regulator, who is 
charged with duties and powers exercised in the public interest, and more like an equal 
partner in a commercial transaction, based on terms which have been mutually agreed 
towards the fulfilment of some mutually beneficial or profitable outcome.
509
 
Nonetheless, a public contract, defined as such under the applicable law, is 
automatically subsumed by, and governed under, the particular rules and principles of 
public law.  
This takes us to a further complicating factor: what is the governing law of projects, 
agreements or ventures which have an “internationalised” character or element? The 
phenomena known as the „internationalisation‟ of the administrative contract is not 
simply a theory, albeit a controversial one, it is, in some other sense, the hardboiled 
reality of an increasingly transnational legal system and globalised economy.
510
  
The administrative contract, and particularly the international procurement contract, is a 
by-product of networked society and knowledge economy. 
511
 One obvious example of 
this for the purposes of this thesis is when the Saudi government puts out a tender for the 
delivery of public services to international as well as domestic firms. Frequently, 
developing economies will rely on the specialist skills and expertise of foreign firms. In 
addition to the nationality or corporate seat of the non-governmental party, the contract 
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itself may include references to a foreign legal system. 
512
 With this, individuals or firms 
who contract with a public authority will increasingly find themselves subject to the 
foreign, and sometimes highly unfamiliar, laws of a foreign state.
513
 
A state contract which has a mixed or legally complex character may have bearing on 
the means of dispute settlement.
514
 If for policy or other reasons a dispute is non-
arbitrable and is regarded as the exclusive jurisidition of national courts, it stands to 
reason that there is no ambiguity over the proper law to be applied to the contract: the law 
applicable to the contract is the law of the legal system, as enforced by  the competent 
national  courts, (the Board of Greviances in the case of KSA). However, if a dispute can, 
in principle, be arbitrated the next matter to be addressed is the question of what law is 
applicable to a internationalised state contracts, for instance the rules of Shariah, 
international law, or a foreign legal system.  
This chapter will probe more deeply into the myriad ways in which the exclusivity of 
national law and legal system is increasingly being circumscribed or constrained by 
extra-national rules, customs and principles, including principles of public international 
law.
515
 National legal systems are also subject to the influence of comparative 
jurisprudence, as globalisation of trade and services provides the impetus for the spread 
and circulation of legal concepts and doctrines across states with diverse legal systems, 
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traditions and cultures.
516
 In the same vein international rules, standards and practices 
(described as lex mercatoria) increasingly structure global markets, and influence the 
laws and decisions of national regulators and courts.
517
 The next section will turn to a 
discussion of how international concepts can be applied to civil law systems, which share 
similarities to Saudi Arabia.
518
 
5.1.1  The Rise of the Administrative Contract in Saudi Arabia 
As it stands, a significant number of transnational corporations have commenced high 
risk commercial projects in KSA, not only in relation to the more established national 
sector in oil production and exploration but also in a wide range of infrastructure projects. 
The Kingdom is currently investing huge sums in residential and commercial real estate, 
most notably as part of its long-term development plans to build 6 new “mega cities”.519 
Remarkably, only a small number of these projects contain selection clauses designating 
the law of the state of the foreign investor, or any national law other than the host state‟s 
law, as the law applicable to the agreement between the state and foreign investor. This 
issue, as we saw in chapter 4 is critical to arbitration matters, as discussed below. 
The inevitability of the increased use of internationalised state contracts is also reflected 
in the statistical composite of KSA‟s workforce with over 78% of the labour market 
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comprised of foreign workers.
520
 Foreign workers from nations such as Turkey, India and 
China have been working for several years on the restructuring of the city of Rabigh, for 
example, for increased economic input. The significant influence of foreign commercial 
and administrative actors in Saudi Arabia should be considered when developing reform 
proposals, including in respect of themes focused on in this thesis: decentralization of 
administrative power; commercial versus administrative contracts; role of law; due 
process; and rights of parties. 
The difficulty is that internationalised state contracts are incredibly complex instruments, 
often obscuring, or at least profoundly complicating, the true nature of the contracts, the 
rights that flow from these and dispute resolution. On other hand, the KSA has strong 
incentives to diversify as well as strengthen its economy through public and private 
cooperation because: 
„The experiences of other developing and transitional countries have 
shown that lack of efficient administrative systems impedes the 
implementation of complex policies such as privatization, outsourcing or 
PPPs, and increases their likelihood to fail. The success of these policies 
necessitates high levels of efficiency within the machinery of government 
streamlined coordination and collaboration among government 
institutions, and qualified human capital to administer complex contractual 
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arrangements, and technical skills to partner with the private sector.‟521 
In other words, KSA‟s governmental infrastructure and economic policies depend on 
administrative contracts and robust commercial links with foreign partners, whose 
expertise and access to resources is necessary for the immense visions, growth, and 
reforms Saudi Arabia has set for itself.  While these “market-based” administrative 
reforms, the process of liberalisation and open competition has seen administrative legal 
systems, in the West and East, increasingly converge in common understandings, customs 
and practices, many of which break down the classic boundaries set up between 
international commercial law, and the increasingly global form of administrative law.
522
 
The next section considers how common definitions and constructions of the sub-
categories of administrative contracts which were discussed in the context of the Saudi 
legal system have been differently or similarly developed at international or transnational 
levels. While these categories have been mentioned in previous chapters, the distinction 
in this discussion here is that the “internationalised” version of these contracts typically 
involves a foreign, private party, thereby forcing the examination of what happens when a 
dispute arises within these contracts and how arbitration may be managed. While a purely 
domestic or national administrative contract between a public entity and a KSA citizen 
may be seen fall within the undisputed competence of national courts, the 
internationalised contract is where the confusion lies, and the very purpose of passage of 
laws such as SAL 2012. As will be discussed below, the nature of the contract can greatly 
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affect the applicability of domestic law.  Specific cases to such as Pemex, ARAMCO, and 
the Pyramids case, will help shed light on this critical point.
523
 
In the above light, the chapter will expand on these concepts to critically analyse the 
common issues of administrative law; to isolate the unique problems to KSA; and to 
broaden the understanding to limitations in Shariah law that will always challenge a 
broad push to “westernize” KSA's approach to administrative law.  
 An important caveat to this analysis is that many scholars and business-interested parties 
attempt to focus any discussions on "foreign investment". While „foreign investment‟ is 
not a phrase naturally inherent to administrative law, internal statistics in KSA 
demonstrate that “foreign parties” are an inevitable element of influences in KSA's 
administrative law system.
524
 That being said, foreign investment has its own distinct 
applicable domestic and foreign laws within KSA and its implementation of international 
treaties and conventions, including: Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), international 
investment dispute settlement frameworks such as ICSID and in the form of umbrella 
clauses attached to economic development agreements.
525
 All of these may be mentioned 
at times in the coming chapters, but it is critical to this study to understand that this 
concept of “foreign investment” is not the focus of reform, but rather an aid in framing 
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discussion of administrative contracts and the multitude of circumstances where Shariah 
law has or could serve as “choice of law”.526  
5.1.2 Types of International Public Procurement Contracts: “The Nominated and 
Internationalised Administrative Contracts”  
As later sections will show legal character, effects of an internationalised state contract 
and its dispute resolution are all is issues over which there is intense contestation. The 
emerging jurisprudence on international administrative law allows us to distinguish 
between acts of state versus commercial acts or regulatory acts versus contractual acts.  
The case law and associated concepts are not so easily untangled, however, due to the 
multi-dimensional rights of parties and the increasing globalization of economic and 
infrastructure related projects.  
5.1.2.1  Public Works Agreements 
Due to globalization and socio-economic growth, it is more common to see 
administrative actions and contracts being legally or judicially established as part of what 
would typically be labelled as commercial or private contracts, e.g. International Public 
Works Agreements; Build, Operate, Transfer (BOT) – Build, Own, Operate and Transfer 
(BOOT) – and Public Private Partnerships (PPP).  More specifically, international and 
civil law administrative doctrines have deemed supply agreements, public works, and 
concessions to be “the Nominated Administrative Contracts.” While domestic 
procurement contracts were introduced in previous chapters, it is the function of public 
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infrastructure and concession contracts in both domestic and international spheres which 
spurs the modern debate of administrative law. These contractual styles breed a more 
flexible interaction between public and private parties, while maintaining the state 
identity. France, for example, passed sweeping reforms in 2004 incorporating these new 
contractual entities into their administrative law, including provisions that PPP contracts 
may be considered administrative contracts, with the state maintaining the unilateral 
authority of penalization for delay or termination of the contract.
527
 Egypt has 
promulgated and amended laws pertaining to concessions for public utilities and 
exploitation of natural resources, including areas such as providing electricity, building 
roads, specialized ports, and airports.
528
  These laws have been recognized as being “a 
real revolution in administrative contracts and state international administrative 
transactions.”529 Modifications were made to rules surrounding review of contractual 
prices; arbitration authorities; and allowances for certain liquidated damages.  
5.1.2.2 International Public Works Agreements 
International Public Works Agreements are an important example of the transformed 
nature of administrative contracts; their increasingly global and transnational character, 
and the delicate balance of rights that ensues. The main distinction between these types of 
contracts and their domestic cousins are that they involve a foreign element, which 
provided the definition as “international”, otherwise the definition was the same e.g. there 
must be a public party; there must be public interest; and the project asset must be 
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transferred to the public entity upon completion of the construction or after a certain 
period of time.
530
  Due to the pervasive use of PPPs, and similar legal mechanisms, these 
agreements have the same classification problems between commercial or administrative 
interests as a domestic “Public Works” administrative contract. In some rare instances, 
developing states, such as Egypt or KSA, are accepting the application of foreign law to 
these types of agreements. This is contrary to domestic Public Works Agreements in 
which, as set under France‟s le Contrat Administratif, the application of foreign 
substantive law is rejected.
531
  Again, the reason this seems to be occurring is increased 
demand from the international community to consider the rights of a foreign party, who 
have the weight of their own governments and national legal apparatus behind them.
532
  
There is international interest in protecting the state identity behind all parties to 
internationalised administrative contracts. 
5.1.2.3  Concession Agreements 
Concession contracts can also be constituted as commercial or administrative, and as 
such open to questions of domestic versus international applications; but as has been 
discussed they have a sordid history in Arab nations economically dependent on oil and 
gas industries dominated by foreign expertise. Concession contracts can involve public 
utility or they can involve the exploitation of natural resources, the latter being more 
controlled by KSA because natural resources, oil and gas are its source of economic 
vitality. Despite ARAMCO‟s negative impacts on arbitration in KSA, other civil law 
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administrative and Arab states regularly cite ARAMCO as a critical consideration for any 
arbitration, reforms or contractual requirements for government entities party to 
internationalised administrative contracts.
533
  
Accordingly, other developing states, including KSA, have started using agreements such 
BOT, BOOT, and the International Public Works contracts to better manage expectations 
and control of administrative contracts involving massive, long-term projects.  They 
allow the state to benefit from the company resources and institutional expertise of a 
private party, but to maintain unilateral authorities in overseeing the use of funds, 
timeline for completion, and quality of public service.  The public party can also leverage 
penalization tools including imposing financial fees, forfeiture of bonds, or termination of 
contracts.
534
 However, State intervention is more limited than regular public works 
contracts in these agreements as they cannot amend service prices without consent of the 
contractor and service prices to end-users are considered contractual terms not regulatory 
authority.
535
 The purpose of these concessions is to satisfy the private party with more 
consistent economic expectations. In theory this practice complies with Shariah 
principles of risk and loss distribution, but while Egypt has fully implemented the 
reforms, KSA has not yet applied some of these new ideas due to concerns of 
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relinquishing control of government projects and the rights to exercise unilateral 
authority in respect of internationalised state contracts. 
5.1.3 Summary 
Three broad points should be considered in light of the above discussion and the growth 
of the international form of nominate form of administrative contract which have long 
since been familiar to civil law systems.  
The first is that contracts belonging to each of the sub-categories discussed above are 
likely to have a mixed or dual legal character, in that each cannot be clearly classed as 
regulatory or as commercial, or as international or administrative instruments. Equally, 
internationalised versions of the concessions, procurements or public works contract are, 
like their domestic counterparts, anchored in public-law (e.g. the civil law concept of 
“contrat administratif”). 536 The mere fact that these agreements are concluded with 
foreign parties should not exempt a state entity from observing or giving effect to same 
sorts of administrative law guarantees which constrain public power at the level of 
domestic administrative law. On the other hand, internationalised contracts, like all 
contracts, vest private party with certain acquired rights which may require protection 
under contract law. These issues will be covered extensively throughout this chapter. 
The second point is that all of the above contracts can be viewed as controversial or 
potentially forbidden under concepts of riba or gharar in Shariah and KSA law. It is 
striking therefore that Saudi Arabia is moving towards the acceptance of the following 
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types of internationalised administrative contracts by allowing a form of liquidated 
damages in specific, contractual instances; providing opportunities for parties to review 
contractual prices on a regular basis; and opening up the discussion for when and how a 
public entity may participate in arbitration proceedings, e.g. in a PPP.
537
 Long-term 
infrastructure projects require options for dispute resolution and adjustment for “changed 
circumstances” or even unexpected geopolitical events. The recent „freezing‟ of several 
infrastructure administrative projects due to economic pressures and the implementation 
of Vision 2030 is a case point. 
The above discussion reinforces the point that there will be situations in which their 
administrative law practices will require more flexibility including in respect of foreign 
“choice of law” clauses.538 In the coming decades, KSA may have little choice to reform 
and revise its arbitral and contractual law and practice if it is to remain competitive and 
attract foreign trade and commerce.  Such changes will, however, have to be palatable to 
the Saudi public who may be hostile to reforms which are perceived to threaten the 
fundamental values of Islam. Set against this backdrop, this chapter offers a critical 
appraisal of the extent to which contractual flexibility should be balanced against the 
constitutional imperative to uphold and respect the requirements of Shariah.  
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At first glance, the internationalisation of public-private partnerships would seem to 
dilute or even minimise the centrality of Shariah norms in the hierarchy of laws within 
the KSA legal order as whole. This writer argues that this view is mistaken. One can 
argue that a faithful reading of Shariah brings greater, and not less, demand for 
strengthened protection of private rights and legitimate governance in the treatment and 
dispute resolution of contracts.
539
 Such values are moreover consistent with emerging 
norms of international law, including rules on the protection of aliens, access to justice, 
fundamental human norms and the emerging body of law known as “global 
administrative law”540 (which sees diverse legal systems and jurisdictions converge on 
common ideas and elements of procedural justice).   
The third and final point focuses on the limits of sovereign authority and immunity. In 
keeping with the focus on the extra-national dimension of administrative contracts, the 
scope of state immunity gains renewed importance: with the international state contract 
we are no longer dealing with a routine exercise of administrative discretion by a public 
official but a legal expression of national regulatory sovereignty – or state act. With this 
in mind, the next section will aim to demonstrate that the legal status and liability of state 
entities and officials may be brought within the scrutiny and ambit of international law, 
though perhaps not always to great effect.
541
 The issue of sovereign authority has a 
significant bearing on many of the issues discussed below, including how to determine 
the regulatory v commercial nature of internationalised state contracts, in what forum, 
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applying what law. These issues will be evaluated both from the perspective of 
international law and domestic conceptions of sovereignty and immunity from the 
standpoint of regulatory, administrative and Shariah law in KSA.  
5.2   What is the Relationship between Sovereignty, Immunity and International 
Law in the International State Contract? 
The sovereign autonomy and independence of the state from external judicial and 
political interference is a longstanding principle of international law. Contemporary 
scholarly positions on the effect of international law on sovereign power tends to falls 
somewhere on a continuum between two argumentative extreme: those who regard the 
legal „fact‟ of sovereignty, encompassing the immunity of a sovereign power from 
international legal liability, as more or less “absolute” and those who contend the 
sovereignty principle is being relativized by the operation of fundamental norms and 
principles commonly accepted by the “international community”. The tension between 
these positions will be fleshed out below. 
5.2.1 The Concepts of Sovereignty and Immunity 
Historically speaking, sovereignty is a word that carries a lot of baggage, having being 
wielded, both, as an instrument of power, and as a means of resisting power by external 
threats, interference and intervention.
542
 In the globalising moment or so we are told, the 
autonomy and exclusivity of the sovereign state is contracting. As Al Husseni has argued: 
[T]he role of the post modern state, the “Welfare State”, is no longer limited to protecting 
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individual rights, freedoms and legitimate interests. Due to the diversity of the modern 
state's activities, its role has expanded to include the provision of public services to 
citizens either through the public sector or through public-private partnerships.”543  
With these developments, 'rules and standards which are generated by private or 
supranational actors acting above, below and across jurisdictional boundaries penetrate 
deep within the state to affect its laws and constrain the decision-making power of its 
governments. The hands-tying effect of much international and global regulation is 
keenly demonstrated by the near universal levels of state membership in supranational 
organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Compliance with trade rules, 
in this case, has become an economic necessity
544
 More generally, supranational courts, 
such as the European (or Inter-American) Court of Human Rights or the more universal 
jurisdiction of the WTO adjudicative courts will adopt rulings and decisions which can – 
and often do – overrule the judgments of national courts.545 
While the above picture suggests the “twilight” of sovereignty, many others have argued, 
conversely, that the regulatory power of the state has not weakened per se, but has instead 
been transformed. On this account, state actors no longer exercise power through the 
“long arm” of the executive branch of government. Rather, administrative power is 
dispersed and distributed through courts quasi-judicial (arbitral) tribunals who are 
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involved in the adjudication of regulatory and administrative disputes.
546
 This creates a 
thick judicial network of national, international and institutional actors who relate to the 
other through varying levels of competition, dialogue, autonomy or mutual 
accommodation.  
This more fluid idea of disaggregated and juridical sovereignty recasts the state not in the 
role of the absolute sovereign- cum-Leviathan but as an assemblage of political and legal 
actors who represent the shifting, rather than stable, interests of various constituencies 
through their participation in (increasingly transnational or international) administrative 
and quasi-adjudicative processes and proceedings.
547
 The process of mutual influence has 
a harmonising effect which may yet prove to be the strongest influence on Saudi Arabia‟s 
legal system, and its gradual willingness to bring its own laws into line with international 
rules, customs and dispute resolution practices.   
5.2.2 Sovereignty and Issues of Immunity In Saudi Arabia 
Closely related to the concept of sovereignty is the doctrine of sovereign immunity which 
has achieved customary status as a general principle of international law. The 
international community has adopted the basic construct and idea of sovereignty and 
sovereign immunity from the UK and French systems, with adaptations in Arab nations 
for compatibility with Shariah law.
548
  The origins of immunity has the function of 
deterring the average citizen from directly “suing” the King, thereby detracting from his 
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ability to perform his duties to all citizens.
549
 Correspondingly, the modern idea of 
sovereignty is closely related to notions of public democracy, wherein the government 
exercises its power in the benefit of the collective good, rather than in pursuit of its own 
selfish ends, or the maximisation of the self-interested aims of privileged groups or 
individuals.
550
  
Article 1 of the Basic Law of Governance states: „The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a 
sovereign Arab Islamic state. Its religion is Islam, and its constitution is the Holy Quran 
and the prophet's (peace be upon him) Sunnah (traditions). Its language is the Arabic 
language, and its capital city is Riyadh.‟551 This declaration of sovereignty is the first 
identifying feature of the Kingdom in its domestic law and indicative of the veracity with 
which the state protects its position and authority. Sovereignty of the State is established 
by domestic administrative law and justice procedures in Saudi Arabia, but is cemented 
by historical, and consistent theological precedent in Saudi Arabia‟s domestic and 
international legal arenas.  
However, as discussed in the previous chapter, sovereignty in KSA is a matter of public 
policy and domestic or international law, not a holy tenet of Shariah law. Further, while 
KSA leverages sovereign immunity to insulate its government or „monarchy from “suit” 
by its peoples‟,552 it has partially diverged from this more absolutist concept of 
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sovereignty in recent years.  Crucially, as argued in Chapter 4‟s discussion of SAL 2012 
the Saudi government has allowed for some recourse for private parties through 
regulatory bodies or adjudication tribunals, and, importantly, relaxed its arbitration 
laws.
553
 While the KSA government‟s relaxation of its arbitration laws in recent years 
should be seen as an opportunity, it has created a degree of uncertainty and 
unpredictability in the matter of who has authority and jurisdiction to determine issues 
relating to the character or execution of administrative contracts, and, crucially, resolve 
disputes relating to them thereof. Foreign commentators, accordingly, have expressed 
some reservations about the consistency and justice of decisional outcomes reached 
through a reliance on KSA law, because they often see limited recourse for questionable 
sovereign acts or public interest purposes, and instead sees states misapply sovereignty 
related defences under the „guise‟ of respect for Shariah law. Thus KSA is perceived as 
using Shariah law as self-interested tool instead of a morality-based law.  
5.2.3 The Legal Review of Sovereign Acts and Immunity  
All civil legal systems guard their autonomy and sovereignty to decide, apply and enforce 
matters of public policy. It is for this reason that all civil systems have an equivalent rule 
to KSA Res. 58 – a rule which preconditions the right to submit a certain kinds of 
disputes for arbitration on the consent of the sovereign state. But how insoluble should 
this rule be? And, what if any limits should be placed the exercise of sovereign power, 
consent, or immunity, when matters of rule of law, legality and justice as concerned.   
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 If the KSA government is to be held to account for failing to observe international 
accepted practices, judicial review becomes an essential tool.  The process of judicial 
review, moreover, offers a transparent way of legally evaluating whether the acts of 
certain public entities or private entities who conduct public functions, do so with the 
consent or authority of government, thereby rendering the state liable or responsible for 
any breach or behaviour that falls within state control, as discussed below. These matters 
are commonly to reside with the exclusive jurisdiction of national law and courts.  
 In turn, legitimate concerns can be raised over the willingness or ability of KSA courts to 
„police‟ the conduct of state entities who enter into contracts with foreign private entities, 
not least when domestic avenues to arbitration are closed.  This will require that state acts 
are judged against authoritative standards of law, which may in the case of the KSA 
include the constitutional-like norms of Shariah or in terms of „universalisable‟ 554public 
law norms of legality, prospective law and substantive due process in contract 
enforcement and adjudication. On the other hand, as the ARAMCO dispute exposed, 
difficulties remain over the extent to which Shariah – which takes the form of 
indeterminate principles and guidelines – are sufficiently coherent so as to be 
successfully applied to disputes involving transnational, multi-actor and legally complex 
concession agreements. Moreover, the above issues provoke further scrutiny into the 
degree to which national courts have faithfully enforced requirements of Shariah, 
particularly when fundamental principles of Islam runs counter to the prevailing 
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economic or political interests of the sovereign authorities, as represented by the highest 
organs of the state (i.e. the Council of Minister in the KSA, or the King). 
 Important decisions in the ARAMCO and Pemex arbitrations (discussed below) illustrate 
how sovereignty related arguments, including public policy defences, can be wielded to 
justify illegitimate exercises of state power at the expense of public and contractual law 
considerations of fairness, equity, and even public interest. This is especially relevant in 
the contexts of international state contracts in which the “public” character of a contract 
is itself contested or contestable. 
Partly in response to the types of challenges, the sovereignty authority of a state is 
conditioned to some extent on its adherence to minimal requirements of international law. 
Indeed, as Judge Lauterpacht surmised in the Norwegian Loans case, „the conformity of 
national legislation with international law is a matter of international law‟.555 For 
instance, the fair treatment of foreign nationals (aliens) by a host state has a long been a 
foundation of customary international law, in the area state responsibility.
556
 More 
particularly, the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be understood as absolute 
because a State can freely consent to be bound by the laws of a different legal system or 
order, as Finke explains: 
The very foundation of sovereign immunity – the sovereignty of the foreign 
state – obviously allows a state to waive its immunity and reveals at the same 
time that immunity must be understood as a rule–exception relationship: 
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states are entitled to claim immunity as long as none of the exceptions apply 
or as long as the state has not consented to the jurisdiction of another 
country.
557
 
The broader point which informs the above quote is not simply that sovereign immunity 
is a conditional, rather than absolute, right but that it has become so because of the 
expanding jurisdiction which international courts and tribunals assert over state acts 
which impair the rights of foreign parties, along with growing number of other issues 
which owing to the importance of their subject matter are deemed to fall under the 
control of international law. 
Over the past three decades, international courts have been prepared to assert jurisdiction 
over disputes, and attribute liability to wrongdoing states, in cases involving abuses of 
governmental power or human rights, the denial of justice or national expropriation of 
private property (in addition to the more traditional enforcement mechanism applied to 
state who have breached their obligations under international treaties).
558
In other words, 
the rise of international customary law has increasingly narrowed the circumstances 
under which claim safe harbour from liability under the banner of sovereign immunity.
 559
 
Crucially, it is not only supranational or national courts which place limits on the scope of 
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sovereign power and immunity.
560
 Rather these issues are being addressed, through the 
back door, by an explosion of international arbitration tribunals such as the ICC in the 
Pemex dispute discussed below.
561
  
The resulting implication is that the balance between sovereign immunity and state 
liability are delicately balanced in the domain of international law, and more so than has 
typically been the case within the classic domain of administrative law.
562
 This raises the 
question of the nexus between sovereignty, encompassing issues of public policy, and 
international law in respect of the governing law of the internationalised state contract. 
These issues will be discussed in the next section to prepare the grounds for an 
assessment into the apparent tension that exists between a more relativized conception of 
sovereignty under international law, and the more absolutist version of immunity that is 
embraced in the KSA context. 
5.3   The Role of International Law in State Contracts 
The question of international law‟s applicability to state contracts has been discussed 
extensively. Most of the traditional (i.e. 1950s and 1960s) discussion emphasises the 
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“sanctity of contract” which is realised through an international law protection of foreign 
trade or investment contracts with governments. Yet, at the same time, many scholars 
recognised the inherent dangers and difficulties of enforcing the governmental 
contractual commitments at the level of international law, in large part because of long 
held assumption that legal issues concerning contract law, remedies and domestic 
jurisdiction were matters to be settled at the national level, applying commercial law, and 
not public international law. Even if international law had some role to play in the 
protection of  contracts concluded within a wider (investment) treaty based agreement, 
this did not extend to the types of state contracts mentioned above (international 
procurement contracts etc.), chiefly because of what many would (uncritically and 
indiscriminately) perceive as their predominantly commercial and contractual nature.
563
 
Regardless of these reservations, esteemed scholars from the fields of both public and 
private international law, including Higgins,
564
 Jennings 
565
 and Mann
566
 have all 
envisioned a role for international law in the determining choice of law and contractual 
issues arising from internationalised state contracts. In broad strokes, these scholars will 
typically emphasize the point that because state contracts are formed by the agreements 
of a foreign private entity and a public entity representing a sovereign state, they are 
necessarily „international‟ in character. This view is by no means novel, and international 
jurists such as Dupuy, the arbitrator in the landmark Texaco dispute,
567
 discussed below, 
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reached the same conclusion many decades ago. More recently, Weil has expanded on 
this view: 
„[W]hether the application of international law is based on the will of the 
parties or the constitutional system of the host state, or whether one considers 
it to be a reflection of reality, the actual outcome is the same: the legal 
relationship arising out of an investment and the law governing the 
relationship are matters within the international legal order.‟568 
Scholars such as Toope, however, reach the opposite conclusion, arguing that state 
contracts are no different from any other contract in most material respects.
569
 
Accordingly, given their similarities to other kinds of commercial contracts, any attempt 
to apply international law at odds with the “choice-of-law” agreed to by the parties is 
anathema to another widely accepted principle of international commercial law; the 
principle of   party autonomy.
570
 Others have remarked upon the apparent dissimilarities 
between state contracts, which are concluded between a state and private party, and the 
classic form and sources of international law, namely international treaties concluded 
among formally equal sovereign states.
571
 These scholars will typically stress the 
exclusivity of the national law as the proper law of the contract, and the applicable law in 
dispute resolution.
572
 Other still warn against the dangers of an international legal system 
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which intrudes upon the domestic policy and regulatory sovereignty of less powerful 
states.
573
 
This writer is inclined, however, to move beyond the classic dualisms and distinctions of 
sovereignty/international and contract/regulatory around which much of the debate on the 
legal treatment and dispute resolution of state contracts has developed.
574
 As scholars 
such as Fatourous have posited, the complexities of modern and internationalised form of 
public-private partnership agreements necessitate a more fined-turned and case-specific 
approach, as suggested by the discussion of the many forms which international state 
contracts, above.
575
 Fatourous says: 
„This body of law, variously named „extranational‟ or, „transnational‟ governs 
those situations where neither municipal law or traditional public law would be 
wholly appropriate……the applicability of transnational law to state contracts is 
supported by the same considerations which militate against the application of 
public international law or municipal law each by itself. The relation between 
the two parties to such contracts is a peculiar one.‟576 
In view of the peculiarity of the „internationalised‟ contract, vexing questions arise in 
respect of their commercial versus regulatory nature. In one respect, administrative 
contracts share many similarities with international instruments such treaties, both in 
negotiation and drafting. On the other hand, as Grigera-Naon has argued, the current 
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body of international law lacks developed rules or doctrines dealing with complex 
international regulatory-commercial agreements which essentially contractual and 
commercial in nature, rather than regulatory.
577
  
Further controversies are reveal when considering whether the acts of private entities 
acting on behalf of the state or in a quasi-regulatory capacity should be subsumed under 
the umbrella of “state acts”, traditionally understood, and thereby brought within the 
ambit and control of international law? If the latter is true, do the laws applicable to an 
“internationalised” state contract encompass public international law rules on state 
immunity and, if so, how are such doctrine to be balanced against other principles such as 
the customary international law principles, such as pacta sunt servanda (the sanctity of 
contract) or rebus sic stantibus. Finally, in which forum are these conflicts, doctrinal and 
jurisdictional, most appropriately resolved, applying which laws? Do tribunals or national 
courts have inherent jurisdiction to apply an international “choice-of-law‟ to a contract 
entered into with a governmental party, even without the consent of the state, or both, 
parties? 
The answer to each of these questions will, as the following analysis will show, depend 
on whether the contract in question is determined to fall under the public control of 
national regulatory sovereignty and the law of the relevant legal system, or is otherwise 
found to be predominantly contractual and commercial in its legal character, effects and 
dispute settlement mechanisms.  
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5.3.1 Immunity and the Distinction between Sovereign and Commercial Acts 
In both international and state contexts, sovereignty and immunity are often defined by 
distinguishing between commercial acts and acts of state, or “the immunity of the 
sovereign is recognized in regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperil) of a state, but 
not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis)”.578   The classification of such acts 
legitimizes the nature of a contract. But once again, there is element of circularity that 
pervades these distinctions: in matters of dispute you must first define the parties and the 
nature of the contract prior to drawing regulatory versus contractual lines, and deciding 
on matters such as choice of law or rights of parties. In questions of regulatory versus 
contractual authority, civil administrative law systems such as Egypt, apply the same 
general rule as KSA: autonomy of a party in a contract supersedes legislative and 
regulatory rules to the extent that the contractual clauses are not contrary to mandatory 
rules and public policy.
579
   
 International arbitral tribunals have prescribed legal tests for assessing the most 
important factors used to determine the character and effects of a state contract having an 
international component. As will be discussed below, these tests are both functional (does 
the party which is alleged to have abused proprietary rights, or breached a contract 
perform state functions?) and structural (does the abusive conduct fall under the public 
control of the state?).  The site of legal controversy as it pertains to the administrative 
contracts is whether a court or tribunal can surpass “immunity” in matters relating to the 
                                                     
578
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annulment, reformation, termination, enforcement, or penalization by the adjudication 
authority.
580
  
Principles of international law are largely concerned with tempering abuses of 
governmental power. As alluded to in chapter 3, international courts have utilised 
important concepts relating to “change of circumstances” or customary international law 
principles such as “pacta sunt servanda”581 in their treatment of state contracts, many of 
which share similarities, in subject matter or form, to the types of international 
administrative contracts discussed above. That being said, a fundamental tension exists 
between the protection of international treaty-based agreements under customary 
international law and the more limited role of international law in determining issues of 
contractual law, remedies and jurisdiction for breaches which are properly classified as 
commercial in nature, and which do not involve abuses of government power.
582
  
This present considerable barriers to legal protection of the rights of foreign private party. 
Consider, for instance, the scenario in which an abusive, retrospective and unilateral 
application of domestic law is deployed by state or pseudo state entity who seeks be 
discharged of its obligations under a now burdensome contract e.g. through an 
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exploitative use of the “changed circumstances” doctrine or contractual defences.583 The 
absence of a genuine public policy or legitimating purpose for a breach or abuse of a 
contract should, at the very least, cast doubt on the appropriateness of state law as the 
proper law of the contract, even if the relevant “choice of law” contract has been resolved 
procedurally by state law (e.g. subject matter, public policy, jurisdiction or arbitrability 
exceptions) or by agreement of the parties. This is more so because of the circularity of 
treating all administrative/state contracts as contracts having a subject matter which 
excludes it from arbitration from the outset, thereby placing any further scrutiny into the 
“substance” of that contract, or its abuse, outside the sphere of legitimate public 
contestation, or judicial review. These issues will be considered below. 
5.3.2 Can International Law be Applicable “Choice of Law” in a 
„Internationalionalised‟ State Contract? 
The „internationalised‟ character of a contract may be discerned from its dispute 
settlement clauses. To the above point, Mann, a noted jurist, has argued that 
“internationalised” nature of a contract can neither be taken as implicit, nor simply denied 
by appealing to the absolute sovereign authority and exclusivity of national law and legal 
system.
584
 Rather, according to Mann‟s view, the applicable law of the contract can only 
be determined by applying the conflict rules of private international law.
585
 International 
law can and should be applied in the construction and dispute resolution, but only if 
parties have so agreed.    
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Disputes involving contracts of an international nature are typically submitted for 
international arbitration, rather than adjudication by national courts (though the 
jurisdiction of national courts is not necessarily excluded). This is significant because 
national courts and arbitral tribunals will often exhibit very different attitudes in their 
approach to contractual disputes, owing to their distinct functions and orientations.  
The general rule is that arbitral tribunals are obliged to give effect to the applicable “rules 
of law” (which may include the rules of both national and international law), as these 
have been agreed upon by not one, but both parties.
586
 Arbitral bodies must act within 
their powers, in accordance with “rules of law” agreed by both parties. Failure to do so is 
grounds for annulment of an award.
587
 In the above light, arbitration is anchored in 
principles of parity and consent of parties. As discussed in connection with the Sandline 
arbitration
588
 below, that the consensus position has been that an international arbitral 
tribunal does not possess inherent jurisdiction to apply international law to a state 
contract. It goes without saying that an arbitrator does not have the power to initiate 
arbitral proceedings in respect of state contract which is caught by general non-
arbitrability rule or policy, for instance the class of agreements which cannot be arbitrated 
under KSA‟s Res.58, as discussed in chapter 4.  
The national courts of the jurisdictions considered in this thesis e.g. France or Egypt do 
not usually possess the power to give effect to a choice of international law, owing to 
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national regulatory restrictions on judicial applications of non-national rules.
589
 Domestic 
law will therefore usually prevail over a foreign or international “choice of law”, unless 
incorporated into national law by way of treaty agreements (e.g. EU regulations or 
international arbitration conventions and other treaties). It is important to note however 
that many jurisdictions do recognise customary international law as part of the domestic 
legal order in non-contractual cases,
590
 thereby enabling national courts to incorporate 
relevant international legal rules in their interpretation of statutory, administrative and 
codified law. There is however is, currently, little support for judicial incorporation of 
international law rules in the interpretation of national law in Saudi Arabia. In the case of 
the administrative contract, accordingly, it is improbable, though not impossible as will 
be discussed in chapter 6, that the Saudi government will choose to be governed by any 
other law, other than that of Shariah. 
In the domain of private, commercial and contractual, the governing law is determined by 
the terms of the contract, and by the relevant rules of private international law. Where 
parties to a contract have failed to agree upon a choice of law, courts in the US and 
Germany are obliged to identify the legal system most closely connected with the 
contract as the governing law of the contract.
591
 An application of non-national rules is 
restricted to the domestic laws of another legal system, and excludes international law. If 
the contract in dispute is a state contract, courts will typically apply the law of the host 
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state given the substantial connection between that state and contractual performance 
(known as the “closest connection rule”).592  
The most plausible interpretation of the relevant SAL 2012 provisions (Article 10, 50 
etc.) indicate that KSA courts would apply the closest connection rule, subject to the 
caveat that the applicable „rules of law‟ do not transgress either Shariah or the Kingdom‟s 
public policy, the agreement of the parties, or the permitted subject of the arbitration
593
 
There are good reasons to suppose that international law has no role to play in the internal 
political and legal affairs of a sovereign state.
594
 It is also perfectly reasonable to suggest 
contractual disputes implicating „pure‟ contractual or commercial law, “choice of law” 
issues are best left in the hands of the parties themselves. What it is less clear-cut, 
however, is whether a contract agreed to as part of broader set of regulatory-commercial 
agreements, such as an economic development agreement or public concession - and is 
based on a unilateral action that can be construed, as, both, a contractual breach and an 
abuse of state power - should always be considered in either/or terms as a legitimate 
exercise of national regulatory sovereignty, or, a pure matter of contract law.
595
 As 
discussed in Chapter 4, in KSA, Res. 58 would seem to restrict choice of law, while 
Article 2 of SAL 2012 seems to allow some judicial notice of the laws of a different 
forum or choice of law.
596
While this apparent tension will be fully fleshed out in the 
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concluding chapter (chapter 6), it is suffice to say that a restrictive interpretation of 
Article 10 and Res. 58 would seem to compel the former conclusion (sovereignty 
prevails), while an application of the “closest connection” test would suggest the latter 
(the state contract should be treated as essentially commercial and therefore adjudicated 
in accordance with the contract law of the host state). And yet, from the point of view of 
the foreign private actor whose legitimate contractual expectations have been breached as 
a result of an abuse of governmental power, the protections each provides regarded sorely 
deficient.  
 To remedy these concerns, or at least address them, this chapter posits that KSA 
legislative texts and ministerial decisions (SAL 2012 and the patchwork of regulations, 
codes and resolutions which regulate administrative discussed in chapter 2) ought to be 
interpreted in accordance with a more purposive interpretation of the applicable Shariah 
“rules of law”, and in accordance with the Islamic imperative that all law be prospective 
and just. 
This, of course, raises the question once again around the boundary to be established 
between the ambit of public acts of sovereignty, include matters of legality and due 
process, matters usually reserved for national courts, and commercial acts which owing to 
their subject matter, or applicable law, are more appropriately decided in a arbitral forum, 
applying non-national laws.
597
 This is relevant because in contrast with national courts, 
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arbitral tribunals have a greater latitude to apply international law and to grapple with 
complex international transactions than is the usually the case for national courts who are 
not generally permitted to give effect to international law. The next sections will consider 
some key cases which have the question of sovereign immunity. 
5.3.3 The Interface between International Law and Sovereign Immunity on Saudi 
Arabia Today: Case Law 
Due to the domestic restrictions on government entities in Saudi Arabia from 
participating in certain international administrative acts, such as arbitration, the case law 
on sovereignty from within the country is limited in scope.  There is however one way in 
which customary international law may be still be brought to bear on a commercial 
contract. International law may come into play when matters of fundamental rights are 
concerned, for instance when a domestic court abuses their adjudicative power, for 
instance by denying private parties of effective justice or by violating principles of 
natural justice/due process.  
In view of the above, international cases often focus more on human rights or 
employment related matters. The latter can be an example of administrative disputes 
within administrative contracts; but also highlights the importance of sovereignty which 
is universally intertwined with the morality of Shariah Law and seemingly 
incomprehensible to non-Muslim states.
598
 Examples of the breadth of sovereign 
considerations can be seen in international case law involving Saudi Arabia. 
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In Jones v. Ministry of Interior for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a UK citizen was 
subjected to torture in a Saudi Arabian jail.  The UK Court found Saudi Arabia to be 
protected by sovereign immunity from suit in the UK for such actions, finding the actions 
to be “jus cogens”599 human rights issues and administrative in nature, but outside the 
Court‟s jurisdiction.600 This is relevant to this study, because while the act was morally, 
questionable, it was deemed to be administrative in nature, therefore an administrative 
matter to be handled within the jurisdiction of KSA, and protected under both sovereign 
immunity as well as administrative laws within KSA.  This is an instance of a foreign 
administrative tribunal determining that the “chain of authority” evaluation was a legal 
matter for the KSA court to determine under its jurisdiction. As discussed above, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reached a similar decision in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson where it was held 
that Saudi Arabia was immune to suit based on the nature of the torture act in dispute as 
administrative, not commercial.
601
 This commercial exception to sovereign immunity is 
an accepted international practice, but is the same distinction that the Board uses in Saudi 
Arabia when determining the nature of administrative contracts and whether there is a 
“public interest” criterion present.602 
The most notorious case in Saudi administrative law and the nexus of all considerations 
of sovereign acts, is again ARAMCO, where the arbitrator found the governmental action 
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to be commercial not immune, and therefore unlawful.
603
 As was discussed in Chapter 4, 
KSA‟s defence of sovereign immunity was rejected. KSA dogmatically rectified this 
position for any and all future dealings between its governmental entities and private 
parties, by avoiding the jurisdiction of international tribunals, hence reaching the same 
results as if a defence of sovereign immunity in ARAMCO had been successful.
604
 It 
subsequently passed regulations and administrative jurisprudence, which in almost all 
instances allow the government to act unilaterally or to engage in sovereign acts within 
any contract it enters into as a party. In this way, the Kingdom perpetually struggles to 
balance its commercial objectives with its desire to prevent another situation like 
ARAMCO.  
5.3.4 Summary  
The case law analysis above indicates that States, such as KSA, often defer to the concept 
of immunity unless an act or contract is found to be primarily commercial in nature.  This 
distinction exists in the international sphere, as well as in Saudi Arabia‟s domestic 
administrative law.  The challenge in Saudi Arabia, however, is a majority of its 
economic activities involve both the government and commercial aspects. This is distinct 
from other countries such as France or the United States, which have thriving private 
economies and have created separate and clear processes for dealing with commercial or 
administrative matters. KSA‟s progress towards privatisation and diversifying its 
economy may be hindered without similar processes, codes, delegation of powers, and 
distinctions between sovereign or commercial acts. 
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State sovereignty does not inherently mean isolation or domestic dominance in all public 
policy matters, nor does agreeing to certain provisions within international administrative 
contracts mean a waiver of immunity.  International comparisons provide for 
international treaties, preservation of organically devised Islamic civil administrative law 
systems, and application of domestic laws in dispute resolution. Challenges persist, 
however, in this attempted “decentralization” and alleged “transnational” adoption of 
administrative standards.  For Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, sovereignty and 
unilateral authorities are much more than administrative justice, transparency, and 
standardization of procedures, it is about protecting both Shariah law and a heritage of 
cultural norms.
605
 This was said to complicate attempts of Arab states to re-imagine an 
administrative legal system that fully embraces international standards based on 
perceived western financial advantages, and contrary to the interests of less experienced 
emerging markets and divergent cultural identities.  However, as examined in the later 
sections, there may be acceptable cross boundaries between Shariah and public 
international law.  
In a return to the previous discussion in this chapter on arbitration serving as 
accountability for state action, however, more controversial examples than not exist of 
states taking unilateral actions in the name of sovereignty.  One such trend can be seen in 
unilateral actions of a retroactive nature or of such audacity as to bring obvious halt to 
blindly categorizing international tribunals as nefarious Trojan horses. This issues will be 
discussed within a broader discussion of how courts and tribunals have determined the 
nature of the contract, through assessment of the public or private nature of the entity. 
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However, as the above discussion on the various types of international state contract has 
hopefully shown, the nature and legal effects of state contracts will vary from one 
agreement to another. A rule prohibiting arbitration of any agreement which is held up as 
a state contract, without consideration of its subject matter or the personality/capacity of 
the parties involved, risks its abuse and manipulation by governmental or pseudo state 
parties who seek to escape their contractual commitments.
606
 That is to say, a general rule 
or policy of non-arbitrability will lack legitimacy for being too over-inclusive, and for  
failing to provide judicial criteria with which to distinguish “true” exercises of sovereign 
regulatory power and disguised commercial acts, especially rules which produce 
discriminatory effects for foreign nationals,
607
 based on public law tests of rationality and 
reason-giving. These requirements have their backbone in public law and increasingly 
permeate the jurisprudence of supranational adjudicatory bodies such as the WTO‟s 
Appellate Body.
608
 
5.4   The Nature of Contracts to be determined by the Public and Private Role 
Played by the Public Entity? 
As discussed above, an internationalised state contract established a new category of state 
action which is, arguably, neither the exclusive preserve of public international law – 
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which governs the law between sovereign states – nor municipal law – acts and decisions 
which are subject to the exclusive territorial control and jurisdiction of the state.
609
 
The question that remains to be answered is: how does this reclassification help to define 
or redress the complex legal issues presented by these new, transnational or hybridised 
form and character of modern commercial instruments? Indeed, it is difficult to answer 
these questions without having regard for all other relevant factors, both subjective (did 
both parties exhibit a mutual understanding of the regulatory v commercial nature of the 
contract? did the state party misrepresent its intention or mislead the other party?) and 
objective elements of a contract (does the state party profit personally from execution of 
the contract? or is the subject matter of the contract one of the nominate forms of the 
French contract administratif?).Most contentious of all is the thorny issue of which body 
has the power or ultimate authority to decide these issues.  
5.4.1 The Nexus between Administrative Law and the State Contract 
The next section considers how international tribunals have grappled with the issues of, 
both, their own competence to determine the legal character of a putative administrative 
contract, and the substantive law which applies to it. For example, case law discussed in 
the next sections will show that a public entity can become private if it engages in 
commercial activity and includes commercial provisions in a procurement contract, or if 
it excludes certain commercial provisions from a procurement contract.
610
  Accordingly, 
the public entity plays a pivotal part in whether it retains or loses its public authority and 
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in defining the true nature of a contract.  Its considerations of an administrative contract 
versus a commercial contract and evaluation of regulatory acts versus contractual acts, 
but confusingly, all can co-exist within the same contract.  
The following categorization of contractual relationships attempts to provide some 
guidance and to delineate general rules for what a party may or may not legitimately 
expect in terms of how a contract may be defined based on their own actions, choices, 
and interpretations.  These categories are organized based on common compositions of 
parties to an administrative contract between a public party and a private party. 
5.4.1.1  Domestic Public v. International Public 
An international administrative contract can be between one public entity and one private 
party. It can also be a scenario in which it is an administrative issue directly between the 
two states, with no private party, or one in which the public authority of sovereign 
immunity supersedes all other considerations within the nature of a contract. Arguably, 
you have two states with „equal‟ sovereign footing, but with possibly competing public 
interests. One premise in scholarly discussion is whether a state is entitled to more 
protection of their “property” or rights abroad than other, private actors due to 
sovereignty concerns. An example of two sovereign nations engaged in conflict of rights 
is seen in the recent case between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, in which the guardianship of 
Tiran and Sanafir islands were in dispute.
611
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While this example discusses physical property, the concepts and debates of sovereignty 
are directly applicable to administrative contracts and acts of administrative authority 
which deprive another public entity of perceived “rights” of tangible or intangible 
natures.  These can include issues of financial benefits, consistency in protecting rights of 
each state‟s citizens, “taking” or expropriating physical property, or ensuring that disputes 
are settled on an even field or at least of the same understanding of the weight of each 
state‟s sovereign rights and positioning in international administrative contracts. It is also 
an argument of the exercise of administrative justice for each state, including role or 
choice of law and due process.  One state does not assume that it is automatically 
submitting to territorial, regulator, or public law of the other when its “property” is being 
held in the other state.
612
 In fact, classical theories of sovereign immunity say that a 
sovereign state must explicitly consent to the laws of another sovereign state or to be 
made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign.
613
 Diplomacy in these matters lends 
itself to states attempting to reconcile their interests in a productive manner, 
acknowledging the legitimacy of each position and attempting to avoid embarrassment by 
displacing regulations or laws of the other state. This scenario is often reflected in oil and 
gas case law where two state or pseudo state actors are in dispute over a contract 
involving the control, management, and transport of one state‟s natural resources using 
another state‟s equipment and financial assets, e.g. Aramco or Texaco v. Libya.614  
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The U.S. resolves questions of sovereignty versus commercial acts by applying a 
“nature” acts test which identifies a sovereign act as one which cannot be performed by 
private persons; as opposed to a “purpose” acts test which determines if the objective of 
the act is of public character. KSA and other civil administrative law jurisdictions use 
similar evaluations in considering conflicting public policies of sovereign states but also 
run into challenges in consistency of application in this subjective approach; which can 
be incongruent between jurisdictions. The following two cases are examples of 
application of this purpose versus nature test in resolving issues of sovereignty when 
Saudi Arabia is a party to the matter. 
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, where Nelson sued the Hospital he worked for and the Saudi 
Government in U.S. courts for illegal imprisoned and falsifying employee records.
615
 The 
question before the U.S. Court was one of subject matter jurisdiction in whether “a 
foreign state-owned enterprise‟s activity in managing a hospital and disciplining 
employees qualifies as commercial activity”, thereby qualifying as a commercial 
exception to foreign sovereign immunity.
616
  The Court found that a commercial activity 
did not exist and therefore Saudi Arabia was lawful in its exercise of sovereign immunity.  
A similar ruling was reached in Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where the U.S. Court 
found Saudi Arabia to be immune in this case because regardless of the existence of a 
commercial act, there were not enough substantive connections to U.S. to invoke 
jurisdiction in the matter.
617
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In applying the purpose versus nature tests, the United States Court found this to be a 
commercial contract based on the nature of the contractual relationship, while in KSA, 
this contract would be classified as administrative and therefore subject to sovereign and 
unilateral authorities as well as limited means of redress for the private party.
618
  
Here, despite the result, the U.S. Court failed to account for the domestic governmental 
and organizational structures within KSA, or the nature of KSA‟s administrative laws as 
contextualized in Shariah law.
619
 Meaning, internationally accepted principles, not 
national law of the opposing party was applied to the facts in order to distinguish between 
sovereign or commercial acts.  The courts‟ evaluation was from an internal U.S., non-
Muslim, and common law perspective. As was addressed in Chapters 2 and 3, if Shariah 
law had been considered, the denial of payment under the terms of the contract would 
have been considered unjust and contrary to tenets of fairness and honouring one‟s word.  
Even in administrative contracts, a party has a right to due compensation. Thereby 
resulting in a U.S. court applying the domestic laws of KSA to a matter, of which one 
could see why that type of judicial intrusion would be problematic. It provides reasonable 
justification for why an Arab state such as KSA, would keep a tight rein on its authority 
involving other entities.  Instead, the U.S. court determined the overarching matter to be 
one of domestic concern instead of international, using international principles, and 
abdicated the need to consider the more domestic issue of whether compensation was 
unjustly withheld. 
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5.4.1.2 Domestic Public v. Private / Foreign rights  
The dynamic of rights of a domestic public entity and a private foreign party are 
exasperated in administrative contracts because not only are there considerations for 
domestic public policy and the individual rights of the private entity, but there are 
considerations of the private rights of the contractor under the umbrella of the sovereign 
duties of its own state to protect its private rights. The Commisa v. Pemex case is a prime 
example of this type of complication where 620 the need to balance the rights of a private 
company, under the U.S. legal umbrella, against those of a sovereign state (Mexico), led 
to a multi-jurisdictional, multi-tribunal legal quagmire that was only recently 
resolved.621   
Concession contracts, are illustrative of this unique conflict and balance of rights, as they 
are contractual terms and conditions bound in regulatory acts designed for the 
“government to claim to reserve, for itself, powers to rectify and amend the arrangements 
entered into”.622 States prefer provisions of executive necessity and flexibility to adjust 
contractual terms as necessary, therefore avoiding a permanently binding agreement 
adverse to the government‟s ability to adjust to future economic and policy needs. The 
problem in Pemex, that will be discussed below and as some of the following cases will 
similarly show, is that States often learn difficult lessons in legal situations before they 
can develop a more savvy approach to crafting lucid yet binding unilateral provisions for 
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administrative contracts, which will also still entice private parties to engage in the 
contracts. 
Mining concession cases, for instance provide rich opportunities for evaluation. In French 
law, such contracts are considered to be hybrids containing characteristics of commercial 
contracts and authority for unilateral acts of state.
623
 Other civil administrative law states 
have had similar considerations, including Libya, Kuwait, the UK, and KSA.
624
 The 
reason is that these contracts almost implicitly involve a public party contracting with a 
private party who is either foreign; partnered with a domestic party; or is a public party 
assuming private form. While hybrid entities will be discussed in a later section, this idea 
of a conflux of commercial and public characteristics within a contract and of the parties 
themselves, is again the essence of why determining the nature of some arbitration 
contracts seems an insurmountable task. Neither International nor KSA administrative 
tribunals have perfected a bright-line test for these legally duplicit creatures.  
Internationally, the issues of hybrid nature were addressed in the international arbitration 
of Texaco v. Libya where a public party was classified as a commercial or private party 
engaging in a commercial act.
625
 Here, the public entity entered into a concession 
contract with a private company for the purpose of mining and managing natural 
resources in Libya by Texaco.
626
 Libya acted in the capacity of a state party but the 
Tribunal found the contract to be commercial not administrative because, although the 
subject mineral resources belonged to Libya, the contract itself was not for public service, 
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was not entered into by an administrative authority, and did not confer unusual powers. It 
cited the existence of a stabilization clause requiring mutual consent for any changes to 
the contract as evidence of equal footing of the parties, as exists in private agreements, 
not public contracts.
627
 The Tribunal did acquiesce that had the stabilization clause not 
been included, the contract would have been administrative, with the presumption that the 
State intended to retain its unilateral privileges. So, in essence a conclusion could be 
reached that Libya lost its administrative character because it engaged in a commercial 
contract, which contained commercial provisions contrary to regulatory acts and 
authority.  Alternatively, a rule could be drawn that in order to retain the administrative 
nature of a contract and a public entities classification as a “public authority”, it must not 
agree to provisions within contracts, such as stabilization clauses, which are contrary to 
regulatory authority. 
Similarly, a public entity in ARAMCO was found to be engaging in a commercial 
activity, thereby losing its administrative authority and altering what it understood the 
nature of the contract to be from administrative to commercial.
628
 A dispute arose as to 
whether Saudi Arabia had administrative authority to make unilateral changes to the 
terms of the contract.
629
 Upon assessment the Tribunal stated that these types of contracts 
were “embryonic in Moslem law and is not the same in the different schools.”630 Here, 
the Tribunal not only applied international law instead of Shariah law, it found the 
concession agreement to be contractual act and commercial in nature, not a regulatory act 
and administrative in nature, thereby rejecting arguments of sovereignty. The conclusion 
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drawn from this case, is that not only are the classification and actions of a party critical 
to determining the nature of a contract, but it can have dire consequences for what laws 
can be applied to a dispute and which tribunal is able to make determinations concerning 
the nature of a contract.  Saudi Arabia learned the importance of provisions within the 
four corners of a contract as interpreted in international law, as opposed to a blanket 
exercise of sovereignty. 
In variation to the above cases, one example provides a distinction in parties and the 
nature of a contract, not on a confusion of the parties themselves but on the specific 
language used within the contract and the acts engaged in by the undisputed public 
authority. In The Amphirite v. the British Government, a public party was deemed to be 
engaged in an administrative act and as such, a party to an administrative contract.
631
  In 
other words, the party and the contract retained the classifications as intended by the 
public party; but the contrast in case law is that the private party in this case assumed the 
two parties were engaged in a commercial contract due to the nature of the activity 
involved, namely the sale of goods. The Tribunal‟s dicta included this statement: “It is not 
competent for the Government to fetter its executive actions, which must necessarily be 
determined by the needs of the community when the question arises. It cannot by contract 
hamper its freedom of action in matters which concern the welfare of the State.”632 Here, 
the Tribunal found the denial of entry to port to be a valid executive action and as such, 
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that the ship-owner had no right to damages.
633
 The conclusion that can be drawn is that 
public interest activities may also encompass commercial activities. 
The Tribunal cited that the Government‟s attempt to predict future executive permission 
to enter the port a second time, was an erroneous interpretation by the ship-owner as 
being in a binding or commercial guarantee; and the agreement should have been viewed 
only as an executive grant of permission for an initial entry to port, with any additional 
entries to be viewed on a case-by-case basis, not as an imminent authority.
634
  The 
importance of this case, is that it shows that the purpose of the contract (here the delivery 
of goods) and the intent or understanding of the parties (one as commercial and the other 
as fulfilling a duty to secure the port) may be conflicting but equally valid, thereby 
obscuring how a tribunal may interpret the facts.  This case also demonstrates a concern 
of the retroactive nature of such decisions that are hallmark to unilateral and 
administrative authority.  Here, the questions arise as to whether the tribunal “balanced” 
the rights of the parties or chose to ignore the right of the private party to receive 
compensation for good faith and reliance.  The ship-owner suffered the financial burden 
and risk of the situation without being made explicitly aware of the unilateral authority of 
the public entity during formation of the contract. 
Another “classic” case involved the Government of Kuwait v. American Independent Oil 
Company („Amnoil‟). 635 Here, a tribunal decided a contractual dispute based on the 
existence of a stabilization clause, by specifically finding that such clauses are essentially 
a limitation on nationalization and inclusion of these clauses supports the existence of a 
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commercial act or contract, not an administrative act or contract.636 Therefore, it 
changed the expectation of the parties in what their rights or obligations were under this 
„hybrid‟ contract of both commercial and administrative nature. One caveat in this legal 
perception though, is that in some international circles, these clauses are not seen to be 
wholly binding or complete waivers of sovereign rights, merely a self-imposed limitation 
by the government body. This debate goes beyond the full scope of this thesis however. 
Consider another case from the UK involving a mineral, petroleum license.  There, a 
tribunal ruled that the lack of a stabilization clause within a concession agreement caused 
the administrative party to retain its unilateral authorities.637 As with Saudi Arabia and 
all administrative law states, the UK government believes its sovereign right to legislate 
natural resources is in no way impeded by contracts previously entered into with foreign 
licensees, aka they are not perpetually and permanently bound.638  Ironically, this is 
similar to the position that Saudi Arabia took in ARAMCO and which the Tribunal 
rejected under international law.  
One scholar questions whether „the nationalization of property rights protected by a 
concession (contract) may be an exception to the general principle that a government may 
always nationalize upon payment of compensation and evidence of non-discrimination 
and public purpose?‟639  It leads the researcher to open the question of whether there are 
degrees of commercialization within administrative contracts and at what point a contract 
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is clearly tipped one way or the other, or is it an irreconcilable point in which the two 
must co-exist in perennial suspension? Does the use of regulatory provisions clarify, 
prevent or exacerbate this precarious point? Case law seems unclear and inconsistent, but 
it may be a scholarly question worth pursuing.   
The above cases illustrate a pattern of it being impossible to find breach by a 
governmental entity in an administrative contract, thereby always limiting the recourse 
and relief of the private party; but of dogmatically equalizing the rights of parties in 
commercial contracts regardless of whether a State is a party to the contract.  This is 
particularly interesting in terms of international treaties and commitments to arbitration in 
concession agreements as suggests justification for having access to arbitration tribunals 
within administrative matters, as a way to preserve juridical resources and more quickly 
ascertain resolutions. States must calculate whether inclusion of certain clauses is 
considered to be an abandonment of sovereignty even though the contracts may be more 
public than commercial in nature or vice versa.  
As the court in the Wimbledon steamship case stated:  
[T]he Court declines to see in the conclusion of any treaty by which a State 
undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a particular act an 
abandonment of its sovereignty. No doubt any convention creating an obligation 
of this kind places a restriction upon the exercise of the sovereign rights of a 
State, in the sense that it requires them to be exercised in a certain way. But the 
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right of entering into international engagements is an attribute of State 
sovereignty.
640
 
 This note seems to be stating that a self-imposed restriction, or ratification, is actually a 
sovereign act, thereby preserving the sovereign nature of the governmental authority in 
its dealings with private parties and other States. 
As the case of ARAMCO taught Saudi Arabia, mineral resources are clearly an attribute 
of KSA‟s State property and sovereignty, and States contracting to such agreements that 
are pivotal to the economic survival of the nation, should have the ability to rectify faulty 
contractual provisions or to revise as public policy conditions change over a long period 
of time.  In the case of ARAMCO, Saudi Arabia was a burgeoning nation with newfound 
power; it deserved the opportunity to learn the extent and depth of its sovereignty against 
the wisdom of older nations. Instead, however, Saudi Arabia has gone to an overly 
restrictive regime that leads to unfettered exercise of its sovereign powers when it comes 
to allowance of arbitration in matters of governmental importance.  However, Saudi 
Arabia is not the only State to enact protective or restrictive measures.  The UK for 
instance, restricts the use of arbitration in agreements involving Petroleum Licenses 
because it considers arbitration to require the use of international law, which is often in 
conflict to the “national interests” involved in concession contracts.641 Egypt has 
implemented a prohibition to government entities engaging in arbitration without 
permission, which is similar to KSA‟s provisions.642 However, in comparison to countries 
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such as France, Egypt, the UK, or the UAE, KSA does seem to be a consistently shy 
participant in globalization reforms. Again, as this author will continue to argue, this 
shyness has a negative implication for aggressive timeline and goals Saudi Arabia has set 
forth in its economic, domestic, and industry initiatives. 
We have discussed the challenges of two public entities balancing their sovereign rights, 
but there is some ambiguity when an administrative contract involves a public authority 
and a pseudo commercial, private, public hybrid party.  Arguably and unlike an 
administrative contract involving a private party, two public authorities should have 
awareness that each exercises equal rights if not clearly delineated powers under a 
specified project.  Most of these contracts will have been formed via an official 
government action or decree, thereby removing the same “issues” that can manifest with 
a private party. However, as the case in ARAMCO demonstrates,643 it is not always clear 
in the beginning that two parties have mutual understanding regarding their 
classifications as public or private, or a pseudo commercial nature of a formed LLC or 
corporate entity distorts classification, thus the Board becomes integral in establishing the 
nature of the contract and classifying the parties. 
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5.4.1.3 Public-Private Partnerships / “Hybrid” Parties  
Hybrid public/private entities not only exist in administrative contracts but they are the 
largest growing sector of parties to infrastructure procurement contracts. However, as 
illustrated by the administrative contract test, they can present challenges both to the 
judiciary and the parties.  Their structure, function, and contractual authorities can create 
a “blurred” line effect between public powers and private gain, in addition to higher risks 
of imposing inordinate control, inappropriate modifications or rescissions.  Efforts to 
distinguish the administrative or commercial aspects of these entities can be further 
exasperated by the State‟s requirements that a foreign entity be a properly licensed LLC, 
or alternatively a sanctioned joint venture with a Saudi Arabian partner, who may often 
also be a partner with the Saudi Government, i.e. a company who partners with Saudi 
Railroad or a University.
644
 This means the State is imposing administrative 
characteristics on what would normally be a purely private entity, in order for them to 
operate in Saudi Arabia under even private contracts.  
Alternatively, they may be a government entity that chooses to partner directly with a 
private entity and then engage in a public procurement bidding process. Public Works 
contracts such as the BOT‟s, BOOTs, and Concession contracts often involve these types 
of parties, with pseudo commercial and public natures. Large projects such as 
construction of a new Terminal at King Khalid International Airport was awarded to a 
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local/international consortium of Saudi and Turkish entities falling into this “grey area” 
of identifying the entities involved.
645
 
PPPs are the most popular example of these types of hybrid parties with a pseudo 
commercial nature, and have arguably become the most predominant means of a 
government to become a contractual party or parties in a procurement agreement for a 
large infrastructure project.
646
 In Saudi Arabia, PPPs are most often established by the 
Supreme Economic Council, with an intended purpose of public service or interest, such 
as recent projects involving water and sewage provisions, desalination plants, 
telecommunications, railroads, and building or operating public markets.
647 
Risks still 
exist with PPPs as, similar to administrative contracts themselves, they do not have 
specific laws that govern their creation or operations, nor are there standard contracts or 
procedures for how they might function.  PPPs are a breeding ground for experimentation 
in cooperation between parties and methods of dispute resolution in contemporary 
administrative law systems.
648
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5.4.1.4 Public v. (Private Domestic v. Private Foreign)  “Buy Local” 
This is a less controversial contractual pairing but worth mentioning nonetheless. The 
procurement process often requires the Saudi government to choose between awarding a 
contract to a domestic private party or a foreign private party. However, Saudi Arabia has 
numerous and comprehensive obligations and restrictions for foreign entities entering 
into administrative contracts, some of which cross over into commercial dealings, e.g. 
licensing requirements or restrictions on project financing.  As was presented in Chapter 
3 through KSA contractual comparisons of obligations for parties within administrative 
contracts, the same restrictions are not always applicable to a private party entering into 
similar contracts, who is not foreign. Shariah law provides private parties of the Kingdom 
more latitude in contracts.  Additionally the communal, familial, and royal bonds of the 
State as rooted in tribal traditions, favours advantages to local family-run businesses with 
long-term relationships with the royal family over local businesses with unknown foreign 
partners. 
649
 Companies such as Saudi Bin Ladin Group, Saudi Ogeir, El Seif, and others 
dominate the contractual market based on their strong ties, reputation, and performance 
record with the Saudi government.
650
 Saudi Arabia has a culture of internalization, 
nepotism, royal favour and community endorsement; often to its own detriment. 
651
 This 
can require any foreign entity to engage in a faux partnership with a local entity, in which 
the local entity is in a financially advantageous position but does not provide any capital, 
labour, or contribution to performance of a contract. This shifts a large burden to any 
foreign entity that may be awarded a contract, despite the preferences for domestic 
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parties.  Not only are they potentially exposed to administrative proceedings which can 
define the terms, conditions, and nature of a contract for them, it means there are 
unexpressed higher expectations of performance and potential misunderstandings due to 
cultural differences. These dynamics should be taken into consideration by foreign parties 
eager to engage in the public procurement process.
652
  
5.4.2 Administrative law and the International State Contract: Retroactvity as a 
Public Concept applied to Private Contracts 
While unilateral actions were discussed at length in Chapter 3, the unilateral actions that 
result in a retroactive effect are the more controversial actions within KSA and 
international administrative law and worth discussing. The retroactive nature of these 
actions and emerging internationalised contractual concepts overlay between traditionally 
public and private law as well as between parties.   
The authority to take unilateral actions under a contract is the epicentre of power, control, 
and controversy in administrative contracts.  These actions are subject to corrupt practices 
and the majority of cases before adjudicatory bodies.  In Saudi Arabia they are also the 
primary tools used in performance of administrative contracts to prevent violations of 
Shariah law, adjust to a fluid public interest, and comply with domestic law.  They are 
socially compelling, defiant to traditional contractual practice, and disquieting in legal 
evaluation. They also serve as a significant deterrent for foreign partners, as these rules 
apply to administrative contracts and could shift powers of negotiation in an arbitration 
agreement. These actions are often manifested into contractual provisions.  
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Reclassification is an authority specifically given to the Board in Saudi Arabia, but a 
similar practice occurs when a party is simply „caught off guard‟ by the classification or 
the nature of a contract, as determined by a judicial authority.  The above cited Amphitrite 
case between the owner of a Swedish ship and the British Government is an example.  
One could argue that the ship owner was reliant on what he understood the terms of the 
contract to be and of his rights to compensation upon any breach of that contract.  
However, since the Court deemed the contract to be administrative, the ship-owner was 
inherently financially damaged by the loss of any anticipated compensation for the goods 
that spoiled on his ship as a result of not being allowed entry to port.  
In France, these decisions are referred to as „retroactive‟ effects of an annulment of 
administrative acts (“recours pour exces de pouvoir”).653 Under French law, nullification 
or annulment of an administrative act is essentially saying that the act or decision never 
existed and the consequences of this type of retroactivity could be devastating, causing 
other subsequent actions to become illegal; to overturn an entire regulatory regime; or to 
cause the loss of job for one individual.
654
 To limit, moderate, and rectify the retroactive 
effects of these actions, administrative judges are given the power to take whatever 
actions necessary to directly address these concerns and to rebalance the interests of the 
parties.
655
 Germany, Austria, and Italy have implemented similar reforms, but it is unclear 
whether such mechanisms exist in Arab states.  
The discussion finally brings this study to the Commisa v. Pemex case as the most recent 
example of the controversy that can arise from unilateral actions, sovereignty and 
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retroactivity in administrative contracts.
656
  There, both an ICC tribunal and a U.S. Court 
of Appeals determined unilateral actions by a Mexican administrative authority and 
governing bodies to have had deleterious effects on the rights of the private party to the 
administrative contract; finding their actions to be a „flagrant violation of public policy as 
well as inherently offensive to universal principles of justice‟.657 There, Pemex, a state-
owned entity, unilaterally annulled a long-term, large infrastructure contract with a U.S. 
registered company, well-after a dispute arose and was submitted to arbitration; while the 
Mexican Court then attempted to circumvent the international tribunal‟s authority by 
relying on a retroactively applied law to set aside the arbitral award in favour of 
Commisa.
658
  Both actions were an attempt to rectify mistakes Pemex had made in 
formation of the contract and an immature body of administrative law, as well as both 
Commisa and Pemex‟s mistakes in simultaneously submitting to the jurisdictions of an 
ICC tribunal and Mexico‟s supreme administrative court. 
The importance of this case is seen in not only the problems that arise from unilateral 
actions of a retroactive nature, but a parallel can be seen to ARAMCO. ARAMCO and 
Pemex both involve large procurement contracts and governing bodies attempting to 
retroactively apply newly passed laws to rectify disputes pertaining to those contracts. 
But, the question becomes less of what they did, but why they did it and whether there 
might be a better course of action in such situations. Mexico, similar to KSA at the time 
of ARAMCO, was considered a developing market, and its lack of delegated powers, 
choice of law provisions, and clear administrative authority at the time of the dispute, 
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manifested into an arbitration “debacle”.  More specifically, in both cases, an 
international tribunal over-ruled the domestic administrative authority or court in the 
matter, thereby threatening the perceived sovereignty of the state and beguiling the rights 
of the private party. 
While the after-effects are on-going, a contrast to KSA‟s reaction to ARAMCO can be 
made in that instead of precluding any future participation in international arbitration 
proceedings as a result of this case, Mexico has so far chosen to strengthen its domestic 
laws, delegate clear administrative authority, and establish statutory-based guidelines for 
participation in arbitration.  Pemex then becomes a positive study in choice of law, rule of 
law, unilateral authority, as well as retroactive effects. 
KSA does not seem to address retroactive effects of reclassification in either its 
administrative law or limited available jurisprudence, although as cited in Chapters 2 and 
3, some mention of deleterious effects on contractors and financial equilibrium has been 
brought up as issues within domestic cases.  An examination of Pemex through a Shariah 
lens would be whether or not application of Shariah law would have come to the same 
result.  
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5.4.3 Summary 
As the above case law shows, the decision to include a provision or not can shift the 
entire balance of the contract, altering not only the definition of a party but in the nature 
of the contract and therefore the options for adjudication of disputes or alleged breaches 
of contract. Often these decisions are made on an economic basis, but involve extraneous 
components that obscure the level of risk or alternatively, impose additional requirements 
or circumstances that could not have been anticipated by a party during formation of a 
contract.
659
 It is important to recall that Shariah law requires formation, offer, and 
acceptance to occur all in the same meeting, thereby limiting the ability of parties to 
reflect on what risks they have just assumed.
660
 
For instance, you could argue from the above case law that licensing regimes for public 
works or concession agreement contractors are another mechanism of protecting 
sovereignty and regulating unilateral authority.  Similar to questions of consent or 
permissions in arbitration clauses within administrative contracts, an administrative 
authority can choose to refuse, revoke, or penalize license holders under public interest 
powers.
661
 Licensing implies consent by the private party to be controlled by the terms set 
by the government entity not in coming to a mutual understanding and freedom of 
negotiation of terms and conditions. Along this argument, should reclassification be 
permitted by the Board when: it is contrary to the requirements of consent in the 
formation of the contract and the agreed upon powers for terms and conditions and 
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control of the contract? What do these choices then mean for the risks each party takes 
when entering an internationalised contract or when resolving a dispute through 
arbitration? 
5.5    International Law and the Limits of Administrative or State Immunity 
In previous chapters it has been shown that in the Saudi legal system, public authorities 
exercise wide powers of supervision, control and modification over the terms and 
performance of an administrative contract. But as alluded to in earlier section the 
exclusivity of the chosen state law – the exclusive competence of the state to determine 
the proper law of the contract or contractual forum – has not escaped controversy or 
criticism.
662
 Among the greatest challenges levelled against the principle of sovereignty is 
the „brooding omnipresence of international law‟663 in the determination of legal issues 
relating to state contracts and economic development agreements.
664
  
5.5.1 Do International Arbitral Tribunals Posses an Inherent Jurisdiction to Apply 
International State Contracts: Key Decisions  
International arbitration may be the more appropriate forum in which to assess the 
contractual terms, rights and obligations under the contract, including whether a 
unilateral modification is covered by the defence of “changed circumstances.” Broadly 
speaking, international arbitration tribunals have shown themselves willing to draw on 
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principles of international law. The ICC tribunal addressed this issue in the Pyramids case 
(also known as the SPP case).
665
 The Tribunal established that Egyptian law was the 
proper law of the contract but went further to find that principles of international law, 
while not self-executing per se, has been accepted as authoritative sources of Egyptian 
law, including principles of Shariah. 
666
Specifically, the Tribunal cited to notions of 
fairness, honouring your word (pact sunta servanda), fraudulent misrepresentation, and 
just compensation.
667
 Accordingly, Egyptian law could be relied upon as the law 
applicable to the contract only in so far as that law did not contravene international legal 
principles. If the tribunal‟s reasoning is sound in the event of a conflict or inconsistency 
between principles of international law and the applicable law of the state, then the 
authoritative norms of international law should, to some extent, prevail.
668
 
Some tribunals have gone even further. In the Sandline arbitration, for instance, the 
tribunal relied on a passing reference to international arbitration in the contract as 
sufficient evidence of it “international” character, even if an international choice of law 
was not expressly agreed upon by both parties.
669
  While the dispute in question was 
undoubtedly a contractual one, the tribunal proceeded, nonetheless, to apply international 
law as the governing law of the contract, while asserting its inherent jurisdiction over the 
dispute. While the decision may seem to some a step in the right direction, the authority 
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of both the Sandline and Pyramid decisions are questionable having little support in state 
practice or custom.
670
  
Critics would argue that the reasoning applied in the Pyramids and Sandline Tribunals is 
faulty on grounds of principle as well as practice. The application of a „but for‟ 
(compliance with international law) rule, when taken to the extreme, falls foul of the 
foundational principle of contract law: the freedom of parties to designate municipal law 
as the applicable forum (of dispute resolution) and proper (substantive) law of the 
contract. But the appropriateness of applying of international law to state contracts 
introduce concerns which go well beyond narrow and procedural issues of choice of law. 
Many would regard any attempt to apply non-national rules to state contracts as little 
more than veiled attempt to undermine the legal and political autonomy of the sovereign 
nation state.
671
 International laws imposed “from above” may be regarded by Muslim and 
Arabs states as an assault on the „legitimate diversity‟ of local cultures, norms and 
traditions, i.e. Shariah. 
672
Following a spate of international arbitration disputes involving 
oil producing nations in the 50s and 60s,
673
 many developing states continue to regard the 
Western model of international arbitration with deep suspicion. For their opponents, 
international arbitral tribunals deploy (or rather misconstrue) principles such as pacta 
sunt servanda   or venire contra factum proporium (a state or state official is bound by his 
own acts) not out of a sense of international legal obligation, but are, instead, for 
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illegitimate purposes, for instance by vesting already powerful Western corporations with 
proprietary rights over a state‟s lucrative national resources.674 
A more general criticism goes to the rather unruly jurisprudence of international 
arbitration. Fundamental principles of pacta sunt servanda or customary human rights 
norms do have authority and bearing on a dispute.
675
 However, rules of international law 
are often invoked by international arbitral tribunals in perplexing and incoherent manner. 
As an illustration of the above point, as discussed in Chapter 3 international law provides 
rules for dealing with a government that has made attempts to frustrate an arbitration 
agreement which it had previously entered into. These issues were addressed in the SGS v 
Pakistan award (while an investment dispute, the material issues involved in this dispute 
are relevant to state contracts). This dispute centred upon a non-arbitration injunction, 
applied by the Supreme Court of Pakistan against arbitration, which was justified at least 
in part on public policy as well as jurisdictional considerations
676
 In this case, the arbitral 
tribunal appealed to the inclusion of a pacta sunt servanda/umbrella clause (in the 
context of an investment treaty) to protect the sanctity of the treaty based agreement and 
the State party‟s arbitral commitment. But while international law may be sufficient to 
deal with the frustration of arbitral commitments in at the level of treaty law, usually in 
respect of national expropriation disputes, it does not provide precise rules for dealing 
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with contractual breaches resulting from abuses of governmental (economic or political) 
power e.g. retroactive action. It is little surprise then that international arbitral tribunals 
have sought to repurpose (the sovereign consent orientated) rules of international law, 
often by construing general principles of international law to give effect to legal 
outcomes for which they not necessarily intended, as well as their own powers of review, 
very widely and questionably.   
Existing international jurisprudence remains largely silent or ambivalent on contractual 
breaches which involve abuses of unilateral authority in the performance, modification or 
recession of a state contract, which are not backed by an investment treaty.
677
 The 
decision held by the Tribunal in Sandline
678
 is a case in point. The Sandline decision, it 
will be recalled, concerned a breach of a state contract involving the repayment of debt. 
While the tribunal broke new ground by concluding that international law could in fact be 
applied „for the purpose of determining the validity of a contract‟, the decision rendered 
was broadly in line with other arbitral decision of this nature. That is to say, the Sandline 
Tribunal affirmed the mainstream position, concluding that an ordinary example of 
contractual performance „was not illegal or unlawful under international law‟.679 
The doctrinal difficulty here is that while constructs such as party autonomy or pacta sunt 
servada have, in effect, crystallised into “hard(ish) law” in the context of mandatory 
arbitration at the level of investment treaty law, the same customary international law 
principles have been applied more cautiously and flexibly, if at all, in connection with 
state contracts, which are not tied to an international treaty through so called „umbrella 
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clauses‟. The bright line established between international state contracts and 
international state contracts which are tied to a treaty appears somewhat arbitrary, not 
least because it relies upon the artificial distinctions of treaty law/ contract law vis a vis 
international/domestic law; distinction as this chapter has attempted to show are no 
longer adequate to describe how states and individuals interact in a globalised 
marketplace.  In any case, the normative argument for the purposes of this discussion 
concerns the legal protections owed to private individuals, foreign or domestic.  To treat 
international administrative contractual law and international investment law, both 
involving state parties, as impermeable to the other seems neither fair nor sustainable.
680
  
 A state can, of course, be persuaded, through soft forms of judicial, political and 
economic integration, to be bound by international rules, or to submit to international 
arbitration using non-national rules, but they cannot be compelled to do so.  On this 
reasoning, and applied to the legal system of KSA, one may be forced to conclude that 
Res. 58 alludes judicial control, and that any agreement subsumed by the non-arbitrability 
rule is immune to it oversight or review by the laws of another forum, or choice of 
foreign or international law. But does this mean that any breach of a contract that is not 
subsumed by treaty based law can be retrospectively justified as a legitimate exercise of 
unilateral authority which, as a sovereign act, attracts no liability? And if so, are the 
grounds for reform, in principle even if this is not followed in state practice. This writer 
would suggest that is a case to be made that international law should be widened to 
include abuses or breaches beyond those involving expropriation of property or cognate 
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areas of investment law, and include contractual arrangements of a hybrid nature, having 
regulatory and not just commercial elements or effects.  
5.5.2 How Can International Tribunals Apply International Law with Respect for 
Shariah? 
This brings us to the delicate matter of the legal outcome of a clash between principles of 
domestic law, for example Shariah law, and principles of international law in an 
internationalised contract. As ascribed in previous chapters, there is a certain 
commonality and standardization of practice that can be seen even across boundaries of 
Shariah and international public law. As such, the question could become less about how 
different they are, but in how easily two parties might bridge the differences to form a 
stronger agreement. As discussed, underlying doctrines such as pacta sunt servanda 
under an international custom complement rather than conflict with the Quranic 
prescription to honor your word to man and to Allah under Sharia. The concept of 
“justice”, unlike the concept of sovereignty (which has no formal basis in Islam), has 
remained an anchoring principle of Islamic since its dawn. The Quran states that: “We 
have sent our apostles (to mankind)…… the scales of justice, so than men might conduct 
them-selves with fairness” which should in company with another core principle of 
Islam, “Oh you who believe, observe covenant.”681 Both amount to the same 
interpretation: agreements must be kept and it is the duty of the parties to find fairness in 
dispute resolution.   
                                                     
681
 The Quran, 57:25 
- 290 - 
While there does seem to be more of a general discomfort by international tribunals in 
applying Islamic law due to lack of education and understanding, this will be re-
addressed in the final chapter under suggested means of reform.  The relevance here, is to 
better understand what may have been the true motivating factor in both Pemex and 
ARAMCO.  Self-identity of a state is seen in its exercises in immunity to protect cultural, 
religious, legal, and economic heritage.  The use or non-use of national law, such as 
Shariah law, can be one indication of prejudice, but it can also simply be an opportunity 
for the States and the Tribunals to learn from each other. For instance in Pemex, the ICC 
tribunal and U.S. Court applied Mexican domestic law and supplemented it with 
international custom. This distinction is highly relevant to KSA because it brings one to 
ask whether the ICC tribunal would have similarly incorporated Shariah law into the 
equation, or whether the ICC‟s comfort level with Mexico‟s legal structure, which is 
based in French civil, administrative law, was influential in their decision-making process 
This writer also contends that unlike national courts, an arbitrator tribunal may be better 
positioned to balance “choice of law” or sovereignty related concerns with respect for 
fairness and equity in a resolution based on the parties and the nature of the contract. As 
suggested, one can find authority for such public law principles in both international law 
and Shariah law. The difficulty lies in the interpretative „openness‟ of concepts such as 
fairness, or the unavoidable „subjectivity‟ that colours a judicial determination of the 
nature or purposes of a contract, both of which are prone to bias and dependent on „rules 
of law‟ and expectations of the parties.682 Therefore, when national law is inadequate, too 
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self-interested, or generally contrary to these notions, or if the arrangement of the parties 
includes a different law, arbitration can be better served by applying non-national law.
683
 
5.5.3 The Limits and Possibilities of Applying International Law to Unilateral 
Authority: Some Signs of Hope? 
One can make the normative case – even if it is not supported by the existing law –  that a 
an abuse or breach by a state entity acting not in a  commercial but sovereign capacity 
exercising regulatory, administrative and political power is precisely the type of action 
which ought to be made subject to the controls of international law.
684
  This would 
include unilateral modification of a contract resulting in an unjustified breach of a 
legitimate expectation, i.e. a retrospective modification of a contract which imposes an 
undue hardship on the private party without judicial remedy or compensation. Indeed, 
such a position seems entirely justifiable from the viewpoint of both the traditional 
perspective of administrative law, and principles of Islamic contract law, discussed in 
chapter 3.
685
 
The issue of governmental abuses, including the exercise of unilateral governmental 
powers as a means of rescinding its obligations under a state contract entered into with a 
foreign party (which may include frustration of a pre-existing arbitration agreement) was 
brought to light in the Maffezini I and II and Salini arbitrations.
686
 In the recent Salini v 
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Morocco 
687
decision, the Tribunal‟s reasoning turned on a familiar division between state 
acts which are “simply commercial” and state acts which are undertaken in a 
governmental capacity and are therefore found to have a (regulatory) “iure imperii” 
character, in this case a public-law concession as defined under French administrative 
law.
688
 In both arbitrations the Tribunal‟s averred that there is insufficient reason to 
differentiate the actions of state from non-state actors when dealing with commercial 
disputes. A similar test has been developed in WTO and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) jurisprudence whereby competition law requirements do not 
apply to state enterprises and agencies‟ conduct if it is shown that such actors are 
essentially driven by business and profit driven considerations.
689
  
 The more novel aspects of the reasoning employed in Maffezini I and II and Salini
690
 
concerned the Tribunal‟s determination that it was empowered to review the merits of a 
case in which a breach of a state contract was alleged to have arisen from, and this is 
crucial, an abuse of administrative/sovereign authority.  
In making the above determination, the Tribunals‟ applied a tripartite test. The first 
component was largely influenced by the public functions test,
691
 which looks to 
distinguish legitimate exercises of public powers, on the one hand, and the abuse of 
governmental powers, on the other. Many of the same issues discussed in chapter 3 in 
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respect of the appropriate balance to be stuck between sovereign or administrative 
discretion in pursuit of the public interest versus the substantive legitimate expectation of 
the private party to a rely on contractual undertakings of a state entity should be 
considered, this writer argues, when applying this element of the test. If the first part of 
the test has been satisfied, i.e. there has been an abuse of power, the disputant must then, 
in a second component, demonstrate that the alleged breach or misconduct is sufficiently 
serious or significant in nature. Mere contractual non-performance which may caught 
under contractual defences and are justifiable such contractual impossibility or undue 
hardship “changed circumstances, discussed in chapter 3, would fail to meet the required 
threshold. The third and final test requires that the alleged abuse of regulatory or policy 
making power is directly and causally connected to breach, thus satisfying the rebuttable  
presumption that the alleged breach was commissioned by a state entity acting in 
governmental rather than commercial capacity. 
Each element of this tripartite test is complementary and has bearing on the issue of 
unilateral authority and to a lesser extent arbitrability. On the one hand, it is seems 
entirely justified that matters involving of public should ultimately be a matter of national 
law, and accordingly subject to review on the merits by domestic courts. Yet, such a 
position is only defensible if the power of state entities to unilaterally amend, abrogate or 
rescind a contract is adequately policed and not abused. If however a state entity, or 
private entity who performs functions equivalent to state actors, unilaterally revokes its 
contractual commitments, or substantially modifies that contract with the precise 
intention of imposing punitive, disproportionate or excessively burdensome conditions or 
measures which pre-exist the contract, then one can arguably point to an abuse of powers. 
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Moreover, one can argue that when national courts fail to address the imbalance or police 
these powers or abuse their adjudicatory powers (“denial of justice” and lack of “due 
process”) that international law should come in to play.692  
In the absence an international governing choice of law clause, consented to by the KSA 
government, an arbitral award which applies non-national rules with the effect of 
imputing liability to state actors are, however, unlikely to be enforced or respect at the 
level of domestic law. 
It is difficult to avoid the reality of state practice and the practice of KSA in respect of 
retroactivity, choice of law, sovereignty, and the concepts mentioned in Chapter 3. In both 
Pemex and ARAMCO you had rather young or under-developed economies attempting to 
compete to defend the autonomy of their laws and legal system, and their discretionary 
power to pursue their own policies, exempt from international review or immunity.  Both 
KSA and Mexico took unilateral actions with a retroactive effect that they claimed 
authority to do under the doctrine of immunity. Additionally, neither state had a clear 
system of dispute resolution of administrative contracts, nor of when a dispute was 
arbitrable.  
 On the other hand we have an international arbitration system which is looking to 
expand its influence and jurisdiction over state acts, through the application of rules 
blended from administrative, international and commercial law i.e. stabilisation of 
expectations, private rights protection and access to justice. Does this seemingly inherent 
conflict of interest justify or contradict notions of sovereignty or is there a way to 
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incorporate more protective measures for national actions into a new internationalised 
administrative contract?  Or more specifically, is there a way for KSA to sanction the use 
of arbitration in administrative contracts and retain both measurable sovereign control 
and obedience to Shariah law? 
As indicated in chapter 3, under Islamic law, which is arguably the supreme law of Saudi 
Arabia,
693
 albeit not codified, there are two broad positions on the circumstances under 
which Islamic contracts can be discharged. In one scenario, discharge of contract 
effectively enables parties to return to the original bargaining position before the contract 
was agreed, but only by mutual consent
694
 The latter position brings the contract forward 
in time, so that the legal rights of both parties is interpreted as though the contract had 
been performed. This is an important distinction since in the second position the contract 
has prospective effect even when performance has been rendered impossible and the 
contract dissolved. In the case of the administrative contract this affects the damages 
(compensation) which a private party can claim against the unjustly enriched 
governmental party.  The crucial point is that Islamic law operates to discharge contract 
prospectively, meaning that only future obligations can be discharged on grounds of a 
„change of circumstances‟, including any decision to unilaterally modify a contract on 
grounds of public policy or interest. Or as one administrative body observed “Indeed, a 
judgement of the Conseil d‟Etat cannot act as a sort of „time- machine‟ that can recreate a 
past moment in the legal order or in the context of social relations. [...] In particular, the 
complete re-establishment of legality may cause more harm than good to those 
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individuals who were not responsible for the initial legal wrong, and thus have no call to 
carry the burden of an annulment caused by others [...]”.695   
In the above light, one could speculate, that given the tenets of good faith, fairness, and 
equity in Shariah law, that the KSA Board or any international tribunal who may apply 
Shariah law in cases like Pemex or ARAMCO would similarly find some equilibrium in 
the positioning of each party upon reclassification or unilateral action. More specifically, 
Shariah law would not condone the retroactive effect of legislation to the administrative 
contracts in either Pemex or ARAMCO.  Further, Shariah law would not sanction 
rescission or annulment of an administrative contract because the government party 
determined that the contract was not to its financial benefit, aka as in ARAMCO it 
wanted to enter into a more flexible and lucrative contract with Onassis or as in Pemex, 
the government was attempting to avoid the costly result of either breach of contract or 
arbitral award.  
5.6  Conclusion 
Saudi Arabia administrative law system is an unpredictable system when compared to its 
counter-parts, not because of its reliance on Shariah law, but because of its more apparent 
differences in legal procedural practices. Comparatively speaking, the system is a by-
product of the struggles for growth and reform in a relatively young nation, whose instant 
economic success in oil, put it in a spotlight and position of development unique to other 
emerging markets.  Saudi Arabia did not have the luxury of taking hundreds of years or 
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decades to adapt to western or non-Muslim styles of contractual or legal matters, instead 
it absorbed as much as it could from its much older “brethren” Egypt and initially took 
great legal risks in its administrative contracts with foreign partners.  Suggested reforms 
based in arguments of “Lex Mercatoria”, Nature of KSA v. International Trends, 
Decentralization of Administrative Power, Developments of PPPs as hybrid tools, and 
Market-Based Solutions are all globally suggested means of unifying administrative 
systems under a standardized set of international norms and laws; but they are all also 
contributors to KSA‟s legitimate attempts to protect its cultural heritage, sovereignty, and 
constitutional law qua Shariah. But Saudi Arabia can only make such arguments if  legal 
limits are placed on the exercise of unilateral authority are invoked on spurious grounds 
of “sovereignty”, particular when the exercise of sovereign power effectively defeats the 
spirit and text  of Shariah: the supreme law of Saudi Arabia. This is an argument not in 
favour of international law that trumps state sovereignty, but one which defends the 
supremacy of the national law of Saudi Arabia, in this case the Shariah, against 
unbounded unilateral exercises of political power. Saudi Arabia‟s legal regime around 
arbitration in administrative contracts is where these dynamics are currently in conflict.   
The final chapter will show that there is not necessarily a conflict between the principle 
of sovereignty – the exclusive or supreme legal and political authority of the nation state 
– and the gradual embrace of models of arbitration, which lest we forget are based on the 
principle of consent. Or more importantly that not only are international law and Shariah 
more aligned than they are understood to be, but both can be used separately and in 
harmony to override immunity for unilateral authority, when the outcome of unilateral 
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actions or of a contrary judicial or arbitral decision would be inconsistent with practice 
and manifestly unfair by depriving private parties of legitimate expectations and rights.  
This argument is exemplified by the practice of the Saudi government. At first entirely 
hostile to foreign and international arbitration, and highly protective of its sovereignty 
over public law and order issues, Saudi state organs are beginning to refer disputes to 
arbitration, not because international rules have been imposed on it from above but by its 
own volition and through incremental reforms to its commercial (arbitration) and public 
laws and policy.  
Therefore, Shariah law and international law in theory would both abhor the use of 
immunity to protect a contractual breach and abuse, which harms the other party without 
legally supported justification; and could likewise support the use of an arbitration panel 
to resolve and rectify the results of any such actions. This equally applies to a judgement 
by the Board or a Tribunal, that a party shall not take „advantage of a favourable 
judgment that he knows to be unjust.‟696  The conclusory chapter to this study will not 
only these ideas together in harmonization of Shariah and international law, but flex the 
themes of separation of powers, delegation of authority, capacity, consent, and choice of 
law into suggestions for viable reform. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion: Overcoming the Non-Arbitrability Challenge: Lessons for Saudi 
Arabia 
Building on this study of the regulation, governance and dispute resolution of 
administrative contracts in KSA, this final chapter reflects upon, and synthesizes some of 
the key themes and arguments developed in previous chapters, as the basis on which to 
identify existing gaps in KSA law, while proposing some key reforms which can be used 
to mitigate some of the most challenging obstacles to treatment and dispute resolution of 
administrative contracts under the current system of administrative decision-making and 
contract adjudication in KSA.  
Above all, this thesis has identified as a major weakness of KSA law the obstacles to 
arbitration of a governmental contract without the consent of the KSA government. The 
non-arbitrability without consent rule present a serious question about the relationship 
between sovereignty and liability both at the state level, and most obviously in the 
growing body of internationalised administrative contracts in which prevailing 
distinctions between commercial and administrative contracts are breaking down. 
In light of the above, this final chapter synthesizes the key findings and arguments 
developed in the above chapters, and proposes some key areas of reform and criticism. 
By first framing its insights in the context of a recent judicial decision in Saudi Arabia 
which perfectly encapsulates main of the key issues assessed in this thesis, this 
concluding chapter proceeds to identify key lessons which can be drawn from KSA‟s 
current non-arbitrability obstacles and from the experiences of other legal systems, which 
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are then used to isolate three crucial legal challenges, procedural, substantive and 
institutional. Ultimately, the suggested reforms attempt to reconcile respect for 
sovereignty of the state with the need for a more just and effective framework for the 
treatment and dispute resolution of administrative contracts. 
6.1   Disappearing Sovereignty and The Internationalised Public Contract: A 
New Kind of Transnational Law 
The findings of thesis demonstrate that administrative contract arbitration agreements test 
the limits of the doctrine of sovereignty and the exclusivity of state law. Saudi Arabia 
readily uses “sovereignty” and “public policy” defences as a legal tool for not 
recognizing or enforcing arbitration agreements, clauses and arbitral awards whether 
governed by foreign state, international private, or international treaty law. While 
seemingly an extreme use of sovereignty, this practice finds common theoretical and 
practical support with other nations also grappling with ways of protecting sovereignty.  
The lex fori theory, for instance, rigidly offers no space for any law other than the law of 
the place of arbitration even if that means forsaking sound outcomes, or tolerating the 
denial of (administrative) liability or justice. This rigid theorem is but a refinement of the 
territoriality principle on which the old dualist-paradigm finds its footing: the state alone 
has exclusive authority to determine the scope of its legal obligations and the limits of its 
authority.  
Such theories make a categorical error: they treat the domains of public and private, 
international and domestic law as closed and mutually autonomous systems or “islands” 
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that do not interact or intersect in any way.
697
 These theories often take too little notice of 
the rise of the internationalised administrative contract, the ever-expanding 
„transnational‟ law, and the decisively just, yet cooperative nature of Shariah law.698  
Amongst the greatest challenges levelled against the principle of sovereignty is the 
„brooding omnipresence of international law‟ in the determination of legal issues relating 
to administrative contracts and economic development agreements.
699
 The past three 
decades have witnessed a meteoric rise in the spread and influence of internationalised 
administrative contracts, PPP agreements, bilateral investment treaties, regional trade 
agreements, and above all, international arbitration regimes [chapters 4 and 5]. These 
developments produce effects that call into question the idea that a state alone has the 
power to determine the rules and decisions that will bind it.
700
 Private individuals, on the 
other hand, need no longer rely on the state to intervene on their behalf at the 
international level; they can now bring actions before international arbitral tribunals 
directly.
701
 Developments in international human rights law and the globalisation of 
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administrative law further corrode the legal boundaries between state responsibility and 
state immunity, the preserve of traditional international law.
702
 
As this complex legal landscape „internationalises‟, doctrinal tests to distinguish 
sovereign acts as (jure imperii) from commercial acts as (jure gestionis) [Chapter 5]; the 
means to apply those doctrines; as well as understanding how such acts manage the scope 
and breadth of administrative contracts and actions of associated parties become more 
critical.  This also applies to the complexities of arbitration itself.  Because private 
arbitration is widely accepted, even by Shariah standards, such distinctions could serve to 
strengthen sovereignty by not confounding the state‟s commercial interests with its 
sovereign power.  In a sense, the continued or abusive use of the immunity defence which 
has an undermining effect of the idea that sovereign authority of governments is 
unconstrained by independent and autonomous standards of law, both at the level of 
domestic administrative law and Shariah, and increasingly the constraining effect of 
international law and arbitration.   
6.1.1 Disappearing Sovereignty: The Complicated Case of Unilateral   
Authority in Arbitration  
The following case law discussion provides a paradigmatic example of the fallacies of 
Res. 58 and the arguments developed in this thesis, which include the consequences of 
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unfettered unilateral authority or the failure of the Board to “police” such authority; the 
doctrine of consent as a multi-faceted look at unilateral authority; and the tension which 
exists between unconstrained discretionary power of the administrative state to modify or 
abrogate its state party‟s contractual commitments and the legitimate exercise of public 
authority in the public interest. It pulls these concepts of arbitrability together under 
considerations of administrative justice, sovereignty, and tests of authenticity in Shariah 
law.  It also serves as a reference point for the rest of this chapter. 
As chapter 4 unveiled, Res. 58 poses a particular threat to disclosure and fairness within 
an administrative contract. Oujim BV (Dutch company) v. the University of King Abdul 
Aziz, involving an administrative procurement contract, further exemplifies this issue and 
the results of “un-checked” unilateral authority.703 The contract included an arbitration 
provision.
704
 A dispute indeed arose and an award was entered against the University, 
which it failed to pay in its entirety.  Oujim, in turn, initiated enforcement proceedings 
with the Board. The University attempted to invoke Res. 58 as grounds for non-payment 
of the remainder of the award. The Board agreed with the University, stating that the 
arbitration was nonbinding as the parties had not obtained permission therefore the 
arbitral award was unlawful.
705
 The Board further stated that permission was necessary as 
the University was a publicly-funded body, acting as a guardian of those public funds and 
had a duty to protect and control such funds in the public interest. They found the arbitral 
award to be an unlawful relinquishment of that duty to protect.
706
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However, Shariah law mandates the fulfilment of contractual agreements and promotes 
justice, and here, the parties both mutually consented to arbitration as a means of settling 
their dispute. It was only after an award was issued against the University that it 
attempted to invoke Res 58, therefore violating the spirit of Shariah law in fulfilling its 
contractual obligations. As discussed in Chapter 4, Shariah law is ultimate law in KSA 
and does not itself advocate the principle or tools of sovereignty.  Res 58 is expression of 
legislative power and sovereign political authority, therefore, it is inferior to principles of 
Shariah law. The University‟s actions to evade final payments of an arbital award were 
contrary to Shariah principles of good faith, honour, and fair dealing; therefore proper 
application of Shariah law would indicate that Res. 58 should not have been a justifiable 
defence in this matter.  
This is also an example of unlawful consent. Oujim had no notice or disclosure that the 
arbitration clause, or the award, would have a non-binding, much less illegal effect.  
Therefore, they could not have given adequate consent in the original contract. Such 
malfeasance and fraudulent misrepresentation would surely contradict Shariah principles 
of haram, “your word is your bond”, and justice.707 
Not only was the original agreement invalid due to lack of consent, unjust enrichment 
and estoppel, but also Oujim was denied the justice it deserved. This argument is only 
magnified by the University‟s behaviour, which is clearly an action of a retroactive 
power-play.  They either failed to conduct their own due diligence in formation of the 
original contract, or intentionally entered into an illegal contract. There should be 
consequences to unfettered unilateral action, and the Board in this case failed to 
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adequately „police‟ the issue. Regardless, not even Shariah law, would find fault with 
Oujim, and in fact Shariah law specifically states to do no additional harm to a 
contractual party. Forcing a party to forego an arbitral award after the administrative 
party had been found at fault, due to non-disclosure of a material term prior to dispute 
resolution, is in-fact doing harm to a party.  
As discussed in chapters 3 and 5, and as illustrated by the case law from jurisdictions 
such as Egypt and France, the confusing nature of internationalised administrative 
contracts present challenges for arbitration panels or the Board in deciding how to 
classify the contract, which laws to apply, and what type of consent may or may not have 
been necessary.
708
  The assessment of this researcher is that consent must always be 
identifiable, regardless of its implicit or explicit nature. 
To put it in context, arbitration of administrative contracts implicates a renunciation of 
initial dispute resolution in national courts, notwithstanding issues of appeal, with the 
parties‟ arbitration agreement serving as the foundation for the arbitrator‟s authority and 
mission.  If a party has never consented to a contract or arbitration agreement or if 
consent was obtained from a party based on false or mistaken pretence, then that party 
would not have consented to the standards of the arbitral seat or the chosen rule of law 
within the arbitration agreement or clause.  Therefore, any alleged consent is null and 
void or unlawful, under both Shariah and international law, making the effect of the 
contract or of the arbitration measures equally null and void or unlawful.  
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This argument can be „turned on its head‟ if you take an „innocent‟ party who gave their 
willing consent to arbitrate, only to be told that they were mistaken in the ability of the 
governmental authority‟s capacity to enter into arbitration and give consent equal to that 
of the private party.  As we have already mentioned, tribunals are then faced with the 
hefty decision of whether to „punish‟ the private party by denying arbitration and due 
process based on lack of consent, or to recognize a waiver or estoppel by the actions of 
the governmental entity, e.g. the University case and Pemex.
709
 While international 
bodies have accepted the latter option, KSA is reluctant to recognize the underlying 
concepts of waiver or estoppel, and in fact do not typically use such terms in their 
administrative law due to the then associated relinquishment of independent control and 
ability to default to public interest.  However, proper application of Shariah principles of 
equilibrium, fairness and “do no harm” could provide adequate justice in this scenario, 
thereby eliminating the need for internationally “coined” waiver or estoppel.710 
In complicated cases requiring analysis of whether or not consent exists, as discussed, the 
French rely on chains of transactions, or consideration of all circumstances, and transfers 
of the parties‟ substantive rights within a specific contractual and arbitral procedural 
framework [Chapters 3 and 4].  In other words, if the parties‟ reasonable and legitimate 
expectations require that arbitration be imposed by virtue of facts, then those expectations 
and facts will, in legal fairness, amount to implicit or subjective consent.  In other legal 
systems, this practice is called equitable estoppel.  One such example was seen in the 
case of a services agreement between two parties to construct a power plant in KSA 
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where the court found an arbitration clause to be valid, holding that the claimants „could 
not rely on the contract when it works to their advantage...but then repudiate the contract 
and its arbitration clause when they believe it works against them.‟711 To KSA‟s credit, 
this ruling attempted to prevent repudiation, but its application as a standing rule in 
KSA‟s non-precedent legal system is unlikely. 
The reasonable limits of unilateral authority in administrative contracts and arbitration, 
e.g. consent, duty to the public, and sovereign immunity, are a legal quandary for KSA 
that has not been alleviated, only softened, by SAL 2012.  As the analysis has shown, 
there are still consequential gaps within the system that equate to gross abuse of unilateral 
authority, serve as a deterrent to private contractors, and have been costly for even the 
Saudi Government itself, as the sorting of limits to unilateral authority or acts by parties 
has led to the “re-trying” of cases through both arbitration panels and the Board. 
Given this framing, the following lessons and discussion of reforms attempt to set a path 
forward for KSA and to evaluate what its future may look like in terms of its arbitration 
process.   
6.2   Lessons in Unilateral Authority: The Hallmark of Administrative 
Contracts 
Unilateral authority is the hallmark feature of administrative contracts, but as analysed in 
this thesis [Chapter 3], left unconstrained its power distorts notions of fairness, good 
faith, and justice.  The Board has failed to adequately police this power due to the lack of 
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codification, precedent, and consistency.  Thus unilateral authority is now without limits 
in KSA as being widely defined and broadly applied to considerations ranging from 
sovereign immunity to legitimate expectations of parties.  This thesis has asked and 
examined what the limits are for exercise of unilateral authority; presenting comparisons 
from jurisdictions like Egypt and France.  At the domestic level it is a public policy and 
contractual matter, and at the international level it is one of sovereignty and 
internationalised administrative contracts. The duty of the Board and the KSA governing 
bodies is to balance the unilateral rights of a public entity in carrying out public interest 
with the inherent rights of a private party.  The lesson learned is that the application of 
Shariah law and international law can both be a means of accountability for corrupt uses 
of immunity to unilateral authority and abuse of power. 
6.3   Lessons from Shariah: Legality and Legitimacy of Unilateral Authority 
Unilateral authority is normally defined within public policy interests; but in KSA this 
power to act can only find genuine legality and legitimacy in Shariah law. Shariah law 
has taught us principles of fairness, good faith, honour, and justice in the context of 
contractual relationships.  Unilateral acts, such as modification, rescission, annulment, or 
submission to arbitration, are judged for their authenticity to these principles. Consent, 
for instance, is closely related to issues of justice and fairness, from the perspective of 
both public law and Shariah, and provides a rich resource for lessons on unilateral 
authority. It is doubtful, that parties can give genuine consent to unilateral actions, 
particularly those which breach contractual commitments on which parties justifiably 
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rely.
712
 Contracts are agreements based on mutuality and benefit. Under Shariah law as 
well as administrative civil law or common law systems, consent at one stage or another 
must be obtained for a contract or arbitration to be lawful.   
As discussed in chapter 3, both the Quran and the Sunnah specify a man to give his 
consent for use or disposal of his property, privilege, or obligation. Fairness and good 
faith require that parties understand what they are agreeing to and how such agreement 
may directly affect their contractual obligations or benefits; or impact legitimate 
expectations of contractual rights.  A party has a legitimate right to know the weight of 
what they have agreed to.  To do otherwise, would invoke legal questions of undue 
influence, bad faith, estoppel, and waiver.  
Many disputes occur where one party was “surprised” by an unexpected change of rights, 
status, or obligations; or phrased another way it is not what they understood to have 
consented to when entering the contract [chapter 3 and 5].  It is also here that the lesson 
of legitimization of unilateral acts under an examination by Shariah law is strengthened 
and the pathway to reform is set. Previous chapters demonstrated how instances of 
changed circumstances, (re)classification, or retroactive effects from unilateral actions 
can be unexpected and contrary to understandings of one or both parties. Such situations 
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shift the entire nature of the contract, as a party cannot consent to a unilateral authority or 
nature of a contract which has not been disclosed.  This violates the spirit of Shariah law 
principles of good faith, fairness, and consent within contractual matters.  By 
supplementing analysis in chapter 5, one concludes that the Board in Saudi Arabia does 
not always have a legitimate „right‟ to reclassify a contract, nor can other civil law 
jurisdictions, such as Mexico or France, use sovereign immunity and unilateral authority 
to retroactively apply legislative authority or contractual terms.  Such actions seem to 
transgress legitimate expectations, guaranteed rights, and Shariah law requirements that 
all material terms of a contract are agreed to simultaneous to offer and acceptance.   
The lesson therefore is that acquiescence to unilateral authority, whether through consent 
or sovereign immunity, is not a malleable concept, but that all parties should be clear and 
unambiguous in their intent, understanding, and consent, as per notions of legitimate 
expectations and good faith.  It is only then that the unilateral authority finds legality and 
legitimacy through Shariah law, thereby setting the true gauge of authenticity in 
administrative contracts and arbitration. 
6.4   A Lesson about the Limits of Absolute Sovereignty  
As has been presented throughout this study, a contract can be between two parties, 
public or private, with freedom to establish terms and conditions.  In the case of 
administrative contract, it creates a primarily regulatory contract by which a claim may 
be made against a State, by a private party, concerning or arising out of a dispute or act 
related to a public interest; thus an alleged act of sovereignty and immunity. This is a 
critical point in arbitration and in any suggested reform for Saudi Arabia, because the 
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sovereignty and regulatory nature of the agreement mandates the application of public 
law, not private law, therefore suggesting that all contractual matters are serviced by 
public law. But as has been discussed, there is not usually a clear distinction in the nature 
of a contract, nor a reflection of legitimate expectations of the rights of parties in 
resolving disputes. 
For instance, what if even the possibility of arbitration, or other avenues for obtaining 
effective justice, are denied to the other party at the level of municipal law? Given the 
expressed intent behind Res. 58 and Article 10(12), discussed in chapter 3, one can easily 
imagine a „new ARAMCO‟ scenario in which the Saudi government will seek to deny 
rights that may be ordinarily available to the private contractor under the express terms of 
oil concession agreements (or the applicable foreign law of the contract), on the grounds 
that the dispute in question concerns a public contract and therefore falls within the 
exclusive sovereign competence of Saudi Arabia‟s domestic law. In this scenario the 
Saudi government retains for itself exclusive authority to determine the nature and 
character of a contract.  Yet this is the scenario that has been argued against in this study, 
one of absolute sovereign control and action by the state. 
The current research emphasizes the importance of having administrative contracts 
subject to arbitration in serving as a precedent for States to nullify certain powers within 
their sovereignty for the sake of international cooperation and participation, without full 
relinquishment of their sovereignty, i.e. as explored in France, Egypt, and even Spain.  In 
other words, compromise and harmonisation are possible where KSA retains its sovereign 
identity. For example, SAL 2012 articles discussed in chapter 4, including exemptions for 
certain ministries from Article 10(2), and case law to be presented in this Chapter, prove 
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that KSA already functions by subjecting certain regulatory, administrative contracts to 
arbitration, despite its restrictions from Res. 58 and Article 10(2) of SAL 2012. In effect 
they are beginning to strike a tenuous balance between exercising their sovereign powers 
and submitting to international custom by consenting to the possible use of arbitration in 
public matters.  From this lesson, Res. 58 and Article 10(2) are open ended provisions, 
not absolute prohibitions; and the ultimate challenge becomes the conciliation of Shariah 
principles, KSA domestic designations, and international law. 
6.5   Lessons from the Exclusivity of State Law 
This thesis has elucidated that practices of exclusivity in State law by KSA have created 
detrimental side-effects in reputation and means of resolving disputes to internationalised 
administrative contracts. What Saudi Arabia designates as an administrative contract 
under its own substantive law, may, to another legal system, have the character of an 
ordinary contract. At the same time, nevertheless, an international economic agreement 
involving a state may well design and apply national laws, including contract law 
principles and regulation, in order to further its own self-interested ends, under the 
pretext of „public policy‟ or concern for the public interest. These rules may well result in 
the unfair or discriminatory treatment of foreign nationals with whom the state has 
undertaken contractual commitments or dealings. 
As case law discussed in chapters 4 and 5 illustrated, a private contractor may seek to 
enforce a different „choice-of-law‟ in the courts of another jurisdiction. Similar to the 
Board, as discussed in chapter 2, international tribunals may auto-determine their own 
competence and capacity to decide issues they deem to fall within the scope of the 
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agreement and their own powers of review.
713
 The tests developed in Maffezini I and II 
and Salini
714
 discussed in chapter 5 may provide a genuine path by which international 
tribunals can begin to establish a link between contractual breaches and abusive exercises 
of governmental power, both in respect of domestic administrative contracts and in the 
international form of state contracts.  Tribunals in particular are better positioned to will 
to comparative jurisprudence, appealing to principles of international law, and in the 
judicial decisions of domestic courts, especially when the applicable law is the law of the 
domestic courts‟ forum state.715 
Yet as has been presented in this thesis, there is no guarantee that Saudi authorities will 
respect the decision of an international arbitral body even if they have given consent to 
arbitration.  Instead, they may refuse enforcement despite being a signatory to 
international agreements. Indeed, as has historically been the case, the Saudi government 
would likely make ready use of the Article V safe harbour clauses of the New York 
Convention that provide defences to non-enforcement on the grounds that foreign award 
or judgements infringes the enforcing state‟s mandatory law or public policy; or of the 
commercial exception in sovereignty cited in case law from chapter 5.
716
 
Saudi Arabia is no different from most jurisdictions in this scenario, including Egypt, 
France or Syria, in that it can simply refuse to permit arbitration or enforce a parties‟ 
choice of law if it explicitly contradicts the will of the legislator; or where ambiguities 
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exist over the power of tribunals to determine not just the applicable law, but equally the 
applicable rules of law.
717
 As discussed in chapter 4, in KSA, Res. 58 restricts choice of 
law, while Article 2 of SAL 2012 permits it.
718
  Does this mean that the private 
contractor‟s options are exhausted or can local courts be asked to decide a dispute, 
notwithstanding the absence of an arbitration clause, or to otherwise request the grant of 
provisional measures in aid of arbitration? Can such courts be situated in other countries, 
or is the power reserved to administrative courts? The lesson and answer is that Shariah 
law, like international law, can be the great equalizer in situations where exclusivity of 
state law is invoked or abused. 
As has been contemplated in this thesis, Shariah law does not necessarily provide 
justification for sovereignty related arbitrability or public policy defences, particularly 
when regulatory, administrative or political power is abused or unconstrained by 
considerations of justice, legality and good faith. Indeed, Shariah law may be compatible 
with international standards even when notions of sovereignty or public policy are not. 
Therefore, an „exclusive‟ approach to choice of law in KSA has a dramatically different 
undertone when it accommodates the supremacy of Shariah law, and in congruence with 
international law. By granting arbitrators‟ broad freedom to determine the applicable rules 
of law, of a more inclusive nature, a correct and just result can be reached. 
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Further, in consideration of the internationalised administrative contract, exclusivity 
seems to no longer be accepted where such commonly accepted principles of 
international and administrative law (“denial of justice” or “due process”) are violated, 
thereby creating a transnational accountability between national courts and international 
tribunals.  KSA has been exposed to comparative jurisprudence, decisions, and principles, 
which are shaping attitudes on the limits of unilateral authority, sovereignty and 
immunity. As discussed, countries like KSA remain reticent but not absolutely prohibitive 
of these developments, thus presenting opportunities for national reform and alignment 
with international standards. 
6.6   Lessons in the Role of Public Policy 
The role of public policy becomes the binding thread throughout this thesis. Governments 
and national courts are entitled to employ public policy arguments in exercising their 
sovereign autonomy, the autonomy and integrity of their legal system‟ and to do so in the 
public interest, at the domestic or international level. But state acts or unilateral 
administrative actions taken to protect matters of public policy do not escape legal 
constraint or judicial review.  
Courts in other jurisdictions permit the annulment of contracts, or arbitral awards, on 
public policy grounds but they set a high bar. Thus if national courts are entitled to annul 
and invalidate that which violates natural justice or key issues of public policy, the 
actions of a state entity should be held to the same standard. Thus, public policy 
considerations may provide justification for a state to modify their contractual 
commitment or frustrate an arbitration agreement without liability, only if reasonably 
- 316 - 
justified, and balanced against considerations of the rights and interests of the other party 
to contract. More importantly, this action must be traced to some original statutory 
warrant in the state context, and made subject to requirements of such as reasonableness, 
non-discrimination and proportionality.  
Moreover, the private party should at the very least to be able to challenge the decision or 
seek compensation before an independent court, that provides reasoned justification for 
its decision. This is entirely consistent with Shariah. The conflict rather is with the 
unbounded sovereign power of the political branches of the KSA government. But 
political exercises of power, sovereign or administrative, in or beyond the state, can be 
tempered by the “higher” principles of both international or Shariah without unduly 
encroaching upon the sovereign rights of the state, or the regulatory powers and functions 
of the administration. 
6.7  Prospects for Reform: A Discussion and Final Analysis 
The lessons above are closely intertwined, yet each offers individualised opportunities for 
reform.  A small reform in one area, such as publishing decisions of the Board, may instil 
more credibility in KSA‟s system, or alternatively, a large statement such as abolishment 
of Res. 58 may catapult KSA into the internationally recognized regional leader in 
arbitration that it strives to be. The prospects for reform in KSA are ripe but 
unpredictable. Generally speaking, reform should be focused on the attributes of strength 
in Shariah law.  Shariah law is compatible with international law, and unlike jurisdictions 
such as France and Egypt, KSA‟s extreme reverence and reliance on Shariah law should 
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provide parties with more assurance than not in contractual matters.  If properly applied 
and understood, Shariah law is a legal compass of morality, fairness, and justice.   
Prospects for reform are best directed to the inclusion of Shariah law experts in 
arbitration as well as a campaign to educate legal professionals on Shariah law. An 
ultimate suggestion is also the abolishment of Res. 58, or alternatively, a softening of 
Article 10(2) to include more ministerial exemptions and clear categorizations as well as 
procedures for administrative contracts that can be arbitrated.  Finally, reforms should be 
directed to revise understanding of public policy and limits to sovereignty. Better 
integration of Shariah law is the most surmountable reform. Reforms related to Res. 58, 
are admittedly more controversial, both procedurally and substantively.
719
   
Based on Resolution No. 58, all arbitration proceedings and awards involving a dispute 
arising under an administrative contract must apply Saudi law, but as has been suggested, 
this does not mean that KSA domestic law and Shariah law are indivisible, and to be 
treated as one-in-the-same. Nor do any choice of law questions have to presume that 
application of Shariah law is non-negotiable, while Saudi legislative law has a certain 
flexibility.  As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Shariah law does not distinguish between 
private or administrative contracts or parties, and instead endorses a mutual decision for 
every contractual provision by the parties themselves. Therefore, it would not endorse a 
restriction imposed by one party upon the other that an alternative set of laws may be the 
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- 318 - 
chosen law.  Alternatively, however, it would not allow for the abolition of Shariah law 
within the contract because that is the word and guidance of Allah. 
In addition to oversight of Shariah, Res. 58 provisions fail to take into account, the rise of 
the internationalised administrative contract as discussed in Chapter 5. Such contracts 
have encouraged a “softening” of KSA‟s grip on choice of law and venue provisions, 
within Res. 58 and Art. 10(2) of SAL 2012.  Despite the vulnerability of its sovereignty 
within these contracts, KSA is now prolifically using these public, commercial “hybrid” 
contracts for public works and concession projects. The nature of these contracts 
inherently involve international elements, which in turn, requires considerations of 
international customs, norms, treaties, private concepts, etc.; in addition to adherence to 
Shariah law.  Reliance on foreign expertise and resources, and its weakened domestic 
economy are placing KSA in a position where it has to clarify expectations of parties and 
rule of law in order to persuade foreign parties to agree to such contracts. In other words, 
KSA cannot evade international standards through hard-line limitations on arbitrability or 
overprotective use of sovereignty, and still participate in international economic 
expansion.  
The following discussions build on these concepts and the lessons above to offer 
procedural and substantive means of reform to the limitations on arbitrability of 
administrative contracts in KSA. 
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6.7.1 Consent Requirements as Obstacles: Overcoming Res 58 and Article 
10(2) of SAL 2012 
The researcher proposes the following reforms in Shariah trained arbitrator, promulgate 
necessary procedures for arbitration submission and an alignment of international legal 
concepts to Shariah principles, and educate parties, lawyers, and jurists on those mutual 
standards. 
As previously described, SAL 2012 has ushered in a modern wave of arbitration norms 
for the Saudi arbitration regime. This wave seems to be gathering acceptance and 
momentum, and is indicative of the „softening‟ occurring not only in judicial settings, but 
in legislative reforms such as SAL 2012.
720
 For instance, Article 2 of SAL 2012 
recognizes that international conventions might rightly allow the parties to select a 
domestic or foreign venue that applies the provisions of other, international laws.
721
 
Further, although Res. 58 facially does not allow for arbitration unless pre-approved by 
the Prime Minister, its substantive application, as evident in the below-mentioned 1979 
arbitration case or Ministerial examples, is not a foregone conclusion. 
As analysed throughout this thesis, current debates often focus on whether or not 
arbitration should be an acceptable practice, whether the practice can be confluent with 
Shariah law, and whether KSA is beginning to see a future of conciliation into 
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administrative contracts. Consent requirements can be overcome through abolishment of 
Res. 58, a relaxing of Art. 10(2), or a more strategic and predictable use of Shariah law. 
Case law illustrates that a softening in KSA‟s rigid approach to arbitration is already 
slowly occurring.
722
 Similar to paths being forged by Egypt and France, these cases are 
an integral foresight into prospective reform.  
In a rare occasion, in 1979, Saudi Arabia and a Swiss company proceeded to arbitration 
concerning a dispute over a Public Works Administrative Contract. The arbitration panel 
was headed by a Muslim arbitrator and Swiss law was applied.
723
 The award was in 
KSA‟s favour and enforcement of the award was readily obtained. KSA attributed the 
success of the arbitration, in-part, to the participation of a Muslim arbitrator who 
understood the sensitivities of Shariah law. Thus, demonstrating integration of Shariah 
law into international arbitration proceedings and supporting a key reform: the use of 
Shariah trained arbitrators should be a procedural mandate in international arbitration 
of administrative contracts involving KSA. 
As chapters 4 and 5 suggested, the rise of the internationalised administrative contract not 
only provides for cohesive use of both Shariah law and international law in resolving a 
disputes; but certain Ministries have been allowed to participate in arbitration of these 
types of contracts despite the otherwise prohibitive legislative provisions. Post-Res 58 
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Ministerial regulatory examples of the “waiving” of Prime Minister approval provide 
more contemporary precedent. The wording of these provisions, well after the 
establishment of Res 58, suggests an intentional and purposeful bypass of the permissions 
construct.
724
 It also endorses arbitration as a procedural matter, not as a threshold or 
capacity issue; establishing an argument that individual Ministries have found arbitration 
to be a useful tool in administrative contracts.  
For example is seen in Royal Decree No M/56 of 22/11/2005, which excluded obligation 
of preliminary consent for arbitration in the Saudi Arabian electricity regulation. Article 
13, paragraph 8 reads: “It is permissible to agree on settling any dispute or conflict 
arising between licensee and the authority through arbitration, according to the provisions 
of the Arbitration Regulation.”725 This could be considered a “blanket” authority for 
arbitration that does not specify the individual contract or license holders, but is an open 
authority for a specific category of contracts. This is reflective of the approach taken by 
France discussed in chapter 4. Certain categories of administrative contracts could be 
prime for arbitration proceedings, without the wholly restrictive tendencies of Res 58 or 
Article 10(2) of SAL 2012, which is the basis for another key reform: Continue to allow 
arbitration through individual Ministries, and clearly categorize not only the types of 
contracts that may be submitted to arbitration but promulgate necessary procedures. 
The most revealing potential precedent for bypassing or relaxing an approval requirement 
is found in a recent, and one of the few, published cases in Saudi Arabia between a Saudi 
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public entity and a western company who arbitrated a dispute over a procurement 
contract.
726
 The Board enforced an arbitral award in the foreign party‟s favour despite 
defences being raised regarding violations of public policy because of one of the 
arbitrators being a non-Muslim and the failure of the governmental authority to obtain 
prior approval for arbitration.  The Board rejected the defences, ordering the Saudi 
authority to pay SR 1.28.018.95 in favour of the claimant.
727
 The court held: 
[I]t stands to reason that justice entails the following; first, the subject matter 
of the dispute requires arbitrators to be experts in the subject matter of the 
dispute. Second, the Board of Grievances should subject the tribunal's 
decision to general principles, these principles are the sanctity of contract and 
that the general consensus among Muslim scholars that an arbitral tribunal's 
decision is binding.
728
 
The holding in this matter indicates a genuine understanding of respect of choice of law, 
fairness, and an open-mindedness to weighing all the facts of a matter to find the best 
outcome, rather than narrow-mindedly restricting all recognition and enforcement based 
on the lack of capacity via an approval requirement. Further, it shows a weighing or 
balancing of what principles of Shariah law or of the arbitration laws regard as the most 
important and reasonable on a case-by-case basis, i.e. despite the presence of a non-
Muslim arbitrator, the Board honored the decision of the panel, and re-enforced it with 
Shariah principles of justice and fairness, e.g. reflective of international contractual 
doctrines of „sanctity of contract‟, and the binding effect of arbitration. It encapsulates the 
                                                     
726
 Board of Grievances Case No. 235/2/Qhaf/1416 H Saudi Arabia 
727
 Ibid. 
728
 Ibid. 
- 323 - 
effective application of Shariah principles in international contractual matters and how 
they may come to the same or similar result as international law.  It also inspires another 
key reform: Align international legal concepts to Shariah principles, and educate parties, 
lawyers, and jurists on those mutual standards. 
Finally, in light of the research thus far, and as supported by analysis in chapters 4 and 5 
of Res. 58 and Art. 10(2) of SAL 2012, the researcher urges the procedural application of 
the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and justifiable reliance in any scenario where the Saudi 
government has agreed to arbitration, whether the Prime Minister has given ex ante 
consent.
 729
 
6.7.2 Public Policy As Obstacle To Substantive Reforms – Reframe KSA‟s 
perception of public policy, allow harmonisation with international 
standards with a more mature, transparent, and precedent based 
system of administrative law 
Beyond procedural reforms are the more complex substantive reforms. As learned from 
“Lessons” above, public policy is not a pretext for abuse of power or denial of justice.  
Substantive reform has two aspects: one is rights of parties, specifically the right to 
procedural due process and, possibly, a substantive legitimate expectation that a contract 
will be performed, or that a remedy for breach or unlawful unilateral action is accessible, 
e.g. arbitration and consent issues. The other is how far these rights should be balanced 
against public policy interests and protected by sovereign immunity. While private parties 
in administrative contracts have to accept that states have responsibilities to the public, 
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unilateral authority is only justified on public policy grounds providing it does not 
constitute an abuse of those power, judged by tests of Shariah, e.g. compensation and no 
contractual conditions which are excessively burdensome, even if state has right to 
modify contract due to change of circumstance [chapters 3, 4 and 5].  Therefore any 
prospective reforms pertaining to public policy must deal with protecting the rights of 
private parties against the interests of the state.   
As briefly discussed in chapters 4, examples of enforcement in arbitration matters serve 
well as a platform for analysis of public policy based reforms.  In addition to protecting 
rights of both private and public parties, enforcement engages doctrines of mutual 
jurisdictional respect, accountability for immunity, and reasonable limits to needless 
intervention.  The prospective reforms to substantive public policy issues in this section 
are not, therefore specific acts such as passage of legislative provisions, but comparative 
reflections of ways that KSA can reframe its own perception of public policy and how it 
can create new general, governmental practices and ideas.  
By drawing on the experience of other countries, one can reflect on the possible ways in 
which local laws may frustrate the arbitral process and undermine the legitimate 
expectations of arbitrating parties, including where, with relevance to the Saudi focus, 
local laws do not recognise the final authority of a validly constituted tribunal to 
determine its own jurisdiction or competence, e.g. ARAMCO and cases presented in 
chapters 4 and 5.
730
 However, in public policy considerations of outcomes in the choice 
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of national or international laws in deciding on the arbitrability of an administrative 
contract as well as the nature of an arbitral award, international case law introduces a way 
to delicately handle the rights of parties; and whether or not to give deference to a 
primary jurisdiction‟s authority to supervise and enforce or not enforce an arbitrated 
award.
 
Many jurisdictions have set a high bar for the use of public policy arguments and 
defences. As discussed in chapter 3, in France, for example, a Paris Court held in an 
arbitral award matter that the threshold for establishing a public policy breach should be 
set high, namely that the breach should be of a “flagrant, effective and concrete” 
character.
731 
In short, suggesting that any challenge to final arbitral award should be 
rejected unless grounds for a grave and serious breach of public policy can be 
established. 
The U.S. has several examples of giving deference to primary jurisdictions to a contract, 
while simultaneously considering public policy implications under the light of multiple 
applicable laws, i.e. international standards, the law of the contract, and public policy 
comparisons to the U.S.‟s own system. In each case the U.S. was serving as a secondary 
jurisdiction to the dispute. For example, in Baker Marine (Nigeria) Ltd v. Chevron 
(Nigeria) Ltd the U.S. court acknowledged the primary jurisdictions power to annul 
arbitral awards.
732 
The US court, as secondary jurisdiction, rejected hearing the matter 
because there was nothing about the Nigerian judgment that conflicted with US public 
policy and there were appellate remedies available to Baker Marine.
733
 In other words, 
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the U.S. court applied the facts and findings of the Nigerian court under Nigerian law to 
U.S. law. This would not be dissimilar to KSA reviewing an arbitral award through a lens 
of conciliation under Shariah law. 
Likewise, in the matter TermoRio SA Esp v. Electranta SP, the Court ruled that where the 
decision “tends clearly to undermine the public interest, the public confidence in the 
administration of law, or security for individual rights for personal liberty or of private 
property,” the secondary jurisdiction may involve itself, but if it does not, then the court 
should not meddle in the decision of the primary jurisdiction.
734
 
TermoRio, Baker Marine, and Pemex establish a perspective on how enforcement of 
arbitral awards, internationally will play out and what KSA could not only anticipate but 
prepare for in any reforms.  As seen in the case law, decisions by primary domestic 
courts, which violate basic principles of rights of parties, legitimate expectations, and 
administration of justice, concern the international community.  In contrast, decisions 
consistent with such notions may be upheld by secondary jurisdictions.  This would mean 
that provided Shariah law and KSA domestic principles were consistently, transparently 
applied to international norms, there would not, in-fact be a conflict of interest between 
KSA sovereignty and international standards in the arbitration of administrative contracts. 
It also means that situations like ARAMCO can be averted, without the use of Res. 58 or 
Article 10(2).  Most importantly, private parties deciding to enter into a contract or 
deciding whether to arbitrate, can look into the law and make an informed decision on 
whether to contract and the risks that may be associated with the contract.  
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Admittedly, and notwithstanding the above-cited cases, KSA‟s approach to sovereignty 
and its governing system is not without precedent. Other examples of anti-cooperative 
sovereign behaviour, beyond ARAMCO and Pemex exist that simultaneously legitimizes 
KSA‟s fears in relinquishment of sovereign control and its own protective behaviour 
[chapters 4 and 5].  In Fougerolle SA (France) v. Ministry of Defense of Syrian Arab 
Republic, an administrative tribunal in Syria refused to enforce two internationally 
granted arbitration awards because, they argued, no preliminary advice on the referral of 
the dispute to arbitration had been obtained from the competent committee of the Council 
of State, as required by Syrian law; thereby rendering the awards void because they 
violated Syrian law.
735
 Thus Syria post-imposed domestic law on an international 
arbitration or the laws of another jurisdiction. This is, the type of scenario that KSA both 
practices to its benefit and avoids to its detriment, leading to its overzealous reputation in 
anti-arbitration, interventionist behaviour.  
Case law demonstrates the Board‟s inclination to overrule or intervene in the will of the 
parties, or to substitute its own appreciation of Shariah on an arbitrary and inconsistent 
basis, e.g. lack of consistent standards of review and a discretionary mode of justice.
736
 
For instance, in the KSA case of Tohoma Construction Co Ltd. v. Hondi Construction Co. 
Ltd, involving an administrative contract for construction of a state Hospital.
737
 In 
Tohoma, the Board of Grievance not only reversed an award for compensation to the 
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other party based on public policy, they denied partial enforcement on the grounds that 
certain portions of the award violated riba.
738
 
Similar to the University case previously cited, the Board held steadfast to principles of 
Shariah law and subjective public policy. But, Shariah law would seemingly contradict 
the behaviour of the Board in this case because the parties in question autonomously 
agreed to the arbitration results, therefore honouring principles of Shariah law that the 
parties reach conciliation; but the Board unilaterally ignored the choice of the parties.  
This type of anti-Shariah decision-making can be altered through reform of the 
delegation of the Board‟s authority, clear laws delineating review authority, and increased 
cooperation with international tribunals in establishing not only matters of public policy 
but in educating arbitrators on Shariah law. 
All of the above cases demonstrate that the courts of other jurisdictions seem to exercise 
any “meddling” or intervention with an arbitral award with great caution and great 
reservation, even when it seems that an international individual private party would be at 
a significant disadvantage. Instead they look for bright line violations of international and 
public policy standards. The reason is a mutual transnational respect for sovereignty, 
public policy, and the responsibility of a state to its people; and how such practices have a 
purpose that at times can be prioritized over individual rights.  
In contrast, what can be gleaned from the sparse precedential proof in KSA is that the 
Board historically sees the arbitral tribunal as a sort of inferior court, and is determined to 
intervene in any rendered decision and exercise its authority and review as Tohoma 
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demonstrated.  However, case law also suggests that the source of the interventions in 
KSA most has to do with concerns of sovereignty, public policy, and Shariah law 
[chapters 3,4,5].  But, as has been presented in this study, public policy is subjective, 
therefore flexible; sovereignty is an accepted international principle but can be exercised 
in ways to accomplish maintaining a state‟s identity without full relinquishment of 
control; and Shariah law is not only compatible with international law but can be an 
effective means of overcoming self-interested acts of immunity in unilateral authority.  
Parties seeking to arbitrate an administrative contract within KSA still have a steep but 
not wholly insurmountable path to success. While KSA‟s grip seems to be „softening‟ on 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards from foreign jurisdictions; patterns of 
success can be readily seen where principles of Shariah law have been applied or where 
matters of an internationalised administrative contract are complicated enough to warrant 
the involvement of an international tribunal. Additionally, certain Ministries have been 
given leave to pursue arbitration in SAL 2012, certain provisions indicate openness to 
foreign law, and the new enforcement judge means a concerted effort to improve 
administrative justice. The new economic and policy path set forth for the Kingdom also 
gives hope in this respect. 
Suggested reforms in KSA, therefore, are not designed to dilute its sovereignty, public 
policy, or adherence to Shariah law; but instead to suggest more of a harmonisation to 
international standards, enshrouded in a more mature, transparent, and precedent based 
system of administrative law. The ultimate demonstration of discretion and sovereign 
strength in KSA will then be to acknowledge cooperation with other states in 
- 330 - 
internationalised administrative contracts, not just co-existence; as well as the true value 
of a cohesive governing structure. 
6.8   Reconciling Shariah Law with International Law 
Beyond public policy as a substantive reform, the reconciliation of Shariah law with 
international law is not only feasible, but results in shared moral and contractual 
principles equating to a robust system of administrative justice, and sovereignty 
tempered to economic cooperation to the benefit of all parties. Challenges to 
reconciliation, however, exist both on the side of KSA as well as their foreign partners; 
but can largely be attributed to a mistaken understanding Shariah law juxtaposed against 
a suspicion of anti-religious and cultural motivations [Chapters 4 and 5]. Reforms to any 
part of arbitrability of administrative contracts in KSA will only be successful if this 
reconciliation occurs.   
For example, the Western model of international arbitration, as we found in ARAMCO, is 
not always well suited to Islamic legal systems and principle.
739
 Additionally, the final 
arbitral award in Pemex includes a significantly large amount of interest, which similar 
to other KSA cases discussed in this thesis, may have violated Shariah principles of 
“riba” and “gharar”, thereby rendering the award unenforceable despite the appeal to 
choice of law.
740
 Adaptation of procedure and training on substantive application of 
Shariah law would rectify these types of situations. 
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Alternatively, we have now seen in the resolution of both ARAMCO and Pemex that a 
domestic court may try to leverage retroactivity in ways that are counter to international 
principles of law; such as due process right to appeal for a private party or legitimate 
expectations of dispute resolution to either an administrative court or an arbitration 
tribunal. In Pemex, a Court of secondary jurisdiction found an abuse of power, by 
applying the law of the primary jurisdiction thereby legitimizing the accountability role 
an arbitration tribunal may have on overcoming immunity for unlawful unilateral 
actions. Additionally, the Pyramids case illustrated that with the proper understanding, 
Shariah law can be effectively applied in compliance with international principles.
741
 
One published case
742
 within KSA between a non-Muslim investor and the Saudi 
Government, before the Board provides a glimmer of „what could be‟ through progressive 
reform.
743
 There, the Board upheld enforcement of an arbitration award based on an 
understanding of “the doctrine of necessity”, surprisingly, approving an award in favour 
of a foreign party despite finding that the award was inconsistent with public policy 
within the KSA. The Board gave a wide interpretation for public policy without being 
limited by domestic public policy.  Similar to the U.S. examples above, the Board 
demonstrated a deep understanding of multi-jurisdictional public policy interests. Shariah 
law principles would have supported this decision, including aversion to undue hardship 
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or unduly burdensome obligations and Islamic law‟s own understandings of “necessity” 
warranting change in action.
744
 This sets a strong precedent for the possibility of 
harmonisation of sovereignty and policy diversity in arbitration matters. 
6.9   Forecast for Institutional Reform of the Saudi Legal System: Balancing 
Rights and Shariah  
As has been suggested, Saudi Arabia‟s origins and grounding in Shariah law, is not 
inherently problematic, nor is its administrative civil law system.  In fact tenets of 
Shariah law are similar in spirit and function to international contractual standards, and 
therefore applicable to even internationalised administrative contracts. The reputational 
and functional problems arise for Saudi Arabia in the legal spaces between these 
elements. Saudi Arabia lacks a system of transparency, predictability, clear separation of 
powers, record-keeping, precedent, and institutional access for foreign partners. What this 
thesis has suggested is that Saudi Arabia does not have to relinquish its identity in 
sovereignty and Shariah law to better participate in arbitration practices; and that without 
reservation the researcher believes Saudi Arabia‟s economic future is utterly dependent 
on its ability to do so.  It must constructively deal with the inhibitions of Prime Minister‟s 
approval and issues of consent; it must enforce its own record-keeping practices 
including publication of cases and access for the public at large; and it must innovatively 
create a consistent and clear judicial system for administrative arbitration. The 
                                                     
744
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effectuated result would be a system that strategically wields international and domestic 
law, with the ultimate strength of Shariah law.  
This researcher concludes that the general treatment and classification of 
internationalised administrative contract often obscures the nature of the rights of the 
parties to the contract.  However, traditional notions of unilateral authority, fairness, 
mutuality, and consent in both Shariah and international law support unambiguousness 
and full disclosure in contractual arrangements, thereby suggesting that the path forward 
in KSA to resolving these questions would be a more fully developed administrative 
structure and transparent definition as well as clear doctrines on the delegation of 
administrative authority. Strategically designed reforms would help to advance the 
credibility, predictability, and success of KSA‟s administrative law and system of 
arbitration. 
Specifically, reforms such as: 1) a dual judicial tract modelled after France, where there is 
clear separation of powers, published case law, and delegated authority; 2) use of an 
impartial and properly trained outside review tribunal who could marry lex mercatiora 
beginnings, transnational ideals, and substantive harmonization into a standing review 
tribunal that fully integrates substantive Shariah law; and 3) transparency.   
Due to KSA‟s governing structure, including religious hierarchy, emphasis on 
independent judicial reasoning, intentional lack of codification and un-delegated 
governmental authority, transparency is the general reform that KSA will continue to 
grapple with the most in the near future. Transparency shall only occur when Saudi 
Arabia makes a conscious decision to not only establish procedures for publishing laws 
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and case law, but in enforcing such provisions. Currently, the Board has directive from 
the Council to publish their decisions, but religious reticence and communal emphasis on 
itjihad reasoning on a case-by-case basis are overwhelming dissuading factors.
745
 
Creating a system of stare decisis or published judicial reasoning does not inherently 
have a binding effect, but promotes a cooperative process with which parties can better 
anticipate how to properly form a contract or avoid an unnecessary dispute. Chapter 2 
taught that Egypt and France provide such examples through their legislative and judicial 
structures and processes.  Saudi Arabia may not be as comprehensive, but it can still 
provide an opaque to transparent system that is more inviting to participants.
746
 This 
would strengthen its credibility and lend itself to a more profound regional and 
international reputation, even for its newly created Commercial Arbitration Centre.
747
  
6.10 Conclusion 
The objective of this thesis is to contribute to the growth and development of arbitration 
of administrative contracts in Saudi Arabia, by investigating the tensions of legitimate 
expectations of parties through the tenets of Shariah law and the normative practices of 
administrative law. The preceding chapters have navigated us through this subject by 
discussing constitutionality, separation of powers, duties of the Board, the importance of 
Shariah law, the legitimate expectations of parties, and how they intersect to suggestions 
of where to go next in the legal progression of such issues. What has become clear is that 
the theatre in which economic vitality and diversification of industry can occur for KSA 
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is one which entertains the growing practice of hybrid agreements such as PPPs, and 
commercial cooperation; and provides a welcoming environment for contractual partners.   
Primarily, this author would propose Saudi Arabia to foster accommodation, 
harmonisation and mutual recognition between different legal systems and arbitral 
frameworks. In other words it must continue to “soften its grip” on both domestic and 
foreign arbitral proceedings and awards involving administrative contracts, through 
learning, education, transfer of legal concepts, the spread of administrative rule of law or 
international administrative law. But this relationship of trust cannot be built in a silo. It 
requires the full participation of the international partners.  
To achieve international cooperation or secure individual rights of parties, one sees that 
for law to be effective, and enforceable, it must be perceived as legitimate by those states 
who consent to be bound to it. This is a fundamental premise of the contractual model of 
international law, which is based on the formal equality of states.  This idea can be 
replicated at level of administration and administrative adjudication of a public contract: 
public authority can only be exercised in the public interest if it is exercised lawfully, but 
also binds the authority to fulfil an expectation on which there is justifiable reliance, in 
accordance with the private law concepts of mutuality and equity, values deeply 
engrained in the traditions of Islamic law. In this sense, international and local laws, or 
foreign arbitration and domestic enforcement, should not be seen as in conflict with the 
other.  Rather arbitral tribunals and national courts, across and between legal systems, can 
be seen to interact through a process of judicial dialogue, competition and mutual 
recognition.  
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Saudi Arabia has to move from so called procedural rules “blind” to local laws and 
customs, to a more pluralistic idea of arbitration as one able to accommodate religious 
and cultural diversity. If Saudi Arabia is to bind itself to harmonised choice of law, 
conflict rules, and international principles; thereby preventing repudiation through 
adherence to administrative fairness, and non-retroactivity, it must do so not by waiver of 
consent via Resolution 58 or Article 10(2), or by use of over-reaching sovereignty; but 
through a positive decision to participate in arbitration in accordance with principles of 
procedural and substantive fairness. Only then shall the international arbitration 
frameworks and tribunals have to accord greater respect and recognition to the sovereign 
authority of Saudi institutions and the constitutional supremacy of Shariah under its 
national law. If it continues in its efforts, Saudi Arabia will then not only succeed in 
diversifying its economy, it may also emerge as a regional leader in arbitration. 
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